Liquidity timing skills for hedge funds by Ji Luo (312306)
  
 
Liquidity timing skills for hedge funds 
 
 
by 
Ji Luo 
Doctoral Thesis to be inserted 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the award of  
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University 
December 2014 
© by Ji Luo 2014
 ii 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
      I am very grateful to both of my supervisors, Dr. Kai-Hong Tee and Professor 
Baibing Li. I thank them for their constant support and guidance throughout my PhD. 
Their availability, encouragement, advice and continued support have been invaluable. 
      I would also like to thank the School of Business and Economics, Loughborough 
University, for funding this research through studentship.  
      I also thank Bill Fung, Yakov Amihud, David Hsieh, Lubos Pastor, Robert 
Stambaugh, Stephan Kessler, Robert Goldstein, Francis Longstaff, Christian 
Wiehenkamp, Alan White, Michele Leonardo Bianchi, John Kambhu, Solnik Bruno, 
Collin-Dufresne Pierre, Lucio Sarno, Angelo Ranaldo, Richard Lyons, Martin Evans, 
Jens Dick-Nielsen, Narayan Naik, Vikas Agarwal, Ben Marshall, David Lando, 
Mancini Loriano, Tim Simin, Charles Cao, Jan Wrampelmeyer, Lukas Menkhoff, 
Maik Schmeling, Massimiliano Caporin, Nick Nguyen, Danielle Lange, Yong Chen, 
Ioannis Vrontos, Vikas Agarwal, Georges Hubner, Daniel Capocci, George Aragon, 
Jack Bao, Craig Holden, Richard Roll, Kingsley Fong, Hany Shawky, Richard Taffler, 
Leonard Kostovetsky, Andreas Park, Elvira Sojli, Robert Whitelaw, Brian Negus, 
Zhaohui Chen Tarun Chordia, Marti Subrahmanyam and Stephen Brown for kind 
advice and help. 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
Abstract 
      In the thesis, we investigate whether hedge fund managers have liquidity timing 
skills in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity market, 
respectively. Managers with the liquidity timing skills can strategically adjust hedge 
funds’ exposure to the target financial market based on their forecasts about the future 
changes in market liquidity.  
      We find empirical evidence that hedge funds in certain categories have the skills 
to time the liquidity levels in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and 
commodity market. We conduct a range of robustness tests, which show that hedge 
funds still exhibit liquidity timing skills after controlling for the factors that may 
affect timing ability. In particular, our findings are robust to the usage of leverage, 
funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions, hedge funds trades on market 
liquidity, financial crisis, hedge fund data biases, market return and volatility timing, 
liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors. We also conduct 
bootstrap analysis to ensure the results are not dependent on the normality assumption. 
Our investigation is helpful to understand the importance of market liquidity to hedge 
funds’ professional portfolio management. 
 
Keywords: Hedge Funds, Liquidity Timing, Fixed Income, Foreign Exchange, 
Commodity, Bootstrap 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
      The investigation of whether professional investment managers have managerial 
skills to forecast and use the changes in market condition has attracted great interest 
(Cao et al., 2013). There has been a great deal of literature that investigates market 
timing skills in different financial markets. Market timing is managers’ ability to 
adjust their portfolios’ market exposure based on managers’ forecasts about future 
market changes (Chen, 2007). The hedge fund industry, which has been growing fast 
during last two decades, provides a fruitful environment for research on active 
portfolio management of hedge fund managers who advertise themselves as market 
timers with market timing skills (Chen, 2007). 
      Chen and Liang (2007) find that hedge fund managers can time market return, 
market volatility and jointly time market return and volatility at both aggregate level 
and individual fund level. Chen (2007) introduces a definition of the focus market in 
which a hedge fund has most active trading and shows that some hedge funds have 
market return timing ability in their focus markets. Recently, Cao et al. (2013) find 
that equity-oriented hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills in the equity 
market. Considering that hedge funds can invest various financial markets, we extend 
the research on hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the equity market to 
the other financial markets, including the fixed income market, foreign exchange 
market and commodity market. In this thesis, we extend timing ability to different 
markets by investigating whether hedge fund managers can show liquidity timing 
ability in these financial markets by adjusting hedge funds’ market exposure based on 
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managers’ forecasts about liquidity conditions of these financial markets. In particular, 
this thesis focuses on hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market, foreign exchange market and commodity market, respectively. To our best 
knowledge, the research issues of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in 
these financial markets have not been investigated in the existing literature. This 
research also has important practical implications. It helps us evaluate the managers’ 
timing strategies in the financial markets, which allows us to have a better 
understanding of the composition and attribution of hedge funds’ performance and 
thus to have a better understanding of the role of market liquidity in hedge fund 
portfolio management. 
      Liquidity is defined as the ability to trade large quantities of an asset quickly, at 
low cost, and without moving the asset price (Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam, 2005; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Liquidity risk measured by the covariation of 
hedge fund returns with innovations in market liquidity plays an important role in 
influencing hedge funds’ performance (Sadka, 2010). During a period of financial 
crisis, hedge funds could be forced to liquidate by margin calls, which could make 
their initial losses even worse (Khandani and Lo, 2011). Thus, a skillful hedge fund 
manager with successful liquidity timing skills can accurately forecast the 
deterioration of market liquidity and reduce the hedge fund’s market exposure before 
the event. Hedge fund industry provides an ideal platform to investigate managers’ 
liquidity timing skills due to the importance of liquidity and hedge funds’ time-
varying market exposure. Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate whether hedge 
funds’ superior performance is attributed to hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity 
timing skills in the financial markets. 
      In the rest of this chapter, we briefly outline each of the following chapters. 
      In Chapter 2, we give a brief introduction to hedge funds. Based on Fung and 
Hsieh (1999), hedge funds are considered as private investment vehicles for wealthy 
institutional and individual investors. Hedge funds are usually organized as limited 
partnerships, in which hedge fund managers are general partners and institutional and 
individual investors are limited partners (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). Edwards (1999) 
states that, in contrast to other institutional investors, hedge funds are not restricted by 
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short sales or leverage and can have concentrated positions in a single asset. Hedge 
funds with different styles may focus on different markets to apply their trading 
strategies. Morningstar supports 31 hedge fund categories that are located in six broad 
category groupings (Morningstar methodology paper, 2012). Due to the freedom of 
regulations applied to hedge funds, hedge fund data could have some biases, which 
include survivorship bias, backfill bias, selection bias, look-ahead bias, multi-period 
sampling bias, funding bias and liquidity bias.  
      Fung and Hsieh (2004) explore the shortcomings of existing hedge fund indexes 
used as benchmarks for hedge fund returns. Fung and Hsieh (2004) propose a seven-
factor model to benchmark hedge fund returns. The seven-factors include an equity 
market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, a bond 
trend-following factor, a currency trend-following factor, and a commodity trend-
following factor. 
      In Chapter 3, we describe various liquidity measures, including liquidity measures 
of high frequency spread, liquidity measures of low frequency spread, liquidity 
measures of high frequency price impact, liquidity measures of low frequency price 
impact and liquidity measures of other methods. Liquidity risk plays an important role 
to determine cross-sectional hedge fund returns (Sadka, 2010). Sadka (2010) 
measures market systematic liquidity risk by using the covariance between hedge 
fund returns and the unexpected changes in aggregate market liquidity. Kessler and 
Scherer (2011) add a global latent liquidity risk factor as an additional factor to 
evaluate hedge funds’ performance and increase the factor model’s explanatory power. 
Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) find that, during the period of liquidity crisis, the 
increase of the margins of trading orders significantly enlarges the probability of 
hedge funds’ contagion, which means the correlation among hedge funds’ 
performance is higher than that expected from the fundamental model. 
      Chapter 4 focuses on the timing ability literature. Timing ability is a type of 
dynamic asset allocation strategy which adjusts portfolios’ market exposure based on 
managers’ forecast about future market conditions (Admati et al., 1986; Chen, 2007; 
Chen and Liang, 2007). Hedge funds are likely to show market timing skills with their 
dynamic investment strategies that cause hedge funds’ time-varying market exposure 
(Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Patton and Ramadorai, 2013). It is important to 
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investigate hedge fund managers’ market timing skills. This is because the 
investigation helps evaluate managers’ market timing strategies in the financial 
markets and allows us to have a better understanding of the composition and 
attribution of hedge fund managers’ performance (Chen, 2007). Chapter 4 gives a list 
of different timing models that include market return timing models, market volatility 
timing model, joint market return and volatility timing models and market liquidity 
timing model. So far, only a few studies are related to the hedge fund managers’ 
market timing skills, and the findings of timing skills are mixed. 
      In Chapter 5, we investigated a new application of market timing by testing 
whether hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market 
liquidity by strategically adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to fixed income market 
based on managers’ forecasts about future fixed income market liquidity. The reason 
that we investigate hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market is because hedge funds are actively managed in this financial market and fixed 
income market liquidity risk management is important to hedge funds’ professional 
management.  
      To measure the liquidity level in the fixed income market, we use the difference 
between the corporate bond spreads and the spreads of credit default swaps (CDS) 
(Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005; Gintschel and Wiehenkamp, 2009; Kessler and 
Scherer, 2011). The yields of corporate bonds and the corresponding Treasury bill 
rates are obtained from Datastream. The CDS spreads are downloaded from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. The hedge fund data is obtained from Morningstar. Fung and Hsieh 
(2004)’ seven-factor model is used as the benchmark for hedge funds’ performance. 
Concerning the data’s availability and time overlap, we use the data period from 
March 2005 to December 2012.  
      We find that managers of hedge funds in directional debt, long/short debt and 
long-only debt categories have successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market. Furthermore, we have conducted a range of robustness tests that show hedge 
funds still exhibit liquidity timing ability in these tests. In particular, our findings are 
robust to the usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions, 
hedge funds trades on the fixed income market liquidity, financial crisis, hedge fund 
data biases, fixed income market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, 
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systematic stale pricing, option factors and bootstrap analysis. Our investigation is 
useful to understand the importance of fixed income market liquidity to hedge funds’ 
professional portfolio management.  
      In Chapter 6, we focus on the foreign exchange market and investigate whether 
hedge fund managers have the skills to time foreign exchange market liquidity by 
adjusting hedge fund portfolios’ exposure to the foreign exchange market based on 
managers’ forecasts about future foreign exchange market liquidity. For this end, the 
liquidity measure in the foreign exchange market is firstly computed as the average of 
percent bid-ask spread of the major currencies. The currencies’ bid-ask prices are 
downloaded from Datastream. Concerning the Euro, which was introduced as an 
accounting currency to the worldwide financial markets on 1 January 1999, we use 
the period of data from January 1999 to December 2012. The benchmark for hedge 
funds’ performances is taken as the seven-factor of Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-
factor model and a foreign exchange market factor proposed by Boyson, Stahel and 
Stulz (2010). The foreign exchange market factor is the change in the trade-weighted 
U.S. dollar exchange rate index. 
      We find that managers of hedge funds in event, distressed securities, event-driven, 
global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative value and debt arbitrage 
categories show successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market. 
Furthermore, we have carried out a range of robustness tests that show hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing skills remain unchanged. In particular, our findings are robust to the 
usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions, hedge funds 
trades on the foreign exchange market liquidity, financial crisis, hedge fund data 
biases, foreign exchange market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, 
systematic stale pricing, option factors and bootstrap analysis. 
      In Chapter 7, we explore the commodity market and investigate whether hedge 
fund managers exhibit the liquidity timing skills in the commodity market by 
adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the commodity market based on managers’ 
forecasts about commodity market liquidity. We adopt Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity 
measure to compute commodity market illiquidity. Amihud (2002) introduces an 
illiquidity measure that is the ratio of daily absolute asset return to its daily trading 
volume. In order to get liquidity measure, the commodity market illiquidity measure 
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is multiplied by minus one. In order to evaluate hedge fund performances, we adopt a 
benchmark that includes the seven-factors in Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model and a commodity market factor used by Agarwal and Naik (2004), Capocci, 
Corhay and Hubner (2005), Aragon (2007), Chen (2007), Meligkotsidou, Vrontos and 
Vrontos (2009) and Chen (2011). The commodity market factor is measured by the 
month-end returns of Standard and Poor Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P 
GSCI). All the above commodity related data is obtained from Datastream. 
Concerning data availability, we adopt the period of data from January 1994 to 
December 2012.  
      We find the evidence that managers of hedge funds in event, distressed securities, 
event-driven, relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage categories 
have liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. Furthermore, we have carried 
out a range of robustness tests and hedge funds still show evidence of liquidity timing 
skills. In particular, our findings are robust to the usage of leverage, funding 
constraints, investor redemption restrictions, hedge funds trades on the commodity 
market liquidity, financial crisis, hedge fund data biases, commodity market return 
and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing, option factors and 
bootstrap analysis. 
      In Chapter 8, we summarize those hedge funds with liquidity timing skills, which 
are found in empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7. Based on the description of investing 
strategies for hedge fund categories, we interpret the reasons why those hedge funds 
show liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and 
commodity market, respectively. We conducts tests to investigate whether the 
liquidity timing skills found in empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7 can be attributed to hedge 
fund managers’ timing skills in the equity market. We check the correlations between 
liquidity measures in different financial markets and the correlations after the start of 
recent financial crisis. We find that the equity market liquidity measure is not highly 
related with liquidity measures in other financial markets. Furthermore, we examine 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills after controlling for the effect of 
managers’ liquidity timing skills in the equity market. We find that our findings that 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign 
exchange market and commodity market are driven by the skills of timing equity 
market liquidity. 
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      Finally, Chapter 9 gives a summary of the main findings and suggestions on future 
research. We propose three future research areas: one is to compare hedge fund 
managers’ liquidity timing skills in the financial markets by using different liquidity 
measures; the second is to investigate hedge fund managers’ simultaneous liquidity 
timing skills in multiple financial markets; the third is to compare with the results of 
liquidity timing skills by adopting other commonly-used hedge fund databases. 
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Chapter 2 
Hedge funds 
 
2.1 Introduction 
      This chapter gives an introduction to hedge funds and hedge fund data. Based on 
Fung and Hsieh (1999), hedge funds are generally considered as private investment 
vehicles for wealthy institutional and individual investors. According to the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, participators are limited to at most 500 
‘qualified investors’, including individual investors who have at least $5 Million to 
invest in hedge funds and institutional investors with capital of at least $25 Million 
(Brown and Goetzmann, 2001). Normally, hedge funds are organized as limited 
partnerships, in which the hedge fund managers are general partners and institutional 
and individual investors are limited partners (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). To ensure the 
common economic benefit for investors and managers, hedge fund managers usually 
take a portion of their own wealth to invest in the hedge funds. The fees charged by 
the investors consist of the fixed management fee and performance-based fee. The 
performance-based fee, which is significantly higher than fixed management fee, is 
paid to successful hedge fund managers. Although hedge funds influence the market 
dramatically, little about what they really do is understood publicly. Brown and 
Goetzmann (2001) state that the term ‘hedge fund’ seems to imply market neutral and 
low risk investment strategies, whereas hedge funds appear to have a high level of 
risk because of the extensive use of leverage.  
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      The term ‘hedge fund’ was introduced in a 1966 Fortune magazine article that 
described the activities of a fund, formed by Alfred Winslow Jones and commonly 
considered as the first hedge fund (Caldwell, 1995). According to Caldwell (1995), 
the first hedge fund was founded by Jones in 1949 and the primary strategy of the 
hedge fund was taking long-short equity positions and leveraging. Brown and 
Goetzmann (2001) find that the first hedge fund has two general characteristics. The 
first was ‘market neutral’ by taking long positions in securities that are undervalued 
and short positions in securities that are overvalued. The net effect of long-short 
positions was to leverage the limited investment resources to make large bets. The 
second characteristic was the use of an incentive fee that was set at 20% of total 
realized profit without considering any fixed management fee.  
      Fung and Hsieh (1999) state that another group of funds, commodity trading pools, 
are often considered as being in the same investment universe as hedge funds. 
Although commodity trading pools have similar structure to the hedge fund 
partnerships, they are normally operated by commodity trading advisors (CTAs). 
CTAs are individuals or firms, registering with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). CTAs not only deal with customer funds, but also provide 
trading advice for future contracts and options on futures contracts. Traditionally, 
CTA funds are restricted to trade futures contracts primarily, which is the main 
distinction from hedge funds. However, nowadays, CTAs are less regulated and often 
make transactions in the over-the-counter securities market with derivative 
instruments, which blur the distinctions between CTA funds and hedge funds. The 
development of the futures markets means that the hedge funds have become 
significant participants in most global futures exchanges (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). 
Consequently, under the Commodity and Exchange Act (CEA), a hedge fund must 
register as a commodity pool to trade futures and options in a futures exchange. Also, 
hedge funds are subject to regulation as commodity pool operators according to the 
National Futures Association (NFA) and the CFTC (Edwards, 1999). 
      The differences in the characteristics of returns between hedge funds and mutual 
funds are mainly due to the differences in investment strategies adopted by hedge 
funds and mutual funds. For instance, hedge funds apply dynamic trading strategies; 
on the contrary, mutual funds usually use a static strategy, buy-and-hold (Fung and 
Hsieh, 1999). Edwards (1999) states that, in contrast to mutual funds and other 
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institutional investors, hedge funds are not restricted by short sales or leverage and 
can have concentrated positions in a single firm, industry or sector. The legal 
framework surrounding mostly unregulated hedge funds has a clear purpose that 
hedge funds are limited to those sophisticated and wealthy investors who can assess 
the risks of hedge funds (Edwards, 1999). Under the Securities Act 1933, firms that 
issue publicly traded securities need to register with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and disclose reports in order to make sure that these firms provide 
all relevant information to the general public. However, according to the safe harbour 
provision of Rule 506 in Regulation D, a hedge fund may claim that it is at the status 
of a private placement for the purpose of being exempt from disclosure requirements 
and most registrations. The Securities Exchange Act 1934 allows the SEC to regulate 
those securities brokerage firms with potential conflicts. However, if hedge funds 
only trade by using their own investment accounts, then they usually do not need to 
register as a broker-dealer and cover the relevant cost of reporting requirements (Fung 
and Hsieh, 1999).  Furthermore, when a hedge fund has less than 100 investors, it is 
exempt from sections 3(c) (1) and 3(c) (7) of the Investment Company Act 1940. And 
hedge funds can have unlimited number of individual and institutional investors if all 
individual investors have at least $5 million to invest in hedge funds and institutional 
investors hold the value of capital under management at least $5 million (Edwards, 
1999). The hedge fund fees consist of an annual fixed management fee of 1%-2% and 
an inventive fee that ranges from 5% to 25% of annual profit. Typically, the inventive 
fee is benchmarked at 0% annual return or against a chosen index such as the U.S. 
treasury rate (Edwards, 1999). In terms of the structure of compensation, it usually 
includes a ‘high watermark’ provision under which the past unmet thresholds should 
be added to current ones (Brown and Goetzmann, 2001). According to Edwards 
(1999), the advantages of hedge funds’ legal environment are that they can choose 
investments and speculative strategies restricted to other funds, avoid the costs 
attributed to regulations and use any fee structure to reach optimization.  
 
2.2 Styles 
      Financial instruments used by hedge fund managers are broad and cover many 
different markets. Hedge funds with different styles may focus on different markets to 
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apply their trading strategies, which emphasises the importance of distinguishing 
hedge fund styles. In order to investigate the differences in styles among hedge funds, 
Brown and Goetzmann (2001) address three questions. First, are there basic styles that 
hedge funds adopt? Second, are there styles among hedge funds that are meaningful to 
individual and institutional investors? Third, are there any trends among these hedge 
fund styles that analysts and investors should know? They find that there are many 
different styles and about 20% of the cross-sectional return variability is attributed to 
the differences in hedge fund styles. Given the importance of stylistic differences 
among hedge funds, Brown and Goetzmann (2001) conclude that it is crucial for 
successful investors to use proper style analysis and style management to make 
investment decisions in the hedge fund market.  Fung and Hsieh (1997) provide a 
quantitative method that is based on hedge fund returns to classify hedge fund styles. 
Applying principal component analysis, which is based on correlations among hedge 
fund returns, to group funds, Fung and Hsieh (1997) find that about 45% of the 
variation in hedge fund performance can be explained by the first five principal 
components in the analysis. Gibson and Gyger (2007) investigate the style 
classification and consistency of hedge funds by applying a hard clustering procedure 
and the principal component analysis. Although it is usual to assume that the styles 
are consistent, investment styles used by hedge fund managers could vary over time 
and differ from the initial styles (Gibson and Gyger, 2007). Gibson and Gyger (2007) 
do not find any significant relation between hedge funds’ performance and their style 
consistency.  
      Hedge funds’ data used in this thesis is obtained from the database of Morningstar. 
The ways Morningstar uses to assign a category to each hedge fund include reviewing 
the hedge fund’s memorandum document, manager-provided investment-strategy 
descriptions and supporting data, conversing with hedge fund managers, carrying out 
cluster analysis and analysing portfolio statistics from surveys (Morningstar 
methodology paper, 2012). The principles of the classification system applied by 
Morningstar are as follows: individual hedge funds in the same category adopt similar 
strategies to generate values and behave more similarly to one another in the same 
category than to hedge funds in other categories; categories consist of enough 
constituents, which can be used for comparisons among peer group hedge funds and 
the differences among categories are meaningful to hedge fund investors and helpful 
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for investors to pursue for investing purposes (Morningstar methodology paper, 2012). 
According to the Morningstar methodology (2012), Morningstar supports 31 hedge 
fund categories, which can be located in six broad category groupings: directional 
equity (Asia/Pacific long/short equity, bear-market equity, China long/short equity, 
emerging-markets long/short equity, Europe long/short equity, global long/short 
equity, U.S. long/short equity, U.S. long/short small-cap equity, emerging markets 
long-only equity and long-only equity), directional debt (long/short debt and long-
only debt), event (distressed securities, event-driven and merger arbitrage), global 
derivatives (currency, global macro, systematic futures and volatility), multistrategy 
(multistrategy, long-only other, fund of funds – debt, fund of funds – equity, fund of 
funds – event, fund of funds – macro/systematic, fund of funds – multistrategy and 
fund of funds – relative value) and relative value (convertible arbitrage, debt arbitrage, 
diversified arbitrage and equity market neutral).  
 
2.3 Biases 
      The data underlying the performance of hedge funds is subject to biases as the 
hedge fund industry is relatively de-regulated. This implies that no strict enforcement 
is put in place on disclosing hedge funds’ performance data and information. If these 
data biases have not been carefully considered and dealt with, results related to hedge 
funds will not be accurate. The following section will discuss some data biases that 
exist in hedge funds and some methods that can be adopted to reduce the effects of 
data biases.  
      Fung and Hsieh (2000) state that, normally, hedge fund data sold by databases 
only includes information for live hedge funds that are still operating.  It is rational to 
assume that subscribers to these hedge fund data services are only interested in those 
hedge funds that accept new capital. Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) reveal that the 
occurrence of survivorship bias is attributed to the reason that the dataset excludes all 
or part of returns for dead or dissolved hedge funds. Since dead hedge funds normally 
have very poor returns, survivorship bias could lead to a high estimation for hedge 
funds’ performances. To alleviate the effect of survivorship bias, Cao, Chen, Liang 
and Lo (2013) include both live and dead hedge funds’ returns to measure their 
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performances. Although hedge fund returns in the database can go back to November 
1977, they focus on the data from January 1994 onward for the reason that the 
database does not remain dead hedge funds before 1994, which induces survivorship 
bias for the early period. These methodologies that are used to alleviate the effect of 
survivorship bias have been widely applied (Carpenter and Lynch, 1999; Getmansky, 
Lo and Makarov, 2004; Chen, 2007; Eling and Faust, 2010; Avramov, Kosowski, 
Naik and Teo, 2011). Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) state that 
survivorship bias includes two subsets: termination and self-selection biases. 
Basically, there are two reasons for hedge funds to drop out of the database. One is 
that they cease to exist. The other reason is that some hedge funds voluntarily stop 
reporting. According to economical and statistical results obtained by Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), these two types of bias, terminating and self-
selection biases, appear to offset with each other. 
      According to Fung and Hsieh (2000), when a new hedge fund is added into a 
database, its historical returns are often backfilled, which is called backfill bias or 
instant history bias. The backfill bias happens because hedge fund managers can use 
historical returns that are backfilled into the databases to do advertisements if they 
have good track records. Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) find that the common practice 
to control for backfill bias is dropping the first 12 or 24 monthly hedge fund returns. 
They adopt another method by minimizing the period between the inception data of a 
hedge fund and its first entry date into the database to control for backfill bias. They 
calculate the period between a hedge fund’s inception date and its date when it was 
added into the database. A hedge fund can be considered as non-backfilled if the 
period is below 180 days. Cao et al. (2013) find that the median incubation period, 
which is the difference between a hedge fund’s inception date and the date when the 
hedge fund was added to the database, TASS, is 23 months on average. To eliminate 
or reduce the effect of backfill bias, they discard the first 23 monthly returns from 
each hedge fund.  Furthermore, Cao et al. (2013) found unchanged inference by 
deleting the first 12 or 24 months from each hedge fund. In generally, the method 
used to mitigate the effect of backfill bias is eliminating the first 12 monthly returns 
for each hedge fund (Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Patton, 2009; Aggarwal and 
Jorion, 2010; Eling and Faust 2010; Avramov, et al. 2011; Fung and Hsieh, 2011; 
Siegmann and Stefanova, 2011; Teo, 2011). 
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      A third party needs to receive permission from a hedge fund manager before 
releasing information about the hedge fund (Fung and Hsieh, 2000). According to 
Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), since it is voluntary for fund managers to report 
information to a database, the selection bias may lead to upward bias. However, 
according to the finding by Fung and Hsieh (1997), the selection bias for hedge funds 
should be limited as some hedge funds with superior performance will not report their 
information. Both of the top and bottom performing hedge funds have less incentive 
to report their information to the database. Furthermore, even if some funds are 
excluded, those hedge funds that still report to the database must present strong 
persistence of performance to make bias results (Asness, Krail and Liew, 2001).  
      Chen and Liang (2007) state that the look-ahead bias, which is one type of 
selection bias, occurs when the observed returns of a hedge fund are conditional on 
the hedge fund’s survival. An unconditional expected return could be obtained by 
multiplying a weighting factor by the observed return. The weighting factor is 
calculated by dividing the unconditional probability of hedge fund survival by the 
conditional probability.  
      Fung and Hsieh (2000) state that multi-period sampling bias exists because 
researchers often require that a hedge fund must have sufficient historical 
performance information before it can be included in a sample for a study. After 
testing the effect of requiring hedge funds with a minimum return history on the 
average returns, Fung and Hsieh (2000) conclude that multi-period sampling bias has 
very little influence.  
      Funding bias occurs because hedge funds that do not receive funding can never be 
observed (Ang, Rhodes-Kropf and Zhao, 2008). However, investors should not care 
about a hedge fund without receiving funding because the hedge fund is not an 
approachable investment vehicle to investors. Denvir and Hutson (2006) state that 
liquidity bias occurs to disappearing hedge funds that choose to stop reporting in the 
lead up to liquidation. According to Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), 
the influence from liquidity bias is limited.  
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2.4 Risks 
      Risk management is always one of the key duties for hedge fund managers. 
According to Lo (2001), to fully capture hedge funds’ risk exposures, traditional risk 
management methods, such as mean-variance, beta or value-at-risk (VaR), are not 
good enough. Brooks and Kat (2002) reveal that hedge fund indices show higher 
kurtosis and lower skewness than stocks and bonds, which indicates that the 
distributions of hedge fund indices have fat tails. Malkiel and Saha (2005) confirm the 
finding that hedge funds in many categories show negative skewness and high 
kurtosis. They use the Jarque-Bera test to investigate the normality of distribution for 
hedge funds. According to the results, the hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected 
by most hedge funds. Lo (2001) lists four kinds of limitations in using VaR as a 
measure of hedge funds’ risks. First, VaR only focuses on the risk attributed to tails of 
hedge fund returns, which cannot fully capture the risks that hedge funds expose to. 
Second, as a statistical measure of risk, VaR ignores the magnitude of loss by 
considering the tail probability. Third, it is difficult to evaluate VaR without taking 
additional economic structure into account. Finally, VaR, an unconditional risk 
measure, is less reasonable than those conditional risk measures to capture hedge 
funds’ active risk management.  
      Hedge funds are free to trade any quantity of assets they like, take long or short 
position in any security, hold different leverage ratios and change investment 
strategies according to their interests. Therefore, hedge-fund managers can adopt 
dynamic strategies to meet their investment objects, inducing dynamic risk (Lo, 2001). 
According to Lo (2001), although liquidity risk and credit risk are different for hedge 
funds, they interact with each other, such as the problems caused by Long-Term 
Capital Management in August/September 1998. Leverage can not only expand small 
profit into large profit, but also extend the scale of potential losses. When the values 
of collaterals decline, investors may withdraw credits quickly. Investors’ withdrawal 
forces hedge funds to liquidate their large positions in a short period, leading to 
widespread financial panic.  
      Besides the risks discussed above, Lo (2001) also mentions two other risk 
management considerations for hedge funds: risk preferences and operational risks. 
The compensating scheme to hedge fund managers includes fixed and incentive fees, 
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which can largely drive investment decisions made by managers, especially in 
extreme circumstances. The risk preferences of investors have great impact on hedge 
fund managers’ behaviour. For example, if the investors are hot money in general, 
managers may tend to impose a lock period or redemption fees to prevent dramatic 
withdraw from investors. Operational risks include risks from organizational 
operations, such as accounting and trade reconciliation, personnel issues, legal 
infrastructure and management of the business (Lo, 2001).  
 
2.5 Benchmark 
      Fung and Hsieh (2004) explore the shortcomings of existing hedge fund indexes 
that are used as benchmarks for hedge fund returns. The data of hedge funds is prone 
to data biases as mentioned above. Sampling differences exist among different hedge 
fund databases. Reliable data began only in the 1990s, but still lacks transparency. 
Finally, it is difficult to make a proper choice of index weights because of the absence 
of clearly specified portfolio targets (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). 
      Alternatively, Fung and Hsieh (2004) use asset-based style factors (ABS) in a 
hedge fund risk model to benchmark hedge fund returns. The ABS factors include 
seven hedge fund risk factors: the equity market factor (Standard & Poor’s 500 index 
monthly total return), the size spread factor (Wilshire Small Cap 1750 – Wilshire 
Large Cap 750 monthly return, which has been adjusted to Russell 2000 index 
monthly total return – Standard & Poor’s 500 monthly total return), the bond market 
factor (month-end to month-end change in the U.S. Federal Reserve 10-year constant-
maturity yield), the credit spread factor (month-end to month-end change in the 
difference between Moody’s Baa yield and the Federal Reserve’s 10-year constant-
maturity yield), the bond trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of lookback 
straddles on bond futures), the currency trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of 
lookback straddles on currency futures) and the commodity trend-following factor 
(return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on commodity futures). Fung and Hsieh 
(2004)’s seven-factor model is used by many studies (Avramov et al., 2011; Sadka, 
2010; Teo, 2011; Brown, Gregoriou and Pascalau, 2012; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 
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2007; Meligkotsidou and Vrontos, 2008; Fung and Hsieh, 2008; Fung, Hsieh, Naik 
and Ramadorai, 2008; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013).  
      Agarwal and Naik (2004) find that it is important to allow a nonlinear risk-return 
for hedge funds because the returns of most hedge fund strategies show a similar 
pattern to those from writing a put option on an equity index. Following Agarwal and 
Naik (2004), Teo (2009) uses out-of-the-money European call and put options on the 
Nikkei 225 that are traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange as two option-based 
equity factors. Cao et al. (2013) add returns on out-of-the-money call and put options 
on the S&P 500 indices into the benchmark. Aragon (2007) includes four option-
based factors from Agarwal and Naik (2004), returns on at- and out-of-the-money call 
and put options on the S&P 500 indices. 
      Besides using Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factors to benchmark hedge fund 
returns, Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) add four factors: an equity market index (the 
Russell 3000 index), a broad bond index (the Lehman Brothers bond index), a broad-
based currency index (the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate 
index that is published by the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System) 
and the negative portion of the S&P 500 index to be the proxy for a put option that is 
based on Agarwal and Naik (2004). Based on the seven-factor model from Fung and 
Hsieh (2004), Kessler and Scherer (2011) use 11 factors as the benchmark model by 
adding other four factors that are the high-minus-low book-to-market value factor, the 
one year momentum factor based on Carhart (1997), the lookback straddle on fixed 
income and lookback straddle on equity. To get a better explanation of risks in Asian 
hedge funds, Teo (2009) extends the seven-factor model with two additional equity 
factors, the monthly total return of the MSCI All Countries Asia ex Japan equity 
market index and the monthly total return of the Nikkei 225 Japan equity market 
index, and two additionally option-based factors by following Agarwal and Naik 
(2004), OTM European call and put options that are based on the Nikkei 225 traded 
on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 
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Chapter 3 
Liquidity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
      This chapter gives an introduction to liquidity and reviews the literature on 
liquidity measures. Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) define liquidity as the 
ability of buying or selling large quantities of an asset rapidly at low cost. Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) argue that the concept of liquidity is broad and elusive. They 
consider liquidity as the ability to quickly trade large quantities of an asset, at low cost, 
and without changing its price. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) use the difference 
between market transaction price and the fundamental value as market liquidity where 
the fundamental value is defined as the expected value of final payoff. Amihud (2002) 
states that illiquidity reflects the impact of the order flow in market on the asset’s 
price. The impact induces the discount a sell offers or the premium a buyer pays 
during the execution of a market order. The discount and the premium come from 
inventory cost and adverse selection costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985). Thus, on the basis of literature, liquidity can be defined as the 
ability to trade large quantities of an asset quickly, at low cost, and without moving 
the price of the asset.  
      Pierre (2011) states that some investors just focus on profitability and ignore 
liquidity risk. In particular, when the capital liquidity level is high, the development of 
derivatives is helpful for the transfer of risks. Some investors assume that liquidity 
risk should not be an issue anymore, which is unfortunately not the case (Pierre, 2011). 
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Cao et al. (2013) find sizeable downward market liquidity shocks that occur around 
October 1997 (the Asian financial crisis), September 1998 (the failure of Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM)), April 2000 (the burst of the dot-com bubble), October 
2007 (the beginning of the recent global financial crisis) and March 2008 (the 
bankruptcy of the investment bank, Bear Sterns). According to Sadka (2010), hedge 
funds’ risks are complex because hedge funds could hold a range of assets that are 
located in different markets, such as the equity market, the fixed income market, the 
foreign exchange market and the commodity market. Typically, hedge funds invest in 
sophisticated financial instruments that are illiquid. In particular, after the Quant crisis 
of August 2007 and the recent global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, investors 
require more understanding and knowledge of risks attached to hedge funds. Sadka 
(2010) emphasizes that it is important to understand liquidity risk that can 
systematically affect hedge funds’ performance. Using the variation of hedge fund 
returns with innovations in aggregate market liquidity to measure liquidity risk, Sadka 
(2010) reveals that liquidity risk plays an important role in determining hedge fund 
returns. Cao et al. (2013) illustrate three reasons for examining liquidity risk for hedge 
funds. Firstly, hedge funds managed by sophisticated managers have been growing 
dramatically since two decades ago. Many talented people have joined hedge funds as 
managers in that period. Therefore, it is natural to enquire as to whether these talented 
managers can time market liquidity. Second, liquidity risk management is important 
for hedge funds. Especially after the collapse of LTCM in 1998, hedge fund managers 
have better understanding of the interaction between market liquidity and hedge fund 
performance. Third, hedge fund managers normally adopt dynamic investment 
strategies that induce time-varying market exposure. Kessler and Scherer (2011) 
confirm that hedge funds can employ various types of investment strategies across 
different markets and financial vehicles. Managers do not need to adhere to specific 
assets. Also, hedge funds tend to hold assets with low level liquidity, which may 
induce them to have large negative returns once in a while during the period of 
financial crisis in exchange of over average returns for a long time (Kessler and 
Scherer, 2011). 
      Aragon (2007) proposes that as an illiquid investment by restricting the 
redemption from investors, hedge funds are considered as a perfect environment to 
investigate issues related to liquidity. Also, it is easy to identify a hedge fund’s share 
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restrictions as relevant information can be observed from the hedge fund’s limited 
partnership agreement. Aragon (2007) demonstrates evidence of significant relation 
between hedge fund returns and share restrictions. Specifically, hedge funds with 
lockup restrictions have about 4-7% higher returns annually than those of hedge funds 
without lockup restrictions. The average alpha, used to measure managerial skills, of 
all hedge funds is insignificant or negative after controlling for share restrictions, 
minimum investment size, notice period and lockup. According to Aragon (2007), 
lockup restrictions require all initial money from investors to be kept in the fund until 
the end of a pre-specified period, which is called the lockup period. Actually, the 
effective lockup period could become longer because some hedge funds only allow 
investors to redeem their money at the end of the year. Most lockup periods last about 
one year and will seldom be changed. The redemption notice period requires investors 
to provide pre-specific days to hedge funds before redeeming shares. Boyle, Li and 
Zhu (2010) define the redemption period as the period between two consecutive 
redemption dates that are pre-specified. Minimum investment size is the minimum 
amount of money an investor needs to invest in a hedge fund. Aragon (2007) finds 
negative relation between the liquidity of a hedge fund and its share restrictions. Thus, 
hedge fund managers can use share restrictions to manage illiquid assets efficiently 
and provide investors with an illiquidity premium.  
 
3.2 Liquidity measures 
      In this section, we will discuss different liquidity measures that are used in the 
literature. Following Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), Marshall, Nguyen and 
Visaltanachoti (2012) and Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2010), we include liquidity 
measures of high frequency spread, liquidity measures of low frequency spread, 
liquidity measures of high frequency price impact and liquidity measures of low 
frequency price impact. Furthermore, other methods of liquidity measure are listed. 
3.2.1 High frequency spread 
Effective spread (TAQ) 
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      Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) use the high-frequency Trade and Quote 
(TAQ) database to calculate the effective spread that is defined as: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (𝑇𝐴𝑄)𝑘 = 2 ∗ |ln(Pk) − ln(Mk)|,                                         (3.1) 
where 𝑃𝑘 denotes the price of the 𝑘th trade and 𝑀𝑘 stands for the midpoint of the best 
bid and ask prices at the time of the 𝑘th trade. An Effective Spread (TAQ)i is the 
weighted average of Effective Spread (TAQ)k of all trades in the time interval i (such 
as a day or a month).  
Realized spread 
      Huang and Stoll (1996) define realized spread on the 𝑘th trade as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘 
= {
2 ∗ (ln(Pk) − ln(Pk+5))  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑏𝑢𝑦
2 ∗ (ln(Pk+5) − ln(Pk))   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙
,                                (3.2) 
where Pk+5 denotes the price of the trade that is five minutes after the 𝑘th trade. Lee 
and Ready (1991) propose an algorithm to decide whether a trade is a buy or a sell.  
Percent realized spread 
      Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2010) introduce the percent realized spread that is 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘 = 2 ∗ |ln(Pk) − ln(Mk+5)|,                                     (3.3) 
where Mk+5 is the midpoint of bid and ask prices that are five minutes after the 𝑘th 
trade.  
Effective spread (605) 
      Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) calculate another effective spread by data 
in the Rule 605 database. According to Rule 605 of the Regulation National Market 
System, all exchanges and market centres should disclose statistical details of order-
based stock performance, such as order size and order type. The Rule 605 effective 
spread is defined as: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (605) 𝑘 
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= {
2 ∗ (Pk − m𝑘)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠
2 ∗ (m𝑘 − Pk) 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠
,                                                            (3.4) 
where m𝑘  is the midpoint of the best bid and ask prices of the 𝑘 th order at the 
exchange. Marketable buys include marketable limit buy orders and market buy 
orders. Marketable sells contain marketable limit sell orders and market sell orders. 
Non-marketable limit orders in the Rule 605 database are discarded for the calculation 
of effective spreads.  
Quoted spread 
      Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012) define quoted spread as: 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = (𝐴𝑘 − 𝐵𝑘)/𝑀𝑘,                                                                       (3.5) 
where 𝐴𝑘 is the ask price, 𝐵𝑘 is the bid price and 𝑀𝑘 denotes the midpoint of ask and 
bid prices.  
Espread 
      Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) develop the effective percentage half-spread measure 
that is defined as: 
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =
|Pk−m𝑘|
m𝑘
,                                                                                               (3.6) 
where 𝑃𝑘 stands for the price of the 𝑘th trade and 𝑀𝑘 denotes the midpoint of the best 
bid and ask prices at the time of the 𝑘th trade. 
Quarterly quoted spread 
      Moreover, Lesmond (2005) uses quarterly bid and ask quotes, 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑄 and 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑄, to 
calculate quarterly quoted spread defined as: 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 1/2 [(
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑄−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑄)
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑄+𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑄)/2
+
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑄−1−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑄−1)
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑄−1+𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑄−1)/2
)].          (3.7) 
Effective cost 
      To measure market liquidity, Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) 
employ effective cost that can be formulated as: 
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𝐿 = {
(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑀), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠
(𝑃𝑀 − 𝑃), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠
,                                                   (3.8) 
where 𝑃  is the transaction price and 𝑃𝑀  denotes the midpoint of the ask and bid 
quotes. From equation (3.8), we find that effective costs are the difference between 
the transaction prices and the quotes prevailing at the time when a trade is executed.  
3.2.2 Low-frequency spread  
Percent bid-ask spread 
      Using daily bid-ask prices, Kessler and Scherer (2011) calculate liquidity measure 
from: 
𝐿 =
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡)
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡+𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡)/2
,                                                                                                    (3.9) 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡 and 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 are ask and bid close prices in day 𝑡, respectively.  
Roll 
      Roll (1984) assumes an asset’s the fundamental value, 𝑉𝑡 , is unobservable. 𝑉𝑡 
follows a random-walk process:  
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                     (3.10) 
where 𝜀𝑡 is an innovation on public information and has a mean value of zero on day 𝑡. 
Roll (1984) also assumes that the observed price, 𝑃𝑡, is modelled as: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 +
1
2
𝑆𝑄𝑡,                                                                                                    (3.11) 
where 𝑆 is the bid-ask spread and 𝑄𝑡 denotes an indicator function that equals 1 or -1 
based on the last, (𝑡 − 1)𝑡ℎ, trade is a buy or a sell, respectively. Furthermore, 𝑄𝑡 is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term, 𝜀𝑡. Combining equation (3.10) and 
(3.11), we get: 
∆𝑃𝑡 =
1
2
𝑆∆𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡.                                                                                               (3.12) 
In Roll (1984), the covariance of the change in observed price is shown as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1) =
1
4
𝑆2.                                                                                      (3.13) 
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Thus, the bid-ask spread proxy is: 
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙 = {
2√−𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1)  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1) < 0
0                                        𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1) ≥ 0
.                            (3.14) 
Extended Roll 
      Holden (2009) extends Roll’s spread measure with a more precise version. He let 
𝐴𝑃𝑡 denote the adjusted price of an asset on date 𝑡 by taking into account splits and 
dividends. The adjusted return is: 𝑎𝑟𝑡 =  𝐴𝑃𝑡/𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 − 1 . Then, the adjusted price 
change, ∆𝑃𝑡
∗, is defined as: 
∆𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑡−1,                                                                                                 (3.15) 
where 𝑃𝑡−1  stands for the unadjusted price of the asset on date 𝑡 − 1 . To get 
idiosyncratic value innovations, Holden (2009) runs a “market model” regression: 
𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝑍𝑡,                                                                       (3.16) 
where 𝑟𝑓 denotes risk free rate, 𝛼 is the constant, 𝛽 is the regression coefficient, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 
stands for the market returns on date 𝑡, and 𝑍𝑡 denotes the residual of regression. The 
idiosyncratic adjusted price change ∆𝑃𝑡
∗∗ is computed as: 
∆𝑃𝑡
∗∗ = 𝑍𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑡−1.                                                                                                  (3.17) 
Therefore, the extended Roll is expressed as: 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙 = {2
√
−𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡
∗∗,∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗∗ )
?̂?
?̅?
  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡
∗∗, ∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗∗ ) < 0
0                                𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡
∗∗, ∆𝑃𝑡+1
∗∗ ) ≥ 0
,               (3.18) 
where ?̂? denotes the probability of a trading day and ?̅? is the average trade price over 
the time period. 
Effective tick 
      By considering price clustering, Holden (2009) develops an effective spread proxy. 
The spread proxy is measured by a probability-weighted average of the size of each 
effective spread over the average trade price over the period. The relevant models 
include:  
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𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘 = ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑆𝑗/?̅?
𝐽
𝑗=1 ,                                                                          (3.19) 
𝛾𝑗 = {
𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑈𝑗, 0}, 1],         𝑗 = 1
𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑈𝑗 , 0}, 1 − ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑗−1
𝑘=1 ], 𝑗 = 2,3, … , 𝐽
,                                          (3.20) 
𝑈𝑗 = {
2𝐹𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1
2𝐹𝑗 − 𝐹𝑗−1, 𝑗 = 2,3, … , 𝐽 − 1 
𝐹𝑗 − 𝐹𝑗−1, 𝑗 = 𝐽
,                                                                  (3.21)         
𝐹𝑗 =
𝑁𝑗
∑ 𝑁𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑗,                                                                                   (3.22) 
where 𝑆𝑗 are mutually exclusive effective spreads, ?̅? is the average trade price, 𝛾𝑗 and 
𝑈𝑗  stands for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  spread’s constrained and unconstrained probabilities, 
respectively, 𝐹𝑗 is the probability that the trade prices correspond to the 𝑗𝑡ℎ spread and 
𝑁𝑗 is the number of trades, corresponding to the 𝑗𝑡ℎ spread. 
Gibbs 
      Hasbrouck (2004) applies Gibbs sampler estimation to the Roll model. He 
assumes that, in the Roll model, the innovation of public information is normally 
distributed with variance of 𝜎𝑒
2 and mean value of zero. The half-spread is defined as 
𝑐 ≡
1
2
𝑆. Using the Gibbs sampler, Hasbrouck (2004) estimates the latent “efficient 
price” 𝑉 = {𝑉1, 𝑉2, … , 𝑉𝑇}, the parameters {𝑐, 𝜎𝑒
2} and the buy/sell/no-trade indicators 
𝑄 = {𝑄1, 𝑄2, … , 𝑄𝑇}, where 𝑇 is the number of days over the time period. 
Zero 
      Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) propose liquidity proxies that are the 
proportion of days with zero returns. There are two arguments used to support these 
liquidity measures. First, illiquid assets are more likely to have zero trading volume 
that induces zero return. Second, assets with higher transaction costs are less private 
information achieved for the reason that higher transaction costs are more difficult to 
be overcome. Even during the days with positive trading volume, these assets are 
more likely to have zero returns. The liquidity proxies introduced by Lesmond, Ogden 
and Trzcinka (1999) are defined as: 
𝑍𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑠 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
𝑇
,                                                                       (3.23) 
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𝑍𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑠2 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒−𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
𝑇
,                                             (3.24) 
where 𝑇 denotes the number of trading days in one month. 
LOT 
      Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) assume that there are informed trades on 
days with non-zero-return and zero-return trading days mean the absence of informed 
trades. They introduce an estimation of the effective spread, LOT model, which can 
be estimated as: 
𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡,                                                                                                (3.25) 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝛼1𝑗   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ < 𝛼1𝑗  
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼1𝑗 < 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ < 𝛼2𝑗
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝛼2𝑗   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛼2𝑗 < 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗
,                                                                       (3.26) 
𝐿(𝛼1𝑗 , 𝛼2𝑗, 𝛽𝑗, |𝜎𝑗|𝑅𝑗𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
= ∏
1
𝜎𝑗
∅ [
𝑅𝑗𝑡+𝛼1𝑗−𝛽𝑗∗𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑗
] × ∏ [Φ2 (
𝛼2𝑗−𝛽𝑗∗𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑗
) − Φ1 (
𝛼1𝑗−𝛽𝑗∗𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑗
)]01
× ∏
1
𝜎𝑗
∅ [
𝑅𝑗𝑡+𝛼2𝑗−𝛽𝑗∗𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑗
]1
,             (3.27) 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗  is the true return of an asset 𝑗 on date 𝑡, 𝛽𝑗 is regression coefficient for asset 
𝑗, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 denotes the market return on date 𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is a public information innovation on 
date 𝑡 and normally distributed, 𝜎𝑗  is the standard deviation of 𝜀𝑗𝑡 , 𝛼1𝑗  and 𝛼2𝑗  are 
thresholds for trades on negative information and positive information for the asset 𝑗, 
respectively, 𝐿(∙)  stands for maximum likelihood function, ∅(∙)  is the standard 
normal density function and Φ2(∙)  denotes distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. The LOT liquidity measure is modelled as: 
𝐿𝑂𝑇 = 𝛼2𝑗 − 𝛼1𝑗.                                                                                                 (3.28)  
FHT 
      Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2010) develop two measures of effective spread: 
𝐹𝐻𝑇 and 𝐹𝐻𝑇2 spread proxies. The two liquidity measures are defined as: 
𝐹𝐻𝑇 = 2𝜎𝑁−1 (
1+𝑍
2
),                                                                                          (3.29) 
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𝐹𝐻𝑇2 = 𝜎 [𝑁−1 (
1
2
+ 𝑃𝑍) − 𝑁−1 (
1
2
− 𝑁𝑍)],                                                     (3.30) 
where 𝜎 is the standard deviation of an asset’s turn return, 𝑁−1 denotes the inverse of 
the cumulative normal distribution, 𝑍 stands for the proportion of zero returns, 𝑃𝑍 and 
𝑁𝑍  are the percentage of trading days with zero returns on positive and negative 
market return trading days, respectively.  
High-low spread 
      Corwin and Schultz (2012) use daily high and low prices to estimate bid-ask 
spread. Daily high (low) prices are more likely to be buying (selling) orders, which 
indicates that high-low ratio contains a stock’s variance and bid-ask spread. However, 
the variance of high-low ratio is not proportional to the spread component. Corwin 
and Schultz (2012) develop the spread estimation by using a function of high-low 
ratios with 1-day and 2-day time intervals. The specific models used to estimate high-
low spread are defined as: 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =
2(𝑒𝛼−1)
1+𝑒𝛼
,                                                                           (3.31) 
𝛼 =
√2𝛽−√𝛽
3−2√2
− √
𝑌
3−2√2
,                                                                                         (3.32) 
𝛽 = ∑ [𝑙𝑛 (
𝐻𝑡+𝑗
0
𝐿𝑡+𝑗
0 )]
2
1
𝑗=0 ,                                                                                          (3.33) 
𝑌 = [𝑙𝑛 (
𝐻𝑡,𝑡+1
0
𝐿𝑡,𝑡+1
0 )]
2
,                                                                                                 (3.34) 
where 𝐻𝑡+𝑗
0  (𝐿𝑡+𝑗
0 ) is the observed high (low) price on date 𝑡 + 𝑗, and 𝐻𝑡,𝑡+1
0  (𝐿𝑡,𝑡+1
0 ) 
denotes high (low) price over the two days 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. 
3.2.3 High-frequency price impact 
Static Price Impact (605) 
      Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) define the static price impact that is based 
on Rule 605 data as: 
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𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 (605)𝑖
= [
(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (605)𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖/?̅?𝑖) −
(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (605)𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖/?̅?𝑖)
]
/ [
(𝐴𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (605)𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖) −
(𝐴𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (605)𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖)
]
,                                              (3.35) 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑖 includes all the orders that are in the range of 2000-9999 shares 
over time interval 𝑖 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑖 includes all the orders that are in the range 
of 100-499 shares over time interval 𝑖. 
Hasbrouck 
      Hasbrouck (2009) uses the cost of per volume as the price impact liquidity 
measure, 𝜆, that is defined as: 
𝑟𝑛 = 𝜆 ∗ 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑢𝑛,                                                                                                  (3.36) 
where 𝑟𝑛  denotes the stock return for the 𝑛𝑡ℎ  five-minute time interval, 𝑆𝑛 =
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜈𝑘𝑛)√|𝜈𝑘𝑛|𝑘 , 𝜈𝑘𝑛  stands for the signed volume of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ trade during the 
𝑛𝑡ℎ time interval and 𝑢𝑛 denotes the error term.  
Five-minute Price Impact 
      Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) focus on the changes in the midpoint of bid 
and ask quotes over a five-minute interval. For a given asset, the specific five-minute 
price impact is modelled as:                           
𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡
= {
2 ∗ (𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘+5) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘))  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑏𝑢𝑦
2 ∗ (𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘+5))  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙
,                          (3.37) 
where 𝑀𝑘+5 denotes the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask quotes five minutes 
after the  𝑘𝑡ℎ trade and 𝑀𝑘 is the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask quotes of the  
𝑘𝑡ℎ trade. Lee and Ready (1991) develop an algorithm to identify buy and sell trades. 
Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2010) develop a simplified price impact measure that is 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑘 = 2 ∗ |𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘+5) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘)|.                                       (3.38) 
 29 
 
3.2.4 Low-frequency price impact 
Amihud 
      Amihud (2002) employs an illiquidity measure that is the ratio of daily absolute 
stock return to its daily trading volume. Other measures, like bid-ask spread, need a 
lot of microstructure data. For many stock markets, this microstructure data is not 
available or does not cover long enough periods. Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) state 
that they choose Amihud (2002)’s measure because it only requires daily data that 
allows them to focus on a much longer time period. The illiquidity measure proposed 
by Amihud (2002) is defined as:  
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑦
𝑡=1 ,                                                                               (3.39) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 denotes the number of available trading days for stock 𝑖 over time interval 𝑡, 
𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑 stands for the return on stock 𝑖 over time interval 𝑡 and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑑 is daily trading 
for stock 𝑖 over time interval 𝑡. 
      Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) extend Amihud illiquidity proxy and 
model the extension as: 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖 =
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖
.                                     (3.40)    
To decrease the impact of outliers, Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012) modify Amihud 
measure as: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑑 ≡ −𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 +
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑|
𝑃𝑖,𝑑𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
),                                                                               (3.41) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑑 denotes the proxy of Amihud liquidity for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑, 𝑅𝑖,𝑑 is the 
return of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 and 𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑 stands for the stock 𝑖’s daily trading volume on 
day 𝑑.  
Amivest 
      Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985) develop Amivest liquidity ratio that is defined as: 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡
|𝑟𝑡|
,                                                                                              (3.42) 
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where 𝑟𝑡 denotes the non-zero return over the time interval 𝑡. 
Pastor and Stambaugh 
      Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose a price impact measure called Gamma, 𝛾, 
that is modelled as: 
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝜃 + ∅𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑟𝑡
𝑒)𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                        (3.43) 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝑒 denotes the stock’s excess return over the S&P 500 return on day 𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 is the 
return on day 𝑡, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 stands for the trading volume on day 𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term.  
Price Impact Components 
      Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) introduce four measures of liquidity based on 
components of price impact. The components, the reaction of prices and trading, are 
modelled as: 
∆𝑝𝑖,𝑗 = Ψ𝑖,𝑡𝜀Ψ,𝑖,𝑗 + λ𝑖,𝑡𝜀λ,𝑖,𝑗 + Ψ𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅∆𝐷𝑖,𝑗 + λ𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ∆(𝐷𝑖,𝑗𝑉𝑖,𝑗) + y𝑖,𝑡,                         (3.44) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 denotes the direction of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ trade for the asset 𝑖, 𝜀Ψ,𝑖,𝑗  stands for the 
unexpected direction of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ trade, 𝑉𝑖,𝑗 is the trading volume of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ trade for the 
asset 𝑖, 𝜀λ,𝑖,𝑗 is the unexpected volume of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ trade, λ𝑖,𝑡 denotes the price impact’s 
permanent variable component, λ𝑖,𝑡  is the price impact’s transitory variable 
component, Ψ𝑖,𝑡 is the price impact’s permanent fixed component and Ψ𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ is the price 
impact’s transitory fixed component. 
Conventional Liquidity Ratio 
      According to Gabrielsen, Marzo and Zagaglia (2011), the conventional liquidity 
ratio is defined as: 
𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ |𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡|
𝑇
𝑡=1
,                                                                                                  (3.45) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes the price of asset 𝑖 on date 𝑡, 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the trading volume of asset 𝑖 on 
date 𝑡 and 𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 stands for percentage change in price for asset 𝑖 over the time interval 
𝑡.  
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3.2.5 Other liquidity measures 
LCAPM 
      Applying the framework of tradition CAPM, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
develop a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model called LCAPM. In the 
LCAPM, the stock price, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − Ψ𝑖,𝑡 , is the price with adjustment of the stochastic 
trading cost, where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the cost-free stock price and Ψ𝑖,𝑡  denotes the absolute 
amount of trading cost. The LCAPM is defined as: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜆𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
,                                              (3.46) 
where  𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 denotes the return of stock 𝑖 over the time interval 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk free 
rate, 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖  stands for the trading cost per price and equals 
Ψ𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
, 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀  and 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 are market 
return and market trading cost per price over the interval 𝑡 + 1, respectively, and 𝜆𝑡 
denotes  𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) . Acharya and Pedersen (2005) assume a constant 
premium or constant conditional variances. The LCAPM can be transferred to the 
unconditional version as: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ) = 𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ) + 𝜆𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
−𝜆𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
− 𝜆𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
.                   (3.47)  
The liquidity measure, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
, reflects the effect between the illiquidity of 
asset 𝑖  and the market illiquidity. The liquidity measure, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
, shows the 
relation between the return of asset 𝑖 and the market illiquidity. The liquidity measure, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑀 −𝑐𝑡+1
𝑀 )
, gives the connection between the illiquidity of asset 𝑖 and the market 
return.  
First-order Autocorrelation 
      To investigate liquidity characteristics, Ding, Shawky and Tian (2009) estimate 
the following time series regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                       (3.48) 
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of hedge fund 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 denotes the risk free rate at time 
𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Ding, Shawky and Tian (2009) take the coefficient 𝑏𝑖 as a 
proxy for liquidity of hedge fund 𝑖. 
Turnover 
      Both Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and Lesmond (2005) use turnover as the 
liquidity proxy and define it as: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝑑𝑡
𝑗=1
𝑆𝑂𝑖,𝑡
,                                                                                       (3.49) 
where 𝑑𝑡 denotes the number of days in month 𝑡, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗 is the trading volume of asset 
𝑖 on the day 𝑗 and 𝑆𝑂𝑖,𝑡 stands for the share outstanding of asset 𝑖 at the end of month 
𝑡. 
Mean Reversion  
      Jylha, Rinne and Suominen (2010) use the stock returns’ short-term mean 
reversion as a liquidity measure. Specifically, the regression model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑡+5 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝜏
4
𝜏=0 𝑅𝑡−𝜏 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                              (3.50) 
where 𝑅𝑡,𝑡+5  denotes stock excess return in five days after the day 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑡−𝜏  is the 
excess return in the past 𝜏 days and 𝜀𝑡 stands for the error term. The liquidity measure 
on day 𝑡 is the sum of the regression coefficients: 
𝐿𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝜏
4
𝜏=0 .                                                                                                     (3.51)                                                                                                       
Variance Ratio 
      Gabrielsen, Marzo and Zagaglia (2011) argue that the variance ratio can be 
applied to measure market liquidity. The variance ratio is defined as: 
𝑉𝑅𝑖 =
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑇
𝑖 )
𝑇∗𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑍𝑇
𝑖 )
,                                                                                                    (3.52) 
where 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑇
𝑖 )  and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑍𝑇
𝑖 )  denotes long-term and short-term variances of asset 
return 𝑖, respectively, and 𝑇 stands for the number of short-term periods into which 
the long-term period can be divided. 
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Smoothing Process 
      Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) develop an illiquidity measure for hedge 
funds, based on hedge funds’ reported and economic returns. The models of returns’ 
smoothing process are specified as: 
𝑅𝑡
0 = 𝜃0𝑅𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑅𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑘,                                                                   (3.53) 
𝜃𝑗 ∈ [0,1], 𝑗 = 0, … 𝑘                                                                                           (3.54) 
1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑘.                                                                                         (3.55) 
where 𝑅𝑡
0 is the reported return of a hedge fund at the time 𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 denotes the true 
economic return of the hedge fund at the time 𝑡. According to Getmansky, Lo and 
Makarov (2004), the illiquidity of the hedge fund is measured by the coefficient, 𝜃0. 
A large value of 𝜃0 indicates the higher level of liquidity. 
 
3.3 Liquidity risk for hedge funds 
      Sadka (2010) measures liquidity risk by using the covariance between hedge fund 
returns and the unexpected changes in market liquidity at the aggregate level. 
According to his results, liquidity risk plays an important role to determine cross-
sectional returns of hedge funds. The positive relation between exposure to liquidity 
and hedge fund future returns reveals that the performance of hedge funds is due to 
beta (exposure to market systematic risks) rather than alpha (managerial skills). 
Furthermore, Sadka (2010) studies the impact of the liquidity that hedge fund 
managers provide to their investors and finds that the performances of hedge funds 
are unrelated to the liquidity measured by redemption notice and lockup periods. The 
findings indicate that it is important to investigate the exposure to market systematic 
liquidity for the evaluation of the performance of hedge funds. Kessler and Scherer 
(2011) use four liquidity measures to measure liquidity risks in the equity market, 
foreign exchange market, fix-income market and commodity market. Applying these 
four liquidity measures, Kessler and Scherer (2011) develop a global latent liquidity 
risk factor. Adding liquidity risk factor as an additional factor to evaluate hedge funds’ 
performance can increase the factor model’s explanatory power, which confirms the 
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impact of liquidity on hedge fund returns (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). Finally, Kessler 
and Scherer (2011) find a significant relation between the global liquidity risk and 
hedge fund returns.  
      According to Khandani and Lo (2011), the global financial markets experienced a 
disastrous period in the months leading up to August 2007. Two credit strategies of 
Bear Stearns failed in June 2007. After losing over 50%, the portfolio of Sowood 
Capital Management was sold in July 2007. The financial problems spread 
countrywide through the second and third quarters of 2007. In the week of 6
th
 August 
2007, some leading hedge funds experienced huge and unprecedented losses. These 
hedge funds mainly invested in equities that were exchanged-traded, but not in credit-
related financial instruments or sub-prime mortgages. Khandani and Lo (2011) find 
that the losses of hedge funds discussed above were attributed to the temporary price 
impact that was induced by one or more quantitative asset portfolios’ rapid and large 
unravelling. Considering the speed of the price impact, Khandani and Lo (2011) 
propose that the forced liquidation by hedge funds was likely caused by a margin call. 
The forced liquidation made the initial losses even worse. Consequently, the further 
losses triggered or forced hedge funds to take stop/loss action or even make the 
decision to close the portfolio positions.  
      Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) introduce a model that is based on funding 
liquidity of traders and market liquidity of an asset. Funding liquidity measured by 
Dudley and Nimalendran (2011) is based on the extent of the collateral that is related 
with traders’ funding from borrowing. According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), the ways of providing liquidity to market from traders is associated with the 
availability of traders’ funding. On the other hand, traders’ funding liquidity, 
including the requirements of margin and capital, is closely linked to the market 
liquidity of these assets. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) state that, due to the 
destabilization of margins, funding liquidity and market liquidity of the assets can be 
mutually reinforcing in certain conditions, which leads to the appearance of liquidity 
spirals. Under the condition that funding liquidity is tight, traders are unwilling to take 
on positions and, especially, on those positions with high margin of capital. The low 
level of market liquidity is able to induce a high level of market volatility. 
Furthermore, if the expectation of future market liquidity is low, then the risk of 
financing traders and margins will increase. The model shown by Brunnermeier and 
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Pedersen (2009) implies that market liquidity is linked to market volatility, which can 
commonly affect cross-sectional assets and can suddenly dry up in certain conditions.  
      Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) focus on the hedge fund returns’ right tail and 
left tail and find that the correlation of returns’ left tail is higher than that of returns’ 
right tail. During the subprime crisis, the increase of the margins of trading orders 
enlarges the probability of hedge funds’ contagion that is the appearance that the 
correlation among hedge funds’ performance is higher than that expected from the 
fundamental model (Boyson, Stahel and Stulz, 2010). Specifically, the correlation 
among certain strategies of hedge went up to 34%. In order to reduce the probability 
of contagion, policies of restricting the size of changes in margins in the short term 
should be made. Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) find that there was significant 
contagion among hedge funds during the financial crisis in 2008. Small changes in 
liquidity do not cause contagion among hedge funds, but dramatic decrease of hedge 
fund liquidity can largely increase the probability of contagion. Ding, Shawky and 
Tian (2009) find that positive liquidity shocks rather than negative liquidity shocks 
can help hedge funds improve their performance. Adopting aggressive strategies for 
liquidity shock, hedge funds managers will achieve better performance than those 
who use conservative strategies.  
      Cao and Petrasek (2011) investigate the relationship between hedge fund 
ownership and market liquidity. They find that stocks that are held by hedge funds 
have higher correlation with the changes in aggregate market liquidity than 
comparable stocks that are held by other individuals and institutions. Furthermore, 
stocks owned by hedge funds have negative abnormal returns during the periods of 
liquidity crises. Aragon and Strahan (2012) show that hedge funds that employed 
Lehman as prime broker experienced dramatic reduction of funding liquidity after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy in September 15, 2008. They conclude that the decrease of 
assets’ liquidity is associated with the adverse shocks to traders’ funding liquidity.  
      Liquidity risk can influence hedge funds’ performances, especially during the 
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, as literature reviews mentioned above. The main 
purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of liquidity risks on hedge funds’ 
performance and hedge fund managers’ strategies. The findings provided by the 
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research should have important implications for hedge funds managers in the process 
of their portfolio management. 
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Chapter 4 
Timing ability  
 
4.1 Introduction 
      In this chapter, we introduce the concept of market timing and discuss various 
market timing models in the literature. According to Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer 
and Ross (1986), the superior performance of an investment is due to either the 
manager’s timing ability or selection ability or the combination of the two abilities. 
Market timing is a type of dynamic asset allocation strategy that adjusts a portfolio’s 
market exposure that is based on the manager’s forecast about the market (Admati et 
al., 1986; Chen, 2007; Chen and Liang, 2007). Therefore, the managers who have 
successful timing ability can increase portfolios’ market exposure before a market rise 
and decrease portfolios’ market exposure prior to a market fall.  
      The question of whether professional investment managers can consistently 
provide abnormal returns has attracted tremendous interest. It is found that it is rare 
mutual fund that can deliver abnormal returns and that most mutual funds that focus 
on equity market have negative alphas (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002). However, 
hedge fund managers do have skills to create abnormal returns, which are not due to 
luck (Kosowski, Naik and Teo 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov 2010). 
Those mutual funds, adopting similar investment strategies to those used by hedge 
funds, outperform traditional mutual funds (Agarwal, Boyson and Naik, 2009). Park 
(2010) states that hedge funds’ outperformance could be due to hedge fund managers’ 
better timing ability compared with the managers of mutual funds. Hedge fund 
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managers can change their portfolios’ asset allocation freely because of the relatively 
less regulatory regime. By using leverage, short sales and various types of arbitrage 
investments, it is easier to generate abnormal returns with timing strategy for hedge 
funds than it is for mutual funds.  
      With the fast growth during the past two decades, hedge funds have provided a 
fruitful environment for the investigation of active portfolio management and 
managers advertise themselves as skilled market timers to investors (Chen, 2007). We 
examine the timing ability of hedge fund managers for the following reasons. First, 
hedge funds are managed by highly talented managers. Therefore, it is curious to 
know whether these managers have the timing skill to deliver superior performance. 
Second, hedge funds are exempted from the Investment Company Act of 1940. They 
are more likely to show market timing skills with dynamic investment strategies that 
lead to time-varying market exposure (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Patton and 
Ramadorai, 2013). Furthermore, Agarwal and Naik (2004) reveal that hedge fund 
returns are option-like because of dynamic investment strategies. Market timing that 
requires a hedge fund manager to adjust market risk exposure based on forecasts will 
generate call-option-like payoffs. Third, hedge funds can invest in various markets, 
which increases the chance for managers to exhibit market timing ability. Finally, it is 
found that hedge funds provide positive risk-adjusted performance (Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999; Fung, 
Hsied, Naik and Ramadorai, 2008; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov, 2010). Thus, 
it is reasonable to ask whether hedge funds’ positive risk-adjusted performance is 
partially attributed to managers’ market timing ability. 
      It is important to examine the market timing skills of hedge fund managers. This 
is because these studies help evaluate managers’ market timing strategies of adjusting 
hedge funds’ market exposure based on market forecasts. Moreover, the studies allow 
us to better understand the composition and attribution of hedge fund managers’ 
performance (Chen, 2007). 
 
4.2 Timing ability model 
Market Return Timing 
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      Market timing models describe time-varying market exposure which reflects 
dynamic asset allocation based on the forecast of future market conditions. The 
pioneering market timing model is the market return timing model of Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966). The classical market timing model of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) is 
defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
2 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                         (4.1) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return of portfolio 𝑝 at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 stands for 
the market excess return at time 𝑡 + 1 and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 is the error term at time 𝑡 + 1. The 
positive value of coefficient, 𝛾𝑝 , indicates that the manager of portfolio 𝑝  has 
successful timing skill because the portfolio increases its market exposure prior to a 
market increase and decreases its market exposure before a market decrease. Thus, the 
excess return of portfolio with market return timing ability is the convex function of 
the market’s excess return.  
      Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose a different way to test market return 
timing ability. They assume that mutual fund managers switch their investments 
between cash and the equity market, which depends on the forecasts about market 
returns. Specifically, the market return timing model of Henriksson and Merton (1981) 
is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
∗ + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                         (4.2) 
𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝐼{𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 > 0}𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1,                                                                                (4.3) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 are the excess returns of portfolio 𝑝 and market at time 𝑡 + 1, 
respectively, 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1  is the error term at time 𝑡 + 1  and 𝐼{𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 > 0}  denotes an 
indicator function. 𝐼{𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 > 0}  equals one if market excess return, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 , is 
positive at time 𝑡 + 1. {𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 > 0} equals zero if market excess return, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1, is zero 
or negative at time 𝑡 + 1. The positive value of coefficient, 𝛾𝑝, reveals that portfolio 
managers can successful time market return by increasing (decreasing) portfolio’s 
market exposure prior to a market rise (fall). 
Market Volatility Timing 
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      According to Chen and Liang (2007), a portfolio manager with market volatility 
timing ability should increase (decrease) a portfolio’s market exposure prior to a fall 
(rise) of market volatility. The market volatility timing model of Busse (1999) is 
defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1(𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝑚) + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                 (4.4) 
where  𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 stands for the excess return of portfolio 𝑝 at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 denotes 
the market excess return at time 𝑡 + 1,  𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1 is the market volatility at time 𝑡 + 1, 
𝜎𝑚 denotes the average of market volatility and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 is the error term at time 𝑡 + 1. 
Thus, the negative value of coefficient 𝜆𝑝  shows that the portfolio manager can 
successfully time market volatility based on forecasts. 
Joint Market Return and Volatility Timing 
      Chen and Liang (2007) state that hedge fund managers could change their 
portfolios’ market exposure based on the forecasts about both market return and 
market volatility. Even if a hedge fund manager expects a rise of market return in the 
future, the manager may not enlarge a portfolio’s market exposure if market volatility 
will increase, and  vice versa. Chen and Liang (2007) list two models to investigate 
the joint timing ability of market return and market volatility. The two timing models 
are defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑗=1 + 𝛾 (
𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1
)
2
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                               (4.5) 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑗=1 + 𝛾𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
2 + 𝜆𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1(𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝑚) + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,           (4.6) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  denotes the excess return of hedge fund 𝑝  at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1  is the 
factor used to control hedge fund’s excess return, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 is the equity market excess 
return at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1 is the market volatility level at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝜎𝑚 stands for 
the average of market volatility level and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 denotes the error term at time 𝑡 + 1. 
In the equation (4.5), the positive value of coefficient 𝛾 measures that the hedge fund 
managers can time both market return and market volatility. The timing term, 
(
𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1
𝜎𝑚,𝑡+1
)
2
, is like the squared value of Sharpe ratio. To jointly test timing ability, the 
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equation (4.6) linearly combines both the market return timing term and market 
volatility timing term. 
Market Liquidity Timing 
      Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) investigate whether hedge fund managers have 
the ability of timing market liquidity by adjusting their portfolios’ market exposure in 
respond to the changes in market aggregate liquidity. The market liquidity timing 
model is specified as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1(𝐿𝑚,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑚) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,       (4.7) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return of hedge fund 𝑝 at the time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 is equity 
market excess return at the time 𝑡 + 1, 𝐿𝑚,𝑡+1 denotes the equity market aggregate 
liquidity level at the time 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑚 stands for the average of equity market liquidity 
level, 𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1 is the other factor, 𝑗, which is apart from equity market factor and used to 
control hedge fund excess return, and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 denotes the error term at time 𝑡 + 1.  
      A positive value of 𝜆𝑝 indicates that the hedge fund manager has market liquidity 
timing ability by increasing (decreasing) the portfolio’s market exposure prior to the 
rise (fall) of market aggregate liquidity level. Consider an example where a hedge 
fund has average beta of 0.3 and average timing liquidity coefficient of 0.6. In this 
case, if the hedge fund manager predicts that a market excess liquidity will be 5% in 
the next month, the hedge fund will forecast an increase of fund beta by 0.03 (i.e., 
0.6×5%), which is 10% of the original level. As discussed in Cao et al. (2013), it is 
difficult to interpret the negative liquidity timing coefficient that suggests that the 
hedge fund managers adjust portfolios’ market exposure in the opposite direction to 
the direction used by those hedge fund managers with successful liquidity timing 
skills. For example, if a hedge fund has average beta of 0.3 and average timing 
coefficient of -0.6. When the manager predicts of 5% market excess liquidity in the 
next month, the hedge fund will forecast a decrease of fund beta by 0.03 (i.e., -
0.6×5%). Following this forecast, the hedge fund will then adjust its market exposure 
accordingly. 
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4.3 Related literature review 
      Market timing is the ability of asset managers to adjust their portfolios’ market 
exposure based on forecasts about the future changes in market condition. The 
academic investigations date back to the research by Cowles (1933). Since then, a 
great deal of literature that is related to market timing ability has become available. 
Previous research that focuses on the timing ability of mutual funds generally shows 
no timing ability of fund managers (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Merton, 1981; 
Henriksson and Merton, 1981; Kon, 1983; Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Henriksson, 
1984; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer, and Ross, 1986; Lehmann and Modest, 1987; 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Graham and Harvey, 1996; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; 
Dnaiel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Becker, Ferson, Myers and Schill, 
1999). On the other hand, Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that fund managers do have 
market timing ability after considering macroeconomic conditions. Using certain 
benchmarks, Graham and Harvey (1996) find some evidence of market timing ability. 
Busse (1999) demonstrates that fund managers have the ability of timing market 
volatility. Bollen and Busse (2001) and Jiang, Yao and Yu (2007) employ high-
frequency data of mutual fund returns and find that mutual fund managers have the 
market timing skill. Besides, Brown, Goetzmann and Kumar (1998) and Chance and 
Hemler (2001) confirm that there is the ability of market timing among mutual fund 
managers.   
      So far, only a few studies are related to the hedge fund managers’ market timing 
ability. According to the empirical results, the findings of timing skills are mixed. 
Fung, Xu and Yau (2002) test the performance of 115 hedge funds that focus on the 
global equity market. These hedge funds have their own target geographical markets. 
According to the results, they conclude that the managers of these global hedge funds 
do not show the ability of market timing. Using the quadratic model of Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) and taking into account the illiquidity effect, French and Ko (2007) 
examine whether long-short equity hedge funds exhibit market timing skill. They do 
not find statistically significant results of hedge fund managers’ market timing ability. 
Park (2010) divides hedge funds’ excess returns into three parts: factor timing, asset 
selection and risk premium. He founds that hedge fund managers do not time the 
market during 1994-2008. 
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      In contrast, Chen and Liang (2007) test whether hedge funds that belong to the 
market timing category have the ability to time the equity market and find that hedge 
fund managers can time market return and market volatility and even jointly time 
them together. The timing abilities are statistically significant at both aggregate level 
and individual fund level. Furthermore, hedge fund managers show better timing 
abilities in the bear and volatile conditions of the market. Chen (2007) introduces a 
definition of focus market in which a hedge fund has most active trading. The 
findings include that convertible arbitrage funds can time the high yield bond market; 
global macro funds show timing ability in the non-U.S. bond market; managed future 
funds have the ability of timing currency market and market timing funds time the 
U.S. equity market. Cao et al. (2013) explore whether hedge fund managers have the 
ability to time equity market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ portfolios based on 
the changes in equity market liquidity. All the hedge funds that are included in the 
sample are equity-oriented. The analysis shows that equity-oriented hedge fund 
managers have the ability of timing equity liquidity. The results are robust to the data 
biases of hedge funds, alternative explanations and other risk factors, timing models 
and liquidity measures.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
      In Chapter 5, we measure the liquidity in the fixed income market by using the 
difference between the corporate bond spreads and CDS spreads. Following Longstaff 
et al. (2005), we assume that CDS market is highly liquid and does not reflect the 
premium of liquidity. However, it is more reasonable to assume that liquidity risk can 
affect CDS market, especially during the liquidity crisis period. The liquidity 
measures in Chapter 5 are proxies of liquidity level in the fixed income market. In 
Chapter 6, on the other hand, we follow Kessler and Scherer (2011) and use bid and 
ask prices to compute a liquidity measure in the foreign exchange market. The 
volume-weighted average of different exchange rate liquidity measures is a better way 
to measure foreign exchange market liquidity level. Note that, however, due to the 
lack of volume data of all traded exchange rates, we follow Kessler and Scherer (2011) 
and use the arithmetic mean to measure the market liquidity. Finally, in Chapter 7, we 
follow Kessler and Scherer (2011) and Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012, 
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2013) and use Amihud (2002) measure as the commodity market liquidity measure. 
With respect to the commodity market, the weights of commodities of S&P GSCI are 
updated every year. Due to the data availability, however, only the recent weights of 
commodities are available. Hence, the weights of twenty-four commodities are 
obtained from the S&P GSCI Methodology that published in August 2013. This 
seems to be a reasonable choice as there are not significant changes for S&P GSCI 
Methodology every year. 
      Based on the section 4.3, it can be seen that different papers find different results 
with respect to timing skills. This could be attributed to the several reasons. First, 
funds apply various investment strategies, and this reflects the difference in the 
importance of liquidity risk in portfolio management to different funds. Secondly, 
fund managers invest in a wide range of assets and financial markets. Funds that 
invest in illiquid assets and markets tend to have larger correlation with liquidity risk 
than the liquid assets and market. Finally, fund managers’ timing skills may not be 
constant and could vary among different funds during different time periods. 
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Chapter 5 
Liquidity timing ability for hedge funds 
in the fixed income market  
 
5.1 Introduction 
      The question of whether professional investment managers can forecast and take 
advantage of the changes in market condition has attracted tremendous interest. The 
first relevant academic investigation dates back to the research done by Cowles 
(1933). Since then, there has been a great deal of literature that focuses on market 
timing ability of the financial markets. Market timing is the ability of asset managers 
to adjust portfolios’ market exposure based on managers’ forecasts about future 
market changes. Motivated by the framework of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) to 
measure market timing, plenty of literature has discussed market timing in mutual 
funds. Most of the previous research focuses on the timing ability of mutual funds and 
show little timing ability of fund managers (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Merton, 1981; 
Henriksson and Merton, 1981; Kon, 1983; Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Henriksson, 
1984; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer, and Ross, 1986; Lehmann and Modest, 1987; 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Graham and Harvey, 1996; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; 
Dnaiel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Becker, Ferson, Myers and Schill, 
1999).  
      The fast-growing hedge fund industry in the past two decades provides a fruitful 
environment for the research on active portfolio management of hedge fund managers 
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who advertise themselves as market timers, holding the skill of forecasting the future 
market (Chen, 2007).  Some literature pays attention to the performance of the hedge 
fund industry. Hedge fund managers have the skills of creating abnormal returns 
(Kosowski, Naik and Teo 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov 2010). Those 
mutual funds that use hedge-fund-like investment strategies with regulatory 
requirements and the fee structure have better performance than that of traditional 
mutual funds (Agarwal, Boyson and Naik, 2009). According to the results of Park 
(2010), compared to the performance of mutual funds, the superiority of hedge funds’ 
performance could come from the better market timing ability of hedge fund 
managers. Although little evidence of timing ability has been found in mutual funds, 
we expect to find significance evidence of timing skills owned by hedge fund 
managers.  
      We want to investigate hedge fund managers’ timing skills for several reasons. 
First, the portfolios of hedge funds are managed by highly talented managers. Thus, it 
is natural to ask whether these talented hedge fund managers have the timing skill to 
deliver superior performance. Second, hedge funds are unregulated by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Managers can change hedge fund portfolios’ assets freely. 
Also, hedge fund managers are allowed to use leverage, short sales and other types of 
arbitrage investments. Thus, hedge funds are more likely to show market timing skills 
by adopting dynamic investment strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Patton and 
Ramadorai, 2013). Furthermore, Agarwal and Naik (2004) find that hedge fund 
returns are option-like which is due to dynamic investment strategies. The strategy of 
market timing requires hedge fund managers to adjust market risk exposure based on 
their forecasts, which will also generate call-option-like payoffs. Third, hedge funds 
normally invest in different markets, which increase the opportunity for managers to 
exhibit market timing ability. Finally, hedge funds can provide positive risk-adjusted 
performance (Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999; Brown, Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson, 1999; Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai, 2008; Jagannathan, Malakhov and 
Novikov, 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to examine whether hedge funds’ positive risk-
adjusted performance is partially attributed to managers’ market timing ability based 
on forecasts of market. The investigation of hedge fund managers’ timing ability not 
only helps investigate how managers adopt market timing strategies, but also gives us 
 47 
 
a better understanding of the composition and attribution of hedge fund managers’ 
performance (Chen, 2007). 
      So far, only a few studies have investigated hedge fund managers’ market timing 
ability and the findings of the timing skills are mixed. Fung, Xu and Yau (2002) test 
the performance of 115 hedge funds that have their own target geographical equity 
markets. The results do not show market timing ability of these global hedge fund 
managers. Using the quadratic model of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and considering 
the effect of illiquidity, French and Ko (2007) also do not fund any timing skills of 
long-short equity hedge fund. After dividing hedge funds’ excess returns into three 
parts – factor timing, asset selection and risk premium – Park (2010) finds that hedge 
fund managers do not exhibit timing ability during 1994-2008. 
      In contrast, some literature supports that hedge fund managers have timing skills. 
Fung and Hsieh (1997) state that dynamic strategies used by hedge fund managers can 
generate option-like returns, suggesting the possibility of the existence of timing 
ability. Chen and Liang (2007) examine whether hedge funds in the market timing 
category have the skills to time the U.S. equity market. The results show that the 
managers of these hedge funds can time market return, time market volatility and 
jointly time market return and volatility. The statistically significant timing abilities 
are found at both aggregate level and individual fund level. Furthermore, hedge fund 
managers show better timing abilities in the bear and volatile conditions of the equity 
market. Chen (2007) defines the focus market as the market in which a hedge fund 
has most active trading. After investigating various hedge funds’ timing ability in 
their focus markets, Chen (2007) finds that convertible arbitrage funds can time the 
high yield bond market. Furthermore, global macro funds have timing ability in the 
non-U.S. bond market, managed future funds show the ability of timing the currency 
market, and market timing funds can time the U.S. equity market. 
      In this chapter, we explore the dimension that whether hedge fund managers have 
the ability to time market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ market exposure based 
on managers’ forecasts of future market liquidity conditions. This issue is helpful to 
understand the role of market liquidity in hedge fund investment management. 
      Liquidity is defined as the ability of trading large quantities of an asset quickly, at 
low cost, and without moving the price of the asset (Amihud, 2002; Pastor and 
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Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam, 
2005; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Market liquidity is a priced state variable 
that is important for asset pricing (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005).  
      Liquidity risk plays an important role to impact the performance of hedge funds 
(Sadka, 2010). There is significant relationship between hedge funds returns and share 
restrictions, which are used to measure the liquidity hedge funds provide to their 
investors (Aragon, 2007). Kessler and Scherer (2011) develop a global latent liquidity 
risk factor that can increase the explanatory power of the factor model for hedge fund 
returns. According to Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010), dramatic decrease of hedge 
fund liquidity can largely increase the probability of hedge funds’ contagion. Also, 
hedge fund ownership and market liquidity have significant relation (Cao and 
Petrasek, 2011). Aragon and Strahan (2012) find that hedge funds, using Lehman as 
prime broker, experienced dramatic reduction of funding liquidity after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy in September 2008. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, market 
liquidity further deteriorated when many investors exited the market, which is known 
as a liquidity spiral (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). During a period of financial 
crisis, hedge funds can be forced to liquidate by margin calls, which could make 
initial losses worse (Khandani and Lo, 2011).  Thus, a skillful hedge fund manager 
can accurately predict the deterioration of market liquidity and decrease the hedge 
fund’s market exposure before the event.   
      There are several reasons why we investigate hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing ability. First, hedge funds that are managed by sophisticated managers have 
been growing substantially for two decades. During this time, many talented people 
have joined hedge funds as managers. It is natural to find whether these talented 
hedge fund managers have the ability of timing market liquidity. Second, liquidity 
risk management is important for hedge fund management. After the collapse of 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, hedge fund managers have a better 
understanding of the interaction between market liquidity and hedge fund 
performance and are likely to be able to time market liquidity. Third, hedge fund 
managers normally adopt dynamic investment strategies that lead to time-varying 
market exposure over time (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Patton and Ramadorai, 
2013). Kessler and Scherer (2011) confirm that hedge funds could use various types 
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of financial vehicles and investment strategies among different markets. Thus, hedge 
fund managers do not need to adhere to some specific assets. Also, hedge funds tend 
to invest in assets with low level liquidity, which could induce them to have large 
negative returns once in a while during liquidity crisis in exchange for over average 
returns for a long time (Kessler and Scherer, 2011). Hedge funds provide an ideal 
platform to examine professional managers’ liquidity timing ability because of 
timing-varying market exposure of hedge funds and the importance of liquidity to 
hedge funds. Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate whether hedge funds’ superior 
performance is partially attributed to hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity 
timing ability.  
      Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) investigate whether hedge fund managers can 
time equity market liquidity by adjusting the equity market exposure of hedge funds’ 
portfolios based on the forecasts of changes in the equity market liquidity. All the 
hedge funds included in the sample are equity-oriented. The results show that equity-
oriented hedge fund managers are able to time equity liquidity, which are robust to the 
data biases of hedge funds, alternative explanations and other risk factors, timing 
models and liquidity measures. Therefore, it is important to understand how the equity 
market liquidity conditions are related to hedge funds’ investment strategies (Cao et 
al., 2013).  
      Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) investigate the liquidity dynamics 
across the equity and bond markets. A vector autoregressive model for liquidity is 
applied for estimation. The vector in the model includes returns, volatility, bid-ask 
spread, depth and the order flows in the equity and Treasury bond markets. They find 
significant correlation between innovation to stock market liquidity and innovation to 
bond market liquidity, which indicates that there are common factors that drive 
liquidity in equity and bond markets. Furthermore, Chordia et al. (2005) demonstrate 
that, during crisis, monetary expansion policies can be adopted to increase market 
liquidity and bond market liquidity could be predicted by money flows to government 
bond funds. Golyenko and Ukhov (2009) investigate whether there is a liquidity 
linkage between equity and bond markets. They find that the illiquidity of the two 
markets is lead-lag related. The impact of illiquidity in the equity market on illiquidity 
in the bond market follows the trend of flight-to-liquidity or flight-to-quality. Cao et 
al. (2013) find that hedge fund managers have skills to time equity market liquidity. 
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Since the liquidities of equity and bond markets are significantly correlated (Chordia 
et al., 2005), it is reasonable to investigate whether hedge fund managers can time 
bond market liquidity. Khandani and Lo (2011) state that the default of Russian GKO 
government bonds in August 1998 widened credit spreads. The wider credit spreads 
induced extreme losses for LTCM and other fixed income arbitrage hedge funds. 
Hence, understanding the changes of bond market liquidity is important for hedge 
fund managers to manage their portfolios.  
      Chen (2007) introduces the definition of focus market in which a hedge fund has 
most active trading. He finds that convertible arbitrage funds can time the high yield 
bond market and global macro funds show timing ability in the non-U.S. bond market. 
Boney, Comer and Kelly (2009) investigate whether bond fund managers could shift 
asset between cash and bonds and across bonds with different maturities to capture 
the changes in returns. They find strong evidence that these bond fund managers have 
positive timing skills. In addition, Chen, Ferson and Peters (2010) evaluate whether 
bond funds can time nine common factors that are related to bond markets. After 
controlling for non-timing-related nonlinearity, they find weak evidence of manager’s 
positive timing skills.  
      In this chapter, we investigate the dimension of liquidity timing ability of hedge 
fund managers in the fixed income market. We focus on whether managers have the 
skills to time fixed income market liquidity by strategically adjusting hedge funds’ 
fixed income market exposure based on managers’ forecasts of future fixed income 
market liquidity conditions. This is also the contribution of this chapter, which has not 
been investigated in the literature as far as we know. 
      The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we discuss 
our liquidity-timing model and the liquidity measure of the fixed income market, 
respectively. We describe the data in Section 4. In Section 5, we show the empirical 
results of the liquidity-timing ability for the various hedge fund categories. Section 6 
explores alternative explanations that are relevant to funding liquidity, investor 
redemption restrictions, and the impacts of hedge fund trades on fixed income market 
liquidity and financial crisis. Section 7 considers the impacts of hedge fund data 
biases. In Section 8, we examine the robustness of our results to several alternative 
model specifications and risk factors. Section 9 gives the empirical results of liquidity 
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timing skills by applying bootstrap analysis. In Section 10, we focus on the liquidity 
timing skills at individual fund level. Finally, Section 11 concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2 Liquidity timing model 
      Our liquidity timing model is developed from the work of Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966). Generally, a timing model is based on the well-known capital asset pricing 
model, which assumes hedge fund returns follow the process: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝,𝑡𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,   𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇 − 1,                                             (5.1)                              
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return of portfolio 𝑝  in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1  denotes the 
market excess return in month 𝑡 + 1 and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1  stands for the error term in month 
𝑡 + 1. The one month Treasury bill rate is used as the proxy of risk-free rate. The 
hedge fund’s market exposure, 𝛽𝑝,𝑡, can vary over time and is set in month 𝑡 based on 
the hedge fund manager’s forecast of market conditions in month 𝑡 + 1. The market 
beta is modelled as a linear function of a manager’s expected market conditions in 
existing timing models (Admati, Bhattacharya, Ross, and Pfleiderer, 1986; Ferson and 
Schadt, 1996). Shanken (1990) justified the linear functional form by a Taylor 
expansion without higher-order terms. The specification is: 
𝛽𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝𝐸(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+1|𝐼𝑡),                                                         (5.2) 
where 𝐼𝑡 denotes the information set that is available to the hedge fund manager in 
month 𝑡 and the coefficient, 𝛾𝑝, captures the time-varying market beta that reflects the 
manager’s timing ability. In order to investigate liquidity timing skills in the U.S. 
equity market, Cao et al. (2013) adjust equation (5.2) to: 
𝛽𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝(𝐿𝑚,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑚 + 𝜐𝑝,𝑡+1),                                                                 (5.3) 
where 𝐿𝑚,𝑡+1 is the liquidity level in equity market in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑚 denotes the 
average equity market liquidity level and 𝜐𝑝,𝑡+1  stands for a forecast noise that is 
unknown until month 𝑡 + 1. The forecast noises have mean value of zero and are 
independent of each other. The manager’s signal, after de-meaning, is used here for 
interpretation (Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Busse, 1999; Cao et al., 2013).  
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      To get the liquidity timing model, Cao et al. (2013) substitute equation (5.3) into 
equation (5.1) and the forecast noise, 𝜐𝑝,𝑡+1, with error term, 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1. Then the liquidity 
timing model is given by: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝,𝑡𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1(𝐿𝑚,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑚) + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.                               (5.4) 
Hedge funds usually adopt dynamic trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; 
Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001) and invest in derivatives (Chen, 2011). Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) explore the shortcomings of hedge fund indexes used as benchmarks for hedge 
fund performance and propose a seven-factor model as a benchmark. Hedge fund 
analysis is normally based on Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. To 
compare the different benchmarks, we have also explored other widely recognized 
models, including CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models, 
in explaining hedge fund returns. We found that the seven-factor model has much 
higher explanation power than the other three models. In addition, the factors such as 
momentum factor in the Carhart four-factor model have insignificant coefficients. 
Thus, we follow Fung and Hsieh (2004) and employ the seven-factor model in this 
chapter. The seven factors include equity market factor (Standard & Poor’s 500 index 
monthly total return), the size spread factor (Wilshire Small Cap 1750 – Wilshire 
Large Cap 750 monthly return, which has been adjusted to Russell 2000 index 
monthly total return – Standard & Poor’s 500 monthly total return), the bond market 
factor (month-end to month-end change in the U.S. Federal Reserve 10-year constant-
maturity yield), the credit spread factor (month-end to month-end change in the 
difference between Moody’s Baa yield and the Federal Reserve’s 10-year constant-
maturity yield), the bond trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of lookback 
straddles on bond futures), the currency trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of 
lookback straddles on currency futures) and the commodity trend-following factor 
(return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on commodity futures). To get clearer 
liquidity timing skills interpretation used by Cao et al. (2013), the bond market factor 
used in this chapter is calculated by using the U.S. Federal Reserve 10-year constant-
maturity yield at the end of month 𝑡 to minus that at the end of month 𝑡 + 1. 
      In this chapter, we investigate whether hedge fund managers have the skills to 
time liquidity in the fixed income market by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the 
fixed income market based on managers’ forecasts of future fixed income market 
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liquidity conditions. We use the difference between the corporate bond spreads and 
the spreads of credit default swaps (CDS) to measure liquidity level in the fixed 
income market (Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005; Gintschel and Wiehenkamp, 2009; 
Kessler and Scherer, 2011). We adjust the equity market liquidity timing model used 
by Cao et al. (2013) to investigate liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market. 
The liquidity timing model with assumption of normal distribution may induce some 
issues, which will be addressed by bootstrap analysis in sections 5.9 and 5.10. Our 
liquidity-timing model is specified as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,   (5.5) 
where 𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 is the bond market factor in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 denotes the liquidity 
level in the fixed income market in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑏  is the average fixed income 
market liquidity level, 𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1 stands for other factors besides the bond market factor 
and 𝐽 = 6 is this case. The coefficient, 𝜆𝑝, measures hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing ability in the fixed income market. A positive value of 𝜆𝑝 indicates that the 
hedge fund manager has liquidity timing skills by increasing (decreasing) the hedge 
fund’s exposure to the fixed income market prior to the rise (fall) of fixed income 
market liquidity.  
 
5.3 Liquidity measures 
      In this section, we firstly review literature about various liquidity measures in the 
fixed income market. Then we choose and justify the liquidity measures that are used 
in this chapter.  
      To measure bond liquidity, many researchers employ the Treasury quoted bid-ask 
spread that is the difference between the best bid and ask prices (Sarig and Warga, 
1989; Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Houweling, Mentink and Vorst, 
2005; Li and Patton, 2007; Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). Roll measure (Dick-Nielsen, 
Feldhutter and Lando, 2012) and the roundtrip cost (Anderson, 2012; Dick-Nielsen et 
al., 2012) are two proxies for transaction cost. The measure of bond zero-trading days 
is calculated as the percentage of days during a certain period (Dick-Nielsen et al., 
2012). To examine price impact in the fixed income market, two popular liquidity 
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measures, the Amihud measure (Lin, Wang and Wu, 2011; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012) 
and the Pastor and Stambaugh measure (Li, Wang, Wu and He, 2009; Lin et al., 2011), 
are adopted. Turnover is computed as the ratio of total trading volume and amount of 
outstanding shares (Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko and Mallik, 2008; 
Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). The trading information, including quote and trade sizes, 
trading volume and trade frequencies, can be used as proxies of corporate bond 
liquidity (Fleming, 2001; Houweling et al., 2005). Moreover, Houweling et al. (2005) 
add two bond liquidity measures: quote frequencies and the age of a bond. Sarig and 
Warga (1989) propose a proxy for bond liquidity that is measured by the amount of 
market outstanding bonds. Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) focus on transitory components 
to measure illiquidity of corporate bonds. Bushman, Le and Vasvari (2010) find that 
the holdings of the bond can reflect the liquidity of the bond. Chacko (2005) checks 
the one year historical custodial holdings to obtain historical turnover for all holdings. 
The value of weighted average turnover for a bond is used as the latent liquidity 
measure for the bond.  
      Considering the data availability and the ease of calculation, we measure the 
liquidity in the fixed income market by using the difference between the corporate 
bond spreads and CDS spreads. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) state that the 
corporate bond spread is the basic variable that is used to measure liquidity premium. 
In addition, the corporate bond spread is calculated by the difference between the par 
yield on a corporate bond and the par yield on the corresponding government bond. 
The currency and maturity of the corporate bond and government bond should match. 
Under the matching conditions, the corporate bond spread reflects only two 
components. One component is default risk and the other component is liquidity 
premium (Longstaff et al., 2005). CDSs are traded in many active markets and are 
used to protect against the default of varied bonds. The holders of CDSs are insured 
against the loss induced by the default of the corresponding bonds.  Furthermore, the 
fair value of the CDS spread, which is considered as the premium of default risk, 
reflects the expected loss from a default. The CDS market is highly liquid and does 
not reflect the premium of liquidity (Longstaff et al., 2005). The component of default 
risk for bond spreads can be measured by the corresponding CDS spreads. The 
difference between bond spreads and the corresponding CDS spreads reflects only the 
component of liquidity risk and can be used as the liquidity factor proxy. Gintschel 
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and Wiehenkamp (2009) show that the liquidity factor measured by the difference 
between corporate bond spreads and CDS spreads is significantly correlated with 
returns in various fixed income markets. The liquidity premium varies over time but 
consistently explains a fair amount of variation of the fixed income price at both time 
serial and cross-sectional levels. To obtain liquidity proxy of the fixed income market, 
Kessler and Scherer (2011) also use the difference between corporate bond spreads 
and the corresponding CDS spreads as the liquidity proxy.  
 
5.4 Data 
      In this section, we describe the data on hedge funds, the benchmark for hedge 
fund performance and the liquidity measure in the fixed income market. The CDS 
spread data we have starts in March 2005. Concerning the data’s availability and time 
overlap, we use the period of all the above data from March 2005 to December 2012. 
      The data on hedge funds is obtained from Morningstar, which contains extensive 
data sources of hedge funds. Following previous hedge-fund-focused literature (Chen 
2007; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010; Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013), 
we include only hedge funds with at least 10 million dollars of assets under 
management (AUM). Furthermore, all hedge funds in the sample should have at least 
24 monthly returns (Eling and Faust, 2010; Jylha, Rinne and Suominen, 2010; 
Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013).  
      Morningstar classifies hedge funds into 31 categories that are grouped into six 
broad strategy categories: directional equity (Asia/Pacific long/short equity, bear-
market equity, China long/short equity, emerging-markets long/short equity, Europe 
long/short equity, global long/short equity, U.S. long/short equity, U.S. long/short 
small-cap equity, emerging markets long-only equity and long-only equity), 
directional debt (long/short debt and long-only debt), event (distressed securities, 
event-driven and merger arbitrage), global derivatives (currency, global macro, 
systematic futures and volatility), multistrategy (multistrategy, long-only other, fund 
of funds – debt, fund of funds – equity, fund of funds – event, fund of funds – 
macro/systematic, fund of funds – multistrategy and fund of funds – relative value) 
and relative value (convertible arbitrage, debt arbitrage, diversified arbitrage and 
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equity market neutral). We focus on hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills at 
the category level. Hedge funds are organized in different categories, which have 
different investment strategies. Hedge funds in the same category employ similar 
investment strategies. Timing ability is a dynamic asset relocation trading strategy. 
Therefore, for some hedge funds, timing skills are widely applied, which is driven by 
the hedge fund categories’ investment strategies. In section 5.10, we will also 
investigate hedge funds’ liquidity timing skills at the individual fund level. 
      The sizes of the hedge funds vary substantially. The size-weighted average of 
hedge fund returns would be a good way to measure the average hedge fund 
performance at the category level. However, in the database that this study uses, only 
about two thirds of hedge funds reveal their size information and the database does 
not update size information as the changes of hedge fund sizes. Therefore, following 
Chen and Liang (2007), Kessler and Scherer (2011) and Cao et al. (2013), we use the 
arithmetic mean value of the returns of hedge funds in the same category to measure 
the hedge funds’ category overall performance. In the future investigation, we believe 
that the size-weighted average of hedge funds returns should be employed if data was 
available. Panel A of Table 5.1 summarizes hedge funds’ monthly returns. During the 
sample period of 2005-2012, the average monthly return for all hedge funds is 0.486% 
and the standard deviation of the returns is 1.856%. Comparing the six broad strategy 
categories, we find that event hedge funds have the highest average monthly return of 
0.608%. On the other hand, multistrategy hedge funds deliver the lowest average 
monthly return of 0.343%. Overall, the average monthly returns for all categories are 
positive over the sample period. Moreover, we find that the returns of relative value 
hedge funds exhibit the lowest volatility of 1.098%.  
      The benchmark for hedge fund returns are seven-factor model that is proposed by 
Fung and Hsieh (2004). The seven factors include an equity market factor (Standard 
& Poor’s 500 index monthly total return), the size spread factor (Wilshire Small Cap 
1750 – Wilshire Large Cap 750 monthly return, which has been adjusted to Russell 
2000 index monthly total return – Standard & Poor’s 500 monthly total return), the 
bond market factor (month-end to month-end change in the U.S. Federal Reserve 10-
year constant-maturity yield), the credit spread factor (month-end to month-end year 
constant-maturity yield), the bond trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of 
straddles on bond futures), currency trend-following factor (return of a portfolio of  
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Table 5.1  
Summary statistics of the data. 
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25% 75% 
    
Panel A: Summary of average hedge fund returns    
       
Directional Equity 3843 0.501  0.841  2.654  -1.003  2.390  
Directional Debt 531 0.482  0.579  1.281  0.051  1.022  
Event 470 0.608  1.066  2.003  -0.248  1.825  
Global Derivatives 1294 0.568  0.475  1.716  -0.655  1.862  
Multistrategy 5398 0.343  0.591  1.572  -0.402  1.542  
Relative value 786 0.370  0.577  1.098  0.008  1.018 
All 12322 0.486 0.725 1.856  -0.691 1.963  
       
Panel B: Summary of factor data     
      
MKT 0.315  0.938  4.587  -1.917  3.093  
SMB 0.150  -0.048  2.475  -1.418  1.375  
BMF 0.027  0.015  0.270  -0.138  0.183 
CSF 0.013  0.000  0.292  -0.100 0.100  
PTFSBD -3.659  -6.575  15.355  -14.190  1.860  
PTFSFX -0.834  -5.635  20.101  -16.508  7.580  
PTFSCOM -0.747  -3.055  14.498  -9.885  6.165  
      
Panel C: Summary of liquidity measures      
      
LiquidityCORP10-15Y -1.490 -1195 0.956 -1.588 -0.881 
LiquidityCORP7-10Y -1.291 -0.849 1.221 -1.402 -0.618 
LiquidityCORP5-10Y -2.078 -2.014 1.263 -2.323 -0.961 
      
Note: This table provides the statistical summary of the data. Panel A in Table 5.1 summarizes average 
monthly returns on hedge funds in different strategy categories and all hedge funds. The monthly 
returns are in percent per month. N denotes the number of hedge funds that exist during the sample 
period. Panel B summarizes the Fund-Hsieh seven factors that are used to benchmark hedge funds’ 
performance.  Specifically, the Fund-Hsieh seven factors include the market excess return (MKT), a 
size factor (SMB), monthly change in the ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (BMF), monthly 
change in the Moody’s Baa yield less ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (CSF), and three trend-
following factors that are PFTSBD (bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). Panel C 
summarizes the liquidity measures in the fixed income market. LiquidityCORP10-15Y denotes that the 
fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yield of Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit 
spread. LiquidityCORP7-10Y denotes that the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the 
difference between the excess yield of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 
- 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spread. LiquidityCORP5-10Y denotes that the fixed 
income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yield of Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. 
To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are 
multiplied by minus one. Thus, LiquidityCORP10-15Y, LiquidityCORP7-10Y and LiquidityCORP5-
10Y in Panel C stand for fixed income market liquidity measures. The sample period lasts from March 
2005 to December 2012. 
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Fig. 5.1 Time series of monthly fixed income market liquidity. This figure plots three time series of 
monthly fixed income market liquidity measures. LiquidityCORP10-15Y denotes that the fixed income 
market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yield of Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch United States Corporate BBB 10-15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spread. 
LiquidityCORP7-10Y denotes that the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yield of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7-10 Years 
and the corresponding CDX credit spread. LiquidityCORP5-10Y denotes that the fixed income market 
illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yield of Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
United States Corporate BBB 5-10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity 
measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by 
minus one. Thus, LiquidityCORP10-15Y, LiquidityCORP7-10Y and LiquidityCORP5-10Y in this 
figure stand for fixed income market liquidity measures. The sample period lasts from March 2005 to 
December 2012. 
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lookback straddles on currency futures) and commodity trend-following  factor 
(return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on commodity futures). We are really 
grateful that David Hsieh shares the data on bond, currency and commodity trend-
following factors, which can be found through the link: 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. The data used to calculate other 
factors is obtained from Datastream and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. The one-month Treasury bill rate is used as the risk free rate that is 
obtained from Kenneth R. French data library, which can found by the following link: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Panel B of 
Table 5.1 provides the statistical summary for the seven factors. For example, the 
average equity market excess return during the sample period is 0.315% per month 
with a standard deviation of 4.587%.  
      The liquidity measure in the fixed income market is computed as the difference 
between the corporate bond spreads and the CDS spreads. For robustness, we use the 
yields of three corporate bonds: Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years, Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Year and Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years. The yields of corporate bonds are obtained from 
Datastream. The corresponding Treasury bill rates and CDS spreads are downloaded 
from Datastream and Thomson Reuters Eikon, respectively. In Panel C of Table 5.1, 
we report summary statistics of the fixed income market liquidity measures. It is not 
surprising to find that three fixed income market liquidity measures have similar 
statistics. Fig. 5.1 shows the time series of monthly fixed income market liquidity 
measures. We find that the three liquidity measures have similar patterns during the 
whole time period. These liquidity measures dropped dramatically from the beginning 
of 2008 to the middle of 2009, which suggests that fixed income market was illiquid 
during recent financial crisis.    
 
5.5 Empirical results 
      In this section, we firstly describe the empirical results of liquidity timing ability 
in the fixed income market at the level of broad categories. Next, we give the  
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Table 5.2 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for different hedge fund categories. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
Directional 
Equity 
-.2245585 
(-0.65) 
-.167322  
(-0.63) 
-.2410284  
(-0.85) 
Directional 
Debt 
.4878441  
(2.96***) 
.3856806  
(3.07***) 
.3386987  
(2.49**) 
Event .2727508  
(1.18) 
.2113639  
(1.20) 
.166086  
(0.88) 
Global 
Derivatives 
-.2048086  
(-0.56) 
-.149899  
(-0.53) 
-.2045013  
(-0.68) 
Multistrategy 
All 
.094516  
(0.39) 
.0738441  
(0.39) 
.0275344  
(0.14) 
Relative Value .1305864  
(0.87) 
.1098339  
(0.96) 
.0663584  
(0.54) 
All 
 
 
-.0864972  
(-0.32) 
-.0608323  
(-0.30) 
-.1213289  
(-0.56) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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explanations and interpretations of the empirical results based on the specifications 
and descriptions of different strategy categories. Finally, we explore the liquidity 
timing ability of hedge funds in the subgroups of broad categories that show 
statistically significant liquidity timing coefficients.  
      We employ equation (5.5) to investigate the liquidity timing skill for different 
hedge fund categories. Table 5.2 reports the coefficients of the fixed income market 
liquidity timing factor at hedge fund category level. In particular, we find that only 
hedge funds in the directional debt category have significantly positive liquidity 
timing coefficients, among which two coefficients are highly significant at 1% level 
and one coefficient is significant at 5% level. However, the managers of hedge funds 
in the other category do not exhibit successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed 
income market. Hence managers of directional debt category hedge funds have 
exhibited the ability to increase (decrease) portfolios’ fixed income market exposure 
prior to a rise (fall) of fixed income market liquidity, which induces a concavity 
connection between hedge fund returns and fixed income market liquidity level.   
      To explain and interpret the different liquidity timing abilities, we focus on the 
description of hedge fund investment strategies and the description is shown in Table 
5.3. According to this, hedge funds in the directional debt category focus on the price 
changes in fixed income products. Usually, hedge fund managers generate fixed 
investment portfolios by using a range of fixed income products such as emerging-
market, high-volatility or high-yield debts. Leverage is widely adopted by hedge fund 
managers to generate higher returns. Compared with debt arbitrage hedge funds, 
directional debt hedge funds are more likely to show a net long exposure to the fixed 
income market. Therefore, combining the market concentration, products used and 
investment strategies adopted, it would be expected that the managers of directional 
debt hedge funds have the ability to time the liquidity in the fixed income market to 
prevent the loss during fixed income market’ liquidity downturn and generate superior 
returns in the preferred market liquidity conditions.  
      Table 5.3 reveals that the primary market in which directional equity hedge funds 
invest is the equity market. Based on their investment strategies, these hedge funds 
usually take net long or short position on the equity market, unlike arbitrage funds 
that take arbitrage opportunities and offset equity market exposure with balanced long  
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Table 5.3  
Description of investing strategies for different hedge funds’ categories. 
 
Strategies 
 
 
Description 
 
Panel A: Description of six broad strategies 
 
Directional 
Equity 
Funds in the directional-equity category grouping primarily invest in stocks and 
may take long or short positions. Managers may also use options to leverage their 
position or to hedge. Hedge funds with more-varied degrees of short positions are 
likelier to have different risk parameters, beta exposures, and return streams than 
traditional long-only funds or indexes. These funds will usually have either net 
long or net short market exposure to equities, unlike arbitrage funds, which tend 
to balance out long and short equity-market exposures. 
 
Directional Debt Funds in the directional-debt category study broad-based changes and prices in 
fixed-income products. In many cases, the manager will select various fixed-
income products such as high-yield or emerging-markets debt to provide a fixed 
investment stream. Many debt funds leverage their returns to provide larger 
returns. Unlike debt arbitrage funds, these types of funds tend to have a net long 
market exposure. 
 
Event Funds in the broad event category grouping attempt to profit when stock or bond 
prices change in response to certain corporate actions, such as bankruptcy, 
mergers, or acquisitions. Managers will typically use short positions or 
derivatives to hedge their market exposure. These positions help the fund capture 
the price change related to the event itself and insulate the fund from broad 
market changes. 
 
Global 
Derivatives 
Funds in the global-derivatives category group study broad-based changes and 
prices in global markets. Often, these funds make tactical decisions about an 
optimal global asset-allocation mix, and they use equities, bonds, currencies, 
derivatives, and commodities in their portfolios. Many managers look for 
emerging trends in countries, industries, and geopolitical institutions. Some 
managers will also attempt to profit from general market volatility during times of 
uncertainty. 
 
Multistrategy The multistrategy broad asset class contains the hedge funds that merge multiple 
techniques into one single fund. 
 
Relative Value Funds in the relative-value category grouping study the pricing relationship 
between pairs of related securities. Managers take a long position in the security 
that appears to be underpriced and a short position in the security that appears to 
be overpriced. The manager will hold the positions until the pricing discrepancy 
disappears. These strategies are usually market neutral. Because markets are 
generally efficient, pricing discrepancies are typically very small and short-lived. 
Therefore, these funds are frequently highly leveraged, using borrowed money to 
increase the size of possible gains. 
 
Panel B: Description of funds in Directional Debt category 
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Long/Short Debt These funds primarily take directional positions in global debt. Long and short 
positions are typically independent of each other. Positions do not fully offset 
each other, and result in net exposures less than -20% or greater than 20% in a 
majority of periods. The majority of the funds’ assets are invested in debt 
investments, but the fund manager may also include other instruments. These 
funds may invest in emerging markets debt, U.S. debt, and global debt, along with 
credit default swaps. At least 75% of the exposure is tied to fixed-income 
investments, and short exposure is greater than 20%. 
 
Long-only Debt This category includes long-only debt strategies in performing debt instruments. 
Included strategies are DIP financing, mezzanine financing, private debt, high 
yield debt, leveraged debt strategies and other specialty finance funds. At least 
75% of the exposure is tied to fixed income, and there is no material short 
exposure. 
 
Note: Sources come from the Morningstar Category Classifications for Hedge funds 
(http://corporate.morningstar.com/uk/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/Mornin
gstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf).  
 
and short equity market positions. In order to leverage and hedge portfolios’ positions 
in the equity market, hedge funds could employ equity market related options and 
other derivatives. Comparing to traditional funds with long positions or market 
indexes, hedge funds that take short positions tend to have different equity market 
beta exposure, risk characteristics and distribution of returns. Hence, we can logically 
predict that directional equity hedge funds do not exhibit liquidity timing skill in the 
fixed income market because of their heavy equity market concentration. Although 
the managers of hedge funds in the directional equity category are equity market 
focused, managers of different sub-categories of directional equity hedge funds could 
have quite different opinions on the trend of the market, which may offset the 
liquidity timing ability at the category level. 
      According to Table 5.3, managers of event hedge funds generate profit by taking 
advantage of the changes in stock and bond prices that are linked to certain corporate 
actions, such as merger, bankruptcy and acquisition. Normally, shorting and 
derivatives are adopted to reduce hedge funds’ market exposure, which helps 
managers focus on profit opportunities related to events and insulate hedge funds 
from the changes of broad markets. Event hedge funds can be classified into three 
sub-categories: distressed securities, event-driven and merger arbitrage. Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2001) find the concavity of returns on merger arbitrage hedge funds, which 
indicates that these hedge funds have larger market exposure during down markets 
than that in up markets. The managers of merger arbitrage hedge funds expected 
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higher market risks during the downturns of markets because of the high probability 
of failure of merger and acquisition in such market conditions (Mitchell and Pulvino, 
2001). Concavity of returns reflects poor timing ability, which may induce lack of 
liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market for the managers of event hedge 
funds.  
      Hedge funds in the global derivatives category mainly invest in global markets. 
Usually, these hedge funds’ managers optimise their portfolios’ asset allocations by 
using various financial products, such as equity, bonds, currencies, commodities and 
derivatives. Managers always focus on the emerging trends that happen in industries, 
geopolitical institutions and countries. During uncertain period, hedge fund managers 
may try to generate profit from the volatility of markets.  Fung, Xu and Yau (2002) 
find that hedge funds in the global derivatives category do not show timing ability in 
the world equity market. Our empirical results provide further evidence that these 
hedge funds do not have liquidity timing skill in the fixed income market. Although, 
the hedge fund managers take positions in many markets in different countries, their 
portfolios’ exposure to the currency market is low because of their high frequency of 
alternation between long and short positions (Chen, 2007). The main investment 
strategy for these hedge funds is trend following, which could be considered as a 
timing ability. However, the hedge funds’ diversified investments in equity, fixed 
income, foreign exchange and commodity markets could lead to the insignificant 
coefficients of fixed income market liquidity timing ability in Table 5.2. 
      Table 5.3 shows that multistrategy hedge funds employ multiply investment 
strategies that their portfolios expose to. In most cases, the portfolios of multistrategy 
hedge funds are divided into many sub-portfolios that are allocated to a range of 
portfolio managers, each of whom concentrates on a different investment strategy. 
Fund of funds use external investment strategies and portfolio managers are paid with 
a second layer of performance and management fees. The strategies adopted by 
multistrategy hedge fund managers may have slight changes over time to adapt the 
market movements. The statistical insignificance of liquidity timing coefficients for 
multistrategy hedge funds could be attributed to the adoption of multiple investment 
strategies, which may make the hedge fund managers’ skills in the fixed income 
market less obvious.  
 65 
 
      Table 5.3 shows that relative value hedge funds invest in the prices relation 
between pairs of connected financial products. The managers of hedge funds take 
long or short positions in those underpriced and overpriced assets, respectively. 
Managers only hold the positions in assets when the pairs of prices are discrepant. 
With both long and short positions, the portfolios of relative value hedge funds are 
always market neutral. The discrepancies of pairs of prices are normally quite small 
and last short period of time in efficient markets. In order to enlarge the scale of 
potential profit, relative value hedge fund managers use high leverages. The reason 
for no evidence of liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market could be that 
relative value hedge funds focus on the profiting from mispriced assets rather than 
forecasting the trend of fixed income market liquidity.  
      Table 5.2 shows that only hedge funds in the directional debt category have the 
liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market, whereas hedge funds in the other 
five categories do not show any evidence of managers’ liquidity timing skills. We 
now turn to focus on hedge funds in the directional-debt category. 
      Panel B of Table 5.3 gives the description of directional debt hedge funds’ two 
sub-categories, which are long/short debt and long-only debt. Hedge funds in the 
long/short debt category primarily take independent long and short positions in the 
global debt market. Usually, the long and short positions do not completely offset. 
Thus, in most of the period, the net market exposures of hedge fund portfolios are 
either greater than 20% or less than -20%. These hedge fund managers invest in debts 
and debt related investments, such as global debt, U.S. debt, emerging market debt 
and CDS. According to Panel B in Table 5.3, overall, at least 75% of portfolios 
expose to fixed income products and over 20% of short positions. Hedge funds in the 
long-only debt category adopt investment strategies, such as private debt, mezzanine 
financing, DIP financing, leverage debt strategies, high yield debt and other specialty 
finance. Overall, at least 75% of portfolios expose to the fixed income market without 
considerable short exposure.  
      Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 give the empirical results for directional debt, long/short 
debt and long-only debt hedge funds by using three comparable liquidity measures in 
the fixed income market. Long/short debt and long-only debt are two sub-categories 
of the directional debt category. We can find that hedge funds in the same category  
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Table 5.4 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing model (LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y). 
  
Directional Debt 
 
 
Long/short Debt 
 
Long-only Debt 
Bond Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0086433  
(-1.46) 
-.0082763  
(-1.32) 
-.0122701  
(-1.76*) 
Currency Trend-
Following Factor 
.0003505 
 (0.08) 
.0020075  
(0.43) 
-.0053883  
(-1.04) 
Commodity Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0077704  
(-1.40) 
-.0075645  
(-1.28) 
-.0120501  
(-1.84*) 
Equity Market Factor .1017607  
(5.06***) 
.1020263 
(4.78***) 
.0965915  
(4.08***) 
The Size Spread 
Factor 
-.0361838 
 (-1.14) 
-.0298967  
(-0.89) 
-.0585695  
(-1.57) 
The Bond Market 
Factor 
1.60195  
(4.45***) 
1.508714 
(3.95***) 
2.107982  
(4.98***) 
The Credit Spread 
Factor   
-2.99973  
(-9.14***) 
-3.135855 
 (-9.01***) 
-2.493049  
(-6.46***) 
𝜆 .4878441  
(2.96***) 
.4231157 
 (2.42**) 
.7723135  
(3.98***) 
Constant 
 
.281474 
(3.92***) 
.2911224  
(3.82***) 
.1828213  
(2.16**) 
Adjusted R^2 0.7482 0.7330 0.6609 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in 
the fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 5.5 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing model (LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y). 
  
Directional Debt 
 
 
Long/short Debt 
 
Long-only Debt 
Bond Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0090149  
(-1.54) 
-.008596  
(-1.38) 
-.0129106  
(-1.87*) 
Currency Trend-
Following Factor 
.0004379  
(0.10) 
.002083  
(0.45) 
-.005242  
(-1.02) 
Commodity Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0078143  
(-1.41) 
-.0076039  
(-1.29) 
-.0120944  
(-1.85*) 
Equity Market Factor .1025657  
(5.11***) 
.1027357  
(4.82***) 
.0976323  
(4.14***) 
The Size Spread 
Factor 
-.0371482  
(-1.18) 
-.0307187  
(-0.92) 
-.0603984  
(-1.63) 
The Bond Market 
Factor 
1.623442  
(4.51***) 
1.527769  
(4.00***) 
2.133386  
(5.05***) 
The Credit Spread 
Factor   
-3.006822  
(-9.20***) 
-3.141918  
(-9.06***) 
-2.506113  
(-6.53***) 
𝜆 .3856806  
(3.07***) 
.3348647  
(2.51**) 
.6031453  
(4.09***) 
Constant 
 
.2793206  
(3.90***) 
.2892573  
(3.81***) 
.1793575  
(2.13**) 
Adjusted R^2 0.7500 0.7344 0.6637 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in 
the fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 5.6 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing model (LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y). 
  
Directional Debt 
 
 
Long/short Debt 
 
Long-only Debt 
Bond Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0086582  
(-1.44) 
-.0083251  
(-1.31) 
-.0118993  
(-1.68*) 
Currency Trend-
Following Factor 
.0001763  
(0.04) 
.0018643  
(0.40) 
-.00575  
(-1.10) 
Commodity Trend-
Following Factor 
-.0076088  
(-1.35) 
-.0074115  
(-1.24) 
-.011937  
(-1.80*) 
Equity Market Factor .1003202  
(4.91***) 
.1006612  
(4.67***) 
.0955812  
(3.98***) 
The Size Spread 
Factor 
-.0414092  
(-1.29) 
-.0345626  
(-1.02) 
-.0653741  
(-1.74*) 
The Bond Market 
Factor 
1.536738  
(4.21***) 
1.447931  
(3.76***) 
2.051113  
(4.78***) 
The Credit Spread 
Factor   
-3.001548  
(-9.00***) 
-3.138609  
(-8.91***) 
-2.483  
(-6.33***) 
𝜆 .3386987  
(2.49**) 
.2897931  
(2.02**) 
.5797374  
(3.63***) 
Constant 
 
.2834189    
(3.89***) 
.292728  
(3.80***) 
.1867919  
(2.18**) 
Adjusted R^2 0.7412 0.7277 0.6515 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in 
fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-
statistics are in the parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated 
by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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share quite similar empirical results in three tables. Overall, hedge funds in these three 
categories are significantly exposed to the equity market factor, the bond market 
factor and the credit spread factor, which indicates the hedge funds’ focused markets 
and are robust to three comparable fixed income market liquidity measures. More 
importantly, the coefficients of fixed income liquidity timing factor are statistically 
significant for all hedge funds, which reflect hedge fund managers’ successful 
liquidity timing skills by adjusting portfolios’ fixed income market exposure based on 
their forecasts about the future fixed income market liquidity. All the values of 
constants or alphas are significantly positive, which means that hedge fund managers 
have the selection skill to generate superior returns. Next, we focus on the values of 
adjusted R squares to check the explanatory power of our models. We get very high 
values of adjusted R squares: even the lowest for long-only debt hedge funds is above 
65%. Therefore, we can conclude that the benchmark can well explain the variations 
of hedge funds’ returns. Moreover, hedge funds in the long-only debt category also 
have significant exposure to bond trend-following factor and bond commodity trend-
following factor. They only significantly expose to the size spread factor in Table 5.6. 
Thus, long-only debt hedge funds tend to have more diverse investment strategies. 
Comparing the overall fits of the modes in the three tables, we notice that the t-
statistics of coefficients of liquidity timing factor in Table 5.6 are slightly smaller than 
those in the other two tables.  
 
5.6 Alternative interpretations 
      In this section, we investigate some alternative interpretations for the robustness 
of our empirical results. We investigate whether the leverage and funding constraints 
can affect hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability. Moreover, we are concerned 
with the redemption restrictions on hedge fund investors. We also examine the size 
effects on market liquidity. Finally, we consider the impact of financial crisis on 
managers’ liquidity timing ability.  
 70 
 
5.6.1 Leverage and funding constraints 
      One of our concerns is that the hedge funds’ usage of leverage may drive the 
liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market. Usually, the prime brokers use 
short-term funding to provide leverage to hedge funds. However, sudden margin calls 
can force hedge funds to liquidate their assets’ positions. During the period of 
liquidity crisis, these forced liquidations could happen to many hedge funds 
simultaneously. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that, due to the 
destabilization of margins, funding liquidity and market liquidity of the assets can be 
mutually reinforcing during market liquidity shocks, which leads to the appearance of 
liquidity spirals. It is possible that the hedge funds’ reduction of exposure to the fixed 
income market during liquidity crisis periods could be due to the increase of 
borrowing costs or cutting of funding by prime brokers. Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) suggest that fire sales, which force hedge funds to liquidate their positions with 
low prices, could induce considerable loss to these hedge funds. Ang, Gorovyy and 
van Inwegen (2011) find that leverage, which is described as a symbol of hedge funds, 
is much less used, especially after the failure of LTCM in 1998, with the average of 
long-only leverage ratio and net ratio of 1.36 and 0.58, respectively. The managers’ 
liquidity timing ability should be attributed to their managerial skills rather than the 
usage of leverage. In addition, if the variation of hedge funds’ fixed income market 
exposure comes from the fluctuations in the usage of leverage, then those hedge funds 
without using leverage should not show liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market.  
      Table 5.7 reports the coefficients of liquidity timing factor for two hedge fund 
groups. One group of hedge funds use leverage and the other group do not. 
Comparing the results of Panels A and B in Table 5.7, we find that, no matter whether 
leverage is used or not, hedge funds in directional debt and long/short debt categories 
exhibit successful liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market. Furthermore, 
long-only debt hedge funds in the two groups show different characteristics on the 
managers’ liquidity timing skill. However, the insignificance of liquidity timing 
coefficients for long-only debt hedge funds may not be reliable. This is because there 
is only one hedge fund in the long-only debt category disclosing its none leverage use, 
which could lead to biased interpretation. Based on the results in Table 5.7, we can  
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Table 5.7 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds that use and do not use 
leverage. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: Results for hedge funds that use leverage 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.9005456  
(2.35**) 
 
.7050221  
(2.41**) 
 
.6580212  
(2.10**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.8695195  
(2.09**) 
.6818061  
(2.15**) 
.6345044  
(1.86*) 
Long-only Debt 1.18067  
(4.49***) 
.9159782  
(4.57***) 
.8680722  
(3.97***) 
 
Panel B: Results for hedge funds that do not use leverage 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.4419366  
(2.47**) 
 
.3546185  
(2.61**) 
 
.3274061  
(2.24**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.4646794  
(2.41**) 
.3719868  
(2.53**) 
.3462525  
(2.20**) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
-.0519911  
(-1.27) 
-.0384875   
(-1.24) 
-.0517642  
(-1.51) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 5.8 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for the 
impact of funding constraints. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
 
.6690296  
(3.14***) 
 
.5639913  
(3.38***) 
 
.4326945  
(2.50**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
 
.6127022  
(2.71***) 
.5175256  
(2.92***) 
.3934813  
(2.15**) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.8955352  
(3.55***) 
.7396451  
(3.74***) 
.6314164  
(3.09***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 denotes the TED 
spread in month 𝑡 + 1 . The dependent variables include a bond market factor ( 𝐵𝑀𝐹 ), which is 
measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a credit spread 
factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1  is the fixed 
income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏  is the mean level of fixed income market 
liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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conclude that the usage of leverage does not cause or affect our findings about hedge 
fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market.  
      To control for the influence of market funding constraints, we employ the TED 
measure, which is the difference between the three-month London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury bill rate (Brunnermeier et al., 2008; 
Banti and Phylaktis, 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Nucera and Valente, 2013). The 
TED spread reflects the market perceived counterparty default risk. The increase of 
counterparty default risk, which is indicated by a wider TED spread, implies that 
prime brokers are willing to provide higher leverage to the market. Considering the 
effect of TED spread, we modify equation (5.5) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                            (5.6) 
where 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 denotes the TED spread in month 𝑡 + 1. 
      Table 5.8 shows the liquidity timing results by considering the impact of funding 
constraints. We find that all the liquidity timing coefficients of hedge funds in those 
three debt-related categories are statistically significant, which is based on equation 
(5.6). Furthermore, the majority of liquidity timing coefficients are significant at 1% 
level, which strongly suggests that hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills 
in the fixed income market. Therefore, the evidence of successful liquidity timing 
ability does not change after controlling for the influence of TED spread.  
5.6.2 Investor restrictions 
      Besides the leverage and funding constraints we discuss above, the restrictions to 
investor redemptions could cause changes in the hedge funds’ exposure to the fixed 
income market. This is because, under the pressure from investors’ withdrawal of 
their capital, hedge fund managers need to liquidate their positions, which induces 
reduction of market exposure (Khandani and Lo, 2011). Especially during the 
financial crisis in 2008, many hedge funds experienced tremendous demand of 
investor redemptions and closed out their asset holdings. In this section, we focus on 
three aspects of investor restrictions to examine the impact of these restrictions on 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability.  
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      First, we consider the liquidity timing skills for hedge funds with an advance 
notice period of 60 days or over. The advance period is the amount of time that 
investors are required by hedge funds to provide before withdrawing capital (Aragon, 
2007). The advance notice period gives hedge fund managers a period to adjust 
portfolios’ market positions to meet with withdrawal requests from investors. The 
advance notice period can reduce the impact of quick redemptions on hedge fund 
management. Second, we investigate liquidity timing ability by using those hedge 
funds with redemption frequency of one quarter or longer. Redemption frequency 
means the frequency that is given to investors to withdraw their capital. A longer 
redemption frequency can prevent hedge funds from experiencing sudden rapid 
capital redemptions, especially during the period of market liquidity crisis. Therefore, 
investor redemption pressure should not be greater for hedge funds with lower 
redemption frequency. Finally, we employ hedge funds with a lockup period of 12 
months or over to investigate managers’ liquidity timing ability in the fixed income 
market. Lockup period is the period during which investors are not allowed to 
withdraw their capital (Aragon, 2007). The lockup period helps hedge fund managers 
avoid the problems of liquidating positions during the period.  
      Aragon (2007) shows that hedge funds that use investor restrictions, such as 
advance notice period and lockup period, generate higher alpha than hedge funds 
without restrictions. The restrictions allow hedge fund managers to efficiently manage 
their illiquid assets and the higher alpha can be considered as the compensation for 
illiquid holdings. The ways of dealing with illiquid assets can reflect whether hedge 
fund managers have the ability to time market liquidity.  
      Panels A, B and C in Table 5.9 report the empirical results of the coefficients of 
the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with investor restrictions of advance notice 
period, redemption frequency and lockup period. We find that our previous 
interpretation that hedge fund managers can time fixed income market liquidity 
remain unchanged. Most of the coefficients of the liquidity timing factor are 
statistically significant at 1% level, which strongly supports managers’ successful 
liquidity timing skill. Results for hedge funds with long advance notice period, low 
redemption frequency and long lockup period suggest that liquidity timing ability is 
derived from hedge fund managers’ liquidity managerial skills in the fixed income 
market, but not from the forced redemption decisions.  
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Table 5.9 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with investor restrictions. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: Results for hedge funds with advance notice period of 60 days or over  
Directional 
Debt 
1.03547 
(4.36***) 
.816571 
(4.53***) 
.8070127 
(4.14***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.9847063  
(4.10***) 
.7768225  
(4.26***) 
.763922  
(3.88***) 
Long-only Debt 1.235468  
(3.50***) 
.9747465  
(3.63***) 
.9734872  
(3.37***) 
 
Panel B: Results for hedge funds with redemption frequency of one quarter or longer 
Directional 
Debt 
.8498245 
(3.33***) 
.6603639 
(3.40***) 
.6256131 
(2.98***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.7272439  
(2.77***) 
.5683526  
(2.84***) 
.5289571  
(2.45**) 
Long-only Debt 1.728976  
(5.03***) 
1.324516  
(5.04***) 
1.311947  
(4.60***) 
 
Panel C: Results for hedge funds with lockup period of 12 months or over 
Directional 
Debt 
.6603801 
(2.38**) 
.4999955 
(2.36**) 
.4774315 
(2.10**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.621057  
(2.05**) 
.4656869  
(2.01**) 
.4439018  
(1.79*) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.8603431  
(2.86***) 
.6813852  
(2.98***) 
.639437  
(2.59**) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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5.6.3 The impact of trades on fixed income market liquidity 
      In this subsection, we take into account the impact of hedge fund trades on 
empirical results on fixed income market liquidity timing ability. Liquidity timing 
ability is the hedge fund managers’ ability to adjust hedge funds’ market exposure in 
month 𝑡 based on managers’ forecasts on the changes in market liquidity in month 
𝑡 + 1. However, it is possible that the hedge funds’ trades in month 𝑡 could influence 
the fixed income market liquidity in month 𝑡 + 1. For instance, if hedge funds with 
large size simultaneously liquidate their positions in the fixed income market in 
month 𝑡, then liquidity level in the fixed income market could reduce in month 𝑡 + 1, 
leading to a possible relationship between hedge funds’ exposure to the fixed income 
market and the fixed income market liquidity (Cao et al., 2013).  
      To reduce the impact of large trades on fixed income market liquidity, we 
examine the empirical studies for two subgroups with hedge funds’ assets under 
management (AUM) of less than $150 million and less than $50 million, respectively. 
According to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, the regulation of hedge funds applies only to those hedge funds with AUM of at 
least $150 million, which is used to distinguish large size and small size hedge funds 
in the sample.  
      Table 5.10 shows the liquidity timing coefficient results for two hedge fund 
samples with different AUM. Except for the long/short debt hedge fund with AUM 
less than $50 million, the other hedge funds show successful liquidity timing skills in 
the fixed income market. Note that only about one third of hedge funds in the 
long/short debt category report that their AUM are less than $50 million, which could 
bias the result. It is more important to find significant coefficients for long/short debt 
hedge funds with AUM less than $150 million because the hedge fund regulation 
mentioned above only applies to hedge funds with AUM of at least $150 million. 
Therefore, hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing ability in the fixed 
income market is not driven by hedge fund trades in the fixed income market. 
5.6.4 The impact of financial crisis 
      Hedge fund managers could exhibit different managerial skills during different  
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Table 5.10 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for small hedge funds. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: Results for hedge funds with AUM less than $150 million 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.6105018  
(3.66***) 
 
.4790121  
(3.77***) 
 
.4344282  
(3.14***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.3807713  
(2.22**) 
.2972896  
(2.27**) 
.2526662  
(1.80*) 
Long-only Debt 1.929932  
(5.46***) 
1.51492  
(5.66***) 
1.493399  
(5.11***) 
 
Panel B: Results for hedge funds with AUM less than $50 million 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.5457539  
(2.67***) 
 
.4330893  
(2.78***) 
 
.3723564  
(2.21**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.3044722  
(1.53) 
.2368366  
(1.56) 
.1804951  
(1.11) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
2.190576  
(4.31***) 
1.772411  
(4.62***) 
1.681378  
(4.02***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 5.11 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds before and after the start of 
financial crisis periods. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: Results for hedge funds up to June 2007 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.1000732  
(0.02) 
 
1.08589  
(0.36) 
 
.5169718  
(0.14) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.5093403  
(0.11) 
1.439817  
(0.43) 
.4773918  
(0.12) 
Long-only Debt -3.585065  
(-0.63) 
-1.907176  
(-0.44) 
1.626149  
(0.31) 
 
Panel B: Results for hedge funds from July 2007 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.652609  
(3.29***) 
 
.4958655  
(3.33***) 
 
.5458522  
(3.16***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.5798903  
(2.71***) 
.4401273  
(2.75***) 
.4853286  
(2.61***) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.8857579  
(3.71***) 
.6752399  
(3.78***) 
.7402745  
(3.55***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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market conditions. Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012) and Schaub and 
Schmid (2013) choose the start of the recent financial crisis in July 2007. Following 
these existing studies, we divide our sample into the period before the start of the 
financial crisis from March 2005 to June 2007 and the period after the start of the 
financial crisis from July 2007 to December 2012. We investigate hedge fund 
managers’ liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market in these two periods. 
Panel A in Table 5.11 shows that hedge funds do not exhibit liquidity timing skills 
during the period before the start of the financial crisis. However, the period before 
the start of the financial crisis is quite short, so the results for this period may not be 
reliable. According to the results in Panel B in Table 5.11, on the other hand, we find 
statistically significant coefficients of liquidity timing factor during the period after 
the start of the financial crisis, which indicates that hedge fund managers can 
efficiently use their managerial skills by adjusting hedge funds’ fixed income market 
exposure after the start of the recent financial crisis.  
      In summary, no evidence shows that our findings of successful liquidity timing 
ability in the fixed income market are driven by the usage of leverage, funding 
constraints, investor redemption restrictions and the impact of hedge fund trades. 
Moreover, we have found that hedge fund managers efficiently use their liquidity 
timing skills in the fixed income market after the start of the recent financial crisis. 
 
5.7 The impact of data biases 
      The data of hedge funds could have some biases because of the freedom of 
regulation to hedge funds and these data biases may influence the accuracy of 
empirical results. In this section, we consider the impact of hedge fund data biases on 
the findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market.  
      According to Asness, Krail and Liew (2001), survivorship bias is attributed to the 
reason that a dataset excludes all or part of returns for dead or dissolved hedge funds. 
Dead hedge funds normally have very poor historical returns. Survivorship bias could 
induce a high estimation for hedge funds’ performance. To alleviate the effect of 
survivorship bias, we remain both live and dead hedge funds in our sample. The 
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database does not maintain dead funds before 1994, which induces survivorship bias 
for the period before 1994. However, the early period problem does not apply to us 
for the reason that the sample we use covers only the period from March 2005 to 
December 2012.  
      According to Fung and Hsieh (2000), when a new hedge fund is added into a 
database, its historical returns are often backfilled, which is called backfill bias. The 
backfill bias exists because hedge fund managers normally self-disclose their 
performance to data vendors only after their track records are established. Managers 
usually use good track records to advertise themselves. To reduce the impact of 
backfill bias, we delete the first 12 monthly returns for each hedge fund by following 
previous literature (Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Patton, 2009; Aggarwal and 
Jorion, 2010; Eling and Faust 2010; Avramov, Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2011; Fung 
and Hsieh, 2011; Siegmann and Stefanova, 2011; Teo, 2011; Cao et al., 2013). Table 
5.12 reports the coefficients of the liquidity timing factor after controlling for hedge 
funds’ backfill bias. It is clear to see that the majority of coefficients of the liquidity 
timing factor are statistically significant at 1% level. Hence, after controlling for 
backfill bias, hedge fund managers still hold successful liquidity timing skills in the 
fixed income market, which is consistent with previous findings. One thing that 
should be noted is that the sample used for Table 5.12 tends to have a longer period. 
This is because we set a requirement that each hedge fund should have at least 24 
monthly returns after deleting the first 12 monthly returns. Some hedge funds with 
short return history are not considered for the analysis. 
      A third party needs permission from a hedge fund manager to release information 
about the hedge fund (Fung and Hsieh, 2000). According to Brown, Goetzmann and 
Park (2001), it is voluntary for hedge fund managers to report hedge funds’ 
information to a database. Thus, the selection bias may lead to upward bias. However, 
according to Fung and Hsieh (1997), the selection bias for hedge funds should be 
limited because some hedge funds with superior performance choose not to disclose 
their information. Therefore, both the top and bottom performing hedge funds are less 
motivated to report their information to the database. Furthermore, even if some 
hedge funds are excluded from a database, those hedge funds that still report their 
information to the database must present strong persistence of performance to bias the 
results (Asness, Krail and Liew, 2001). 
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Table 5.12 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for backfill 
bias. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.4919781  
(2.74***) 
 
.3899238  
(2.85***) 
 
.3331722  
(2.25**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.4105661  
(2.17**) 
.324483  
(2.25**) 
.2731881  
(1.76*) 
Long-only Debt 
 
.8227933  
(3.61***) 
 
.6512786  
(3.76***) 
.5950539  
(3.16***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed 
income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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      Fung and Hsieh (2000) state that multi-period sampling bias occurs because 
researchers often require that hedge funds must have enough historical performance 
information before they can be included in a data sample for an investigation. The 
requirement of sufficient historical information may or may not be a problem, which 
requirement of sufficient historical information may or may not be a problem, which 
depends on the context a research focuses on. For example, for investors who invest 
in only hedge funds with at least 24 monthly returns, the investigation of hedge funds 
having at least 24 monthly returns will not bias the results. After examining the effect 
of requiring hedge funds with a minimum return history on their average returns, 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) conclude that multi-period sampling bias has a very small 
impact.   
      Funding bias exists because hedge funds without receiving funding can never be 
observed (Ang, Rhodes-Kropf and Zhao, 2008). However, investors should not care 
about a hedge fund with funding bias because the hedge fund is not an approachable 
investment vehicle. Denvir and Hutson (2006) find that liquidity bias occurs to a 
disappearing hedge fund that chooses to stop reporting in the lead up to liquidation. 
According to Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), the impact of liquidity 
bias is limited.  
      In summary, we have investigated hedge fund liquidity timing ability in the fixed 
income market after controlling for data biases, such as survivorship bias, backfill 
bias, selection bias, multi-period sampling bias, funding bias and liquidity bias. We 
conclude that our findings of managers’ liquidity timing skills are not driven by hedge 
fund data biases. 
 
5.8 Other robustness checks 
      In this section, we examine our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful 
liquidity timing skills with different robustness checks. We use alternative liquidity 
timing models by controlling for market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk 
factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors, respectively.  
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5.8.1 Fixed income market return and volatility timing 
      Fixed income market liquidity is positively related to fixed income market returns 
and negatively related to fixed income market volatility (Chordia, Sarkar and 
Subrahmanyam, 2005). Because hedge fund managers may have the ability to time 
fixed income market returns or volatility, managers’ liquidity timing skills may 
partially reflect their return or volatility timing skills. To investigate this possibility, 
we control for fixed income market return and volatility timing skills and adjust the 
equation (5.5) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 =
𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑1𝐵𝑀𝐹
2
𝑡+1 + 𝜑2𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏,𝑡+1 −
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                              (5.7) 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏,𝑡+1 denotes the realized fixed income market volatility in month 𝑡 + 1, 
which is calculated as the standard deviation of daily market returns in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏 is the mean value of fixed income market volatility. 
      Table 5.13 reports the empirical results for liquidity timing skills in the fixed 
income market. All the coefficients of liquidity timing factor are statistically 
significant at 1% level, which supports hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity 
timing ability in the fixed income market after controlling for fixed income market 
return and volatility timing. Thus, managers’ liquidity timing skills are not attributed 
to the positive relation between fixed income market liquidity and returns or the 
negative relation between fixed income market liquidity and volatility. The positively 
significant results in Table 5.13 emphasize the importance of liquidity timing to hedge 
funds’ professional portfolio management.  
5.8.2 Liquidity risk factor 
      The benchmark we use to evaluate hedge funds’ performance is the seven-factor 
model from Fung and Hsieh (2004). However, liquidity risk could be useful to 
determine hedge fund returns. Sadka (2010) finds a significant correlation between 
the variation of hedge fund returns and the innovations in aggregate market liquidity, 
which highlights the importance of investigating hedge funds’ exposure to market  
 84 
 
Table 5.13 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for fixed 
income market return and volatility timing. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.9403859  
(3.85***) 
 
.7372801  
(3.97***) 
 
.7365489  
(3.41***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.8930551  
(3.44***) 
.698421  
(3.53***) 
.7056384  
(3.09***) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
1.050462  
(3.53***) 
.8279374  
(3.66***) 
.8296075  
(3.17***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑1𝐵𝑀𝐹
2
𝑡+1 + 𝜑2𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏,𝑡+1 − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The 
dependent variables include a bond market factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the 
constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors 
include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following 
factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in 
month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed income market liquidity, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏,𝑡+1 denotes the realized fixed 
income market volatility in month 𝑡 + 1, which is calculated as the standard deviation of daily market 
returns in month 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean value of fixed income market volatility. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y means that, in the regression, the fixed income market 
illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in 
the fixed income market, the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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systematic liquidity for evaluation of the performance. By adding a global latent 
liquidity risk factor to the factor model, Kessler and Scherer (2011) increase the 
explanatory power over hedge funds’ performance. Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) 
demonstrate that there was significant contagion among hedge funds during the 
liquidity crisis in 2008. Ding, Shawky and Tian (2009) find that positive liquidity 
shocks can help hedge funds improve their performance. Cao and Petrasek (2011) 
find that assets owned by hedge funds have negative abnormal returns during liquidity 
crises. To address the concern, we propose a model to include a liquidity risk factor 
and investigate hedge fund performance as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                                                      (5.8) 
where ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 denotes the liquidity risk factor or innovation in the fixed income market 
liquidity from an AR(2) process, which is the unpredictable component of fixed 
income market liquidity, in month 𝑡 + 1. Cao et al. (2013) also employ the AR(2) 
process of equity market liquidity as the liquidity innovation. We use ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1  as a 
proxy of liquidity risk factor in the fixed income market.  
      Table 5.14 exhibits the empirical results of liquidity timing ability by using 
equation (5.8). We find that all the coefficients of liquidity timing factor are positively 
significant. Although the t-statistics values of coefficients in Table 5.14 are slightly 
smaller than those in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, the statistically significant results 
indicate that our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing ability 
in the fixed income market remain unchanged. Therefore, hedge funds’ liquidity 
timing skills are not driven by liquidity risk factor. 
5.8.3 Systematic stale pricing 
      Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) state that 
hedge fund returns are serially correlated because of hedge funds’ illiquid holdings 
that are traded with low frequency and show stale prices. Stale prices indicate that 
current prices and information are nonsynchronous, which induces serial correlation. 
Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979) and Chen, Ferson and Peters (2010) 
point out that thin or infrequent trading could induce biased estimations. Furthermore,  
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Table 5.14 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
liquidity risk factor. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.4072351  
(2.57**) 
 
.2708363  
(2.28**) 
 
.2865859  
(2.19**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.3363873  
(1.99*) 
.2220781  
(1.72*) 
.2391793  
(1.70*) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.7278439  
(3.77***) 
.4968028  
(3.48***) 
.5376719  
(3.49***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 
is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond 
market factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year 
Treasury, and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size 
spread factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and 
commodities. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level 
of fixed income market liquidity and ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 denotes the innovation in the fixed income market liquidity 
from an AR(2) process, which is the unpredictable component of fixed income market liquidity, in 
month 𝑡 + 1 . The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 5.15 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
systematic stale pricing. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.4527037  
(2.59**) 
 
.3538908  
(2.68***) 
 
.304338  
(2.13**) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.3853486  
(2.07**) 
.3030633  
(2.15**) 
.2516064  
(1.65) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.7438241  
(3.73***) 
.570372  
(3.80***) 
.5553592  
(3.43***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑1𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡(𝐿𝑏,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑2𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡−1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡−1 −
?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑3𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund 
category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹 ), which is 
measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a credit spread 
factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1  is the fixed 
income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1 and ?̅?𝑏  is the mean level of fixed income market 
liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀  measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances 
of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
 
Chen et al. (2010) find that systematic stale pricing caused by the relation between 
stale pricing and the market factor can lead to biased estimation of timing ability. To 
mitigate this bias, they add lagged terms into the benchmark. Following this line of 
research, we propose a liquidity timing model, including two lagged bond market 
factors and two lagged interaction terms between lagged bond market factors and 
lagged fixed income market liquidity terms, as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑1𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡(𝐿𝑏,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑏) +
𝜑2𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡−1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜑3𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.       (5.9)                                                                                                                           
      Table 5.15 reports the results of the coefficients of liquidity timing factor. We find 
that hedge funds in directional debt and long only debt categories show successful 
liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market. Hedge funds long/short debt 
categories have liquidity timing skills when we adopt two out of three comparable 
fixed income market liquidity measures into equation (5.9). However, when you use 
the liquidity timing model with only one lagged bond market factor and one lagged 
interaction term, all the coefficients of liquidity timing factor for long/short debt 
hedge funds are statistically significant. Hence, we are confident to conclude that 
hedge fund managers can time fixed income market liquidity, which is not driven by 
the impact of systematic stale pricing.   
5.8.4 Option factors 
      Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001) show that some hedge funds have option-like 
returns because of the investment strategies they use. Jagannathan and Korajczyk 
(1986) point out that the evidence of timing ability could be attributed to the 
investments in options and assets with option-like payoffs. If so, then the timing 
evidence may not indicate that managers have real timing skills, which can be applied 
to hedge fund managers since these managers are widely known to invest in 
derivatives.  
      Brown, Swan, Steenbeek and Gallagher (2005) examine the “St. Petersburg” or 
“doubling” trading strategy that investors enlarge their holdings on risky assets, which 
are on a loss, to bet on recouping a profit in future. Such a trading strategy can 
generate option-like or concave payoff. Weisman (2002) reveals that the “St.  
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Table 5.16 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for option 
factors. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.3518039  
(1.60) 
 
.2744311  
(1.57) 
 
.2080562  
(1.23) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.3440602  
(1.47) 
.2698023  
(1.44) 
.2064112  
(1.14) 
Long-only Debt 
 
 
.481006  
(1.85*) 
.3691061  
(1.78*) 
.3011162  
(1.50) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a bond market 
factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹), which is measured by the change in the constant maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include an equity market factor, a size spread 
factor, a credit spread factor, three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities and 
four option factors that are returns on highly liquid at-the-money an out-of –the-money call and put 
options in the S&P 500 index. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1 and 
?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures fixed income market 
liquidity timing ability. LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income 
market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch United States Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y 
stands for that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, 
the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the 
parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
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Petersburg” or “doubling” trading strategy, which is “informationless investing”, is 
widely adopted in the hedge fund industry.   
      Moreover, hedge fund managers are paid by the incentive fee, which is 
performance-based. If managers can recover previous losses and generate hedge fund 
returns that are over a pre-decided hurdle rate, then hedge fund managers will get the 
incentive fee. The payment structure is considered as a call-option-like fee structure 
with option-like payoff.  
      To address the concern of option-like payoff that is not related to timing ability, 
we modify the benchmark for hedge funds’ performance by adding four option factors, 
which are introduced by Agarwal and Naik (2004), to equation (5.5). The four option 
factors used to measure hedge funds’ nonlinear returns are returns on highly liquid at-
the-money and out-of –the-money call and put options in the S&P 500 index. We 
thank Vikas Agarwal for providing us the option factor data. 
      Table 5.16 gives the empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
ability in the fixed income market after controlling for option factors. In contrast to 
previous findings, we find only hedge funds in the long-only debt category have some 
liquidity timing ability with two coefficients of liquidity timing factor statistically 
significant at 10% level. Other coefficients in Table 5.16 are not significant. 
According to the results of Table 5.16, it seems that hedge fund managers have weak 
liquidity timing ability after adding four option factors. However, these findings may 
not be reliable. This is because the data of four options provided by Vikas Agarwal 
ends in August 2009, so the sample used for Table 5.16 only covers the period from 
March 2003 to August 2009, which is significantly shortened. Furthermore, we find 
that hedge funds show liquidity timing ability after the start of the financial crisis, not 
before the start of financial crisis in section 5.6.4. The shortened period is after the 
start of the financial crisis, which should influence obtaining significant results. 
Therefore, we propose to adopt a longer period of hedge fund sample to investigate 
whether hedge fund managers show successful liquidity timing ability in the fixed 
income market in future research. 
      In summary, we have evaluated hedge funds’ liquidity timing ability by 
controlling for the impacts of market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, 
systematic stale pricing and option factors. We have not found evidence that hedge 
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fund managers’ successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market are 
driven by these impacts. 
 
5.9 Bootstrap analysis 
      We note that the previously empirical results were based on the normality 
assumption. However, hedge fund returns are not always normally distributed (Fung 
and Hsieh, 1997, 2001). Brooks and Kat (2002) reveal that hedge fund indices exhibit 
higher kurtosis and lower skewness than stocks and bonds, which indicates that the 
distributions of hedge fund indices have fat tails. Malkiel and Saha (2005) find that 
hedge funds in some categories show negative skewness and high kurtosis. By using 
the Jarque-Bera test to investigate the normality of distribution for hedge fund returns, 
they show that the hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected by some hedge funds. 
To avoid the normality assumption and investigate whether the evidence of hedge 
fund managers’ liquidity timing skills comes from pure luck, we follow the previous 
literature (Efron, 1979; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen 
and Liang, 2007; Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and 
French, 2010 and Cao et al., 2013) to test the liquidity timing skills via a bootstrap 
approach where the normality assumption is not required. We use the arithmetic mean 
value of the returns of hedge funds in the same category to measure the overall 
performance of the hedge fund category. 
      More specifically, we employ bootstrap analysis to randomly resample the 
residuals of the regression to generate hedge funds that have the same risk factor 
loadings but have no liquidity timing skills. Then, we test whether the t-statistics of 
the liquidity timing coefficients for the actual hedge funds are statistically different 
from those for bootstrapped hedge funds without liquidity timing skills. We bootstrap 
the t-statistics rather than the liquidity timing coefficients because the t-statistics are 
pivotal (Chen and Liang, 2007). Our bootstrap analysis includes four steps.  
      First, for hedge fund returns in a certain category, we run equation (5.10): 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.  (5.10) 
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Table 5.17 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: the fixed income market liquidity timing 
coefficients and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.4878441  
(0.0358) 
 
.3856806  
(0.0250) 
 
.3386987  
(0.0894) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.4231157 
 (0.0413) 
.3348647  
(0.0267) 
.2897931  
(0.0905) 
Long-only Debt 
 
.7723135  
(0.0665) 
 
.6031453  
(0.0661) 
.5797374  
(0.0947) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the p-values for 
these liquidity timing coefficients, which are obtained by bootstrap analysis. The liquidity timing 
model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly returns. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are the liquidity timing 
coefficients and the corresponding p-values that are in the parentheses. The number of bootstrap 
simulations for each hedge fund is 5,000. 
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We save the estimated coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … } and the times series of regression 
residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝 denotes the number of monthly returns 
for the hedge fund category. Next, we randomly resample the residuals with 
replacements and generate time series of residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 }. We resample 𝐵 times, and 
therefore 𝑏 = 1, 2, … , 𝐵 . Then, we obtain hypothetical monthly excess returns by 
setting the liquidity timing coefficient to zero, which is based on equation (5.11). 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (5.11) 
Third, we estimate equation (5.10) by employing the hypothetical monthly excess 
returns from the second step and save the estimated liquidity timing coefficient and t-
statistic. The hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity timing ability according to 
construction. Therefore, any non-zero liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic are 
contributed to sampling variation. Fourth, we repeat the first three steps for 𝐵 times to 
obtain hypothetical distributions of cross-sectional t-statistics. We set 𝐵 to 5,000 in 
our bootstrap analysis. The p-value for a given statistic is defined as the frequency 
that the statistical values of hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵 time simulations exceed 
the statistical value for actual hedge funds. See Davidson and Hinkley (1997) for an 
overview of bootstrap methods. 
      Table 5.17 reports the bootstrap analysis results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills in the fixed income market. We find that all the p-values are less than 
10%, which indicates that hedge fund managers in the directional debt, long/short 
debt and long-only debt categories still exhibit the skills to time fixed income market 
liquidity without imposing the normality assumption. Therefore, the conclusion that 
hedge fund managers exhibit liquidity timing skills is not dependent on the normality 
assumption. 
 
5.10 Empirical results at individual fund level 
      The research so far has focused on liquidity timing ability at the strategy level. 
This section investigates the hedge managers’ liquidity timing skills at individual fund 
level. First, we investigate if each of the individual hedge funds has timing ability. 
Since each strategy includes a very large number of funds, we display the results by 
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using the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing coefficients by employing equation (5.5). Next, we adopt the method 
of bootstrap analysis to investigate the statistical significance of liquidity timing 
ability. The bootstrap approach ensures the obtained results do not rely on the 
normality assumption in the statistical analysis. 
5.10.1 Timing ability at individual level 
      We undertake the analysis in Section 5.5 at individual fund level. For each fund, 
we estimate the regression coefficients using equation (5.5). Then the null hypothesis 
of 𝜆𝑝 = 0 is tested and the corresponding t-statistic is calculated. Table 5.18 displays 
the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ liquidity 
timing coefficients. In particular, the numbers in the table report the percentage of 
hedge funds with t-statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the 
indicated values. For example, 15.82% of hedge funds in the directional debt category 
have t-statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that are greater than 1.96. Overall, 
for each category of hedge funds, a substantial portion of hedge funds are associated 
with t-statistics of the liquidity timing coefficient greater than 1.28. This provides 
strong evidence of liquidity timing skills at the individual fund level. 
      However, we also find that some hedge funds have t-statistics that are smaller than 
-1.28, which reflects that these hedge funds show negative liquidity timing ability. As 
discussed in Cao et al. (2013), it is difficult to interpret the negative liquidity timing 
coefficient, which suggests that the hedge fund managers adjust portfolios’ market 
exposure in the opposite direction to the direction used by those hedge fund managers 
with successful liquidity timing skills. In general, we can see that the right tails of the 
distribution of t-statistics are thicker than the left tails.  
      Overall, the distribution of t-statistics for liquidity timing coefficients indicates 
successful liquidity timing skills. We note, however, that these tests are based on the 
assumption of normal distributions. The normality assumption could be misleading in 
practice. First, hedge fund returns may not be normally distributed because hedge 
funds usually adopt dynamic trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001). 
Secondly, the evaluation of liquidity timing skills for a large number of hedge funds 
could induce a multiple comparison problem (Cao et al., 2013). Some hedge funds  
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Table 5.18 
Distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ liquidity timing 
coefficients. 
  
t≤-2.326 
 
 
t≤-1.960 
 
t≤-1.645 
 
t≤-1.282 
 
t ≥1.282 
 
t ≥1.645 
 
t ≥1.960 
 
t ≥2.326 
 
Panel A: Distribution of t-statistics (LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
0.0320 0.0584 0.0810 0.1073 0.2505 0.1959 0.1582 0.1224 
Long/short 
Debt 
0.0373 0.0653 0.0932 0.1259 0.2331 0.1772 0.1422 0.1119 
Long-only 
Debt 
0.0098 0.0294 0.0294 0.0294 0.3235 0.2745 0.2255 0.1667 
Panel B: Distribution of t-statistics (LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
0.0226 0.0508 0.0716 0.1073 0.2542 0.1921 0.1563 0.1224 
Long/short 
Debt 
0.0280 0.0629 0.0839 0.1282 0.2354 0.1748 0.1422 0.1142 
Long-only 
Debt 
0 0 0.0196 0.0196 0.3333 0.2647 0.2157 0.1569 
Panel C: Distribution of t-statistics (LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
0.0301 0.0603 0.0772 0.1186 0.2429 0.1751 0.1507 0.1205 
Long/short 
Debt 
0.0373 0.0746 0.0909 0.1352 0.2261 0.1585 0.1352 0.1096 
Long-only 
Debt 
 
0 0 0.0196 0.0490 0.3137 0.2451 0.2157 0.1667 
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing coefficients based on the equation (5.5), which is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund in the sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market 
illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
United States Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y 
stands for that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, 
the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are 
the percentage of hedge funds with t-statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the 
indicated values. 
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without true liquidity timing ability will show significant t-statistics by random 
chance. In order to deal with the above potential problems, we adopt the method of 
bootstrap analysis to investigate the significance of the liquidity timing coefficients at 
individual hedge fund level. The bootstrap analysis can test whether the liquidity 
timing skills are contributed to hedge fund managers’ managerial skills or pure luck 
without imposing the normality assumption.  
5.10.2 Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing skills 
      We adopt bootstrap analysis to investigate the significance of liquidity timing 
coefficients at individual hedge fund level by following previous literature (Efron, 
1979; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen and Liang, 2007; 
Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and French, 2010 and 
Cao et al., 2013). The principle of performing bootstrap analysis at individual fund 
level is similar to that outlined in Section 5.9. It includes five steps.  
      First, for hedge fund 𝑝, we run the equation (5.12) and save the estimated  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.  (5.12) 
coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … }  and the time series of regression residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 =
0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝  denotes the number of monthly returns for hedge fund 𝑝. 
Secondly, we randomly resample the hedge fund’s residuals with replacements and 
generate time series of residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 } . We resample 𝐵  times, and therefore 
𝑏 = 1, 2, … , 𝐵. Then, we obtain a hypothetical hedge fund’s monthly excess returns 
by setting the liquidity timing coefficient to zero, which is based on equation (5.13).  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (5.13) 
Third, we estimate equation (5.12) by employing the hypothetical hedge fund’s 
monthly excess returns from the second step and save the estimated liquidity timing 
coefficient and t-statistic. Because, the hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity 
timing ability according to construction, any nonzero liquidity timing coefficient and 
t-statistic are contributed to sampling variation. Fourth, we repeat the first three steps 
for all actual hedge funds in the sample. Then, we can obtain the cross-sectional 
statistics, such as the top 10 percentile, of estimated liquidity timing coefficients and  
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Table 5.19 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: t-statistics with the corresponding p-values in 
parentheses. 
 Bottom t-statistics for ?̂? Top t-statistics for ?̂? 
  
1% 
 
3% 
 
5% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
5% 
 
3% 
 
1% 
 
Panel A: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
-2.7780 
(0) 
-2.3443 
(0.0020) 
-2.0457 
(0.0078) 
-1.4115 
(0.0022) 
2.6823 
(0) 
3.6894 
(0) 
4.1515 
(0) 
5.3642 
(0.0308) 
Long/short 
Debt 
-2.8294 
(0) 
-2.4156 
(0.0084) 
-2.1697 
(0.0924) 
-1.5697 
(0.1014) 
2.5824 
(0) 
3.6374 
(0) 
4.1515 
(0.0002) 
5.3642 
(0.0680) 
Long-only 
Debt 
-2.0369 
(0.0018) 
-1.2814 
(0) 
-1.1387 
(0) 
-0.8290 
(0) 
3.2802 
(0.0002) 
3.9808 
(0.0008) 
4.0821 
(0.0180) 
5.3236 
(0.0172) 
Panel B: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
-2.6877 
(0) 
-2.1833 
(0) 
-1.9984 
(0.0034) 
-1.4046 
(0.0028) 
2.7253 
(0) 
3.8634 
(0) 
4.2085 
(0) 
5.4634 
(0) 
Long/short 
Debt 
-3.0331 
(0.0010) 
-2.3199 
(0.0024) 
-2.0192 
(0.0204) 
-1.5489 
(0.0898) 
2.6361 
(0) 
3.6821 
(0) 
4.0940 
(0.0002) 
5.3929 
(0.0664) 
Long-only 
Debt 
-1.8619 
(0) 
-1.2561 
(0) 
-1.1579 
(0) 
-1.0323 
(0.0010) 
3.1188 
(0.0012) 
3.9713 
(0.0036) 
4.2085 
(0.0252) 
5.4634 
(0.0188) 
Panel C: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y) 
Directional 
Debt 
-2.8864 
(0) 
-2.3513 
(0.0016) 
-2.1195 
(0.0252) 
-1.4102 
(0.0016) 
2.5831 
(0) 
3.6063 
(0) 
4.1138 
(0.0006) 
4.7963 
(0.1590) 
Long/short 
Debt 
-2.9893 
(0.0012) 
-2.5031 
(0.0194) 
-2.2082 
(0.1340) 
-1.5715 
(0.1238) 
2.5217 
(0) 
3.3493 
(0) 
4.1138 
(0.0006) 
4.7963 
(0.1988) 
Long-only 
Debt 
 
-1.6730 
(0) 
-1.4158 
(0) 
-1.2272 
(0) 
-1.0519 
(0.0012) 
3.0884 
(0.0002) 
3.6849 
(0.0102) 
3.9922 
(0.0400) 
4.6401 
(0.1260) 
Note: This table summarizes the bootstrap analysis results for cross-sectional individual hedge funds. 
The liquidity timing model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures fixed income market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly returns. 
LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y 
means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 7 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y stands for that, in the 
regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields 
of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 Years and the corresponding 
CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, the fixed income market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are the sorted t-statistics of 
liquidity timing coefficients for cross-sectional individual hedge funds and the corresponding p-values 
that are in the parentheses. The number of bootstrap simulations for each hedge fund is 5,000. 
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t-statistics for all sample hedge funds. Finally, we repeat the first four steps for 𝐵 
times to obtain hypothetical hedge funds’ distributions of cross-sectional t-statistics, 
such as the top 10 percentile. We set 𝐵 to 5,000 in our bootstrap analysis. The p-value 
for a given statistic is defined as the frequency that the statistical values of 
hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵  time simulations exceed the statistical value for 
actual hedge funds.  
      The bootstrap analysis can be used to investigate how likely it is that hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing skills come from pure luck without imposing the normality 
assumption. Table 5.19 reports the t-statistics and the corresponding p-values, which 
are obtained from bootstrap analysis at different extreme percentiles. The extreme 
percentiles we choose are the bottom 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% and the top 1%, 3%, 5% 
and 10%. Based on the p-values for different percentile t-statistics, we find that hedge 
funds with the top t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficients have liquidity timing 
skills, which are not contributed to pure luck. For example, the t-statistic of hedge 
funds in the directional debt category has the value of 4.1515 and its corresponding p-
value is 0, which indicates that directional debt hedge funds in the top 3% percentile 
have the ability to time fixed income market liquidity. Although, for hedge funds in 
the directional debt, long/short debt and long-only debt categories, some funds have 
negative timing ability, which is not contributed to pure luck; it is more important to 
find that a portion of hedge funds in these categories show successful liquidity timing 
skills. Therefore, the evidence in Table 5.19 supports that the top-ranked hedge fund 
managers have successful liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market. 
 
5.11 Conclusions 
      In this chapter, we have examined whether hedge fund managers have the ability 
to time fixed income market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the fixed 
income market based on managers’ forecasts on future fixed income market liquidity. 
We have investigated hedge funds’ liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market 
because hedge funds are actively managed with highly dynamic investment strategies 
and fixed income market liquidity risk management is important to hedge funds’ 
professional management.  
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      We find that hedge fund managers have positive liquidity timing ability in the 
fixed income market. Managers increase (decrease) hedge funds’ fixed income market 
exposure prior to the rise (fall) of fixed income market liquidity. To validate the 
results, we have conducted a range of robustness tests and hedge funds’ successful 
liquidity timing ability remains unchanged in these tests. In particular, our findings 
are shown to be robust to usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption 
restrictions, hedge funds trades on the fixed income market liquidity, financial crisis, 
hedge fund data biases, fixed income market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk 
factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors. We have also undertaken bootstrap 
analysis to ensure the results are not dependent on the normality assumption.  
      According to Chen (2007), convertible arbitrage hedge funds and global macro 
funds have the timing skills in high yield bond market and non-U.S. bond market, 
respectively. Bond fund managers show positive timing skills by shifting asset 
between cash and bonds (Boney, Comer and Kelly, 2009). Chen, Ferson and Peters 
(2010) find weak evidence of the ability to time nine common factors related to bond 
markets. In this chapter, we investigate the dimension of liquidity timing of hedge 
fund managers in the fixed income market, which has not been investigated in the 
literature as far as we know. We find that hedge fund managers can forecast and take 
advantage of the changes in the fixed income market liquidity condition. Our 
investigation of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability is useful to understand 
the importance of fixed income market liquidity to hedge fund managers’ professional 
portfolio management.  
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Chapter 6 
Liquidity timing ability for hedge funds 
in the foreign exchange market  
 
6.1 Introduction 
      In this chapter, we investigate liquidity timing skills of hedge fund managers in 
the foreign exchange market. We focus on whether managers have the ability to time 
foreign exchange market liquidity by strategically adjusting hedge funds’ foreign 
exchange market exposure based on managers’ forecasts of foreign exchange market 
liquidity conditions. To the best of our knowledge, this important issue has not been 
investigated in the literature before.  
       Besides affecting the performance of hedge funds as discussed in the previous 
chapter, liquidity risk holds crucial a position in the foreign exchange market. Engel 
(1992) investigates a general equilibrium model and finds that the forward currency 
exchange rate contains a liquidity risk premium. Some recent literature shows that the 
cross-sectional foreign exchange rates’ returns are determined by the foreign 
exchange market liquidity. Banti, Phylaktis and Sarno (2012) construct a global 
liquidity risk measure in the foreign exchange market by using 20 US dollar based 
exchange rates with a period of 14 years. They find that the liquidity risk in the 
foreign exchange market is important to explain the cross-sectional currency returns 
and the annual liquidity risk premium is about 4.7 percent. Menkhoff, Sarno, 
Schmeling and Schrimpf (2012) use different liquidity proxies and show that liquidity 
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risk in the foreign exchange market is a risk factor for currency returns. Mancini, 
Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) focus on the systematic impact of foreign 
exchange market liquidity on carry trades. The trading strategy of carry trade requires 
investors to invest in currencies that have high interest rates and borrow currencies 
that have low interest rates. They find that liquidity risk in the foreign exchange 
market is important to determine the carry trade returns, which indicates that liquidity 
risk is priced.  
      Furthermore, the funding liquidity has significant impact on the foreign exchange 
market. Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) investigate the causes of the crash 
risk of carry trades in the foreign exchange market. They use the TED spread to 
measure the funding liquidity level and find that the deterioration of funding liquidity 
forces investors to unwind of their carry trades and induces crash in the foreign 
exchange market, which confirms the findings of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
Banti and Phylaktis (2012) employ two foreign exchange market liquidity measures, 
transaction costs and market depth. Their evidence shows that funding liquidity can 
affect foreign exchange market liquidity. During the period of market decline, the 
level of funding liquidity is low, which is related to the tightness of capital and could 
lead to liquidity dry-ups in the foreign exchange market. Kaul and Stefanescu (2011) 
demonstrate that funding liquidity could drive the comovement of currency liquidity. 
Melvin and Taylor (2009) find that the recent financial crisis, beginning in August 
2007, spilled over into the foreign exchange market, which saw its liquidity disappear.  
      Kessler and Scherer (2011) state that hedge funds can use various financial 
vehicles and investment strategies among different markets, like the foreign exchange 
market. Nucera and Valente (2013) investigate the risk and performance of currency 
hedge funds. They find that many currency hedge funds earn higher returns than risk 
premium from carry trades in the foreign exchange market, which is robust to hedge 
fund data bias, different corrections for hedge funds’ sample variability and 
alternative benchmarks for carry trade. It is reasonable to test whether the 
outperformance of currency hedge funds is attributed to hedge fund managers’ active 
portfolio management.  
      Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) examine whether hedge fund managers can time 
equity market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ equity market exposure based on 
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managers’ forecasts about equity market liquidity. All the hedge funds used in the 
sample are equity-oriented. They find that equity-oriented hedge fund managers have 
the skills to time equity liquidity, which is robust to the data biases of hedge funds, 
alternative explanations and other risk factors, timing models and liquidity measures. 
Kaul and Stefanescu (2011) analyse the intraday spreads for exchange rates and find 
significant comovement in currency spreads at both intraday and daily level. 
Furthermore, currency liquidity has strong relation with aggregate liquidity in the U.S. 
equity market. Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) focus on systematic 
liquidity in the foreign exchange market and show that aggregate liquidity varies over 
time. During the decline of liquidity in the foreign exchange market, there are strong 
comovements among the liquidity of currencies. They also find that foreign exchange 
market liquidity is likely to fall when the equity market liquidity is low.  
      Chen (2007) finds that managed future funds have the ability of timing currency 
market. On the other hand, Cumby (1987) employs the Henriksson-Merton test to 
investigate market timing ability for foreign exchange advisory services. In contrast to 
Chen (2007), Cumby (1987) shows that there is no evidence of the foreign exchange 
advisors’ successful market timing skills. 
      Cao et al. (2013) find that hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills in the 
equity market. Since the liquidities of the equity and foreign exchange markets are 
significantly correlated, it is reasonable to investigate whether hedge fund managers 
can time foreign exchange market liquidity. The investigation of hedge fund managers’ 
liquidity timing ability is helpful to understand managers’ active portfolio 
management in the foreign exchange market.  
      The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we discuss our 
liquidity-timing model and liquidity measure in the foreign exchange market, 
respectively. We describe the data in Section 4. In Section 5, we show the empirical 
results of liquidity-timing ability in the foreign exchange market. Section 6 explores 
alternative explanations that are related to funding liquidity, investor redemption 
restrictions, and the impacts of hedge fund trades on foreign exchange market 
liquidity and financial crisis. Section 7 concerns the impacts of different hedge fund 
data biases. In Section 8, we examine the robustness of our results to several 
alternative model specifications and risk factors. Section 9 gives the empirical results 
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of liquidity timing skills by applying bootstrap analysis. In Section 10, we investigate 
the liquidity timing skills at individual fund level. Finally, Section 11 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
6.2 Liquidity timing model 
      In this chapter, we investigate whether hedge fund managers can time liquidity in 
the foreign exchange market by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to foreign exchange 
market based on managers’ forecasts of future foreign exchange market liquidity 
conditions. For this end, we obtain daily bid-ask spreads for major exchange rates. 
The monthly illiquidity measures in the foreign exchange market are calculated as the 
average of bid-ask spreads for the major exchange rates. To get liquidity measures in 
the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures are 
multiplied by minus one.  
      Hedge funds usually use dynamic trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; 
Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001) and invest in derivatives (Chen, 2011). Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) explore the shortcomings of hedge fund indexes that are used as benchmarks 
for hedge fund performance and propose a seven-factor model as benchmark. The 
seven factors include the equity market factor, the size spread factor, the bond market 
factor, the credit spread factor, the bond trend-following factor, the currency trend-
following factor and the commodity trend-following factor.  
      Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) add a foreign exchange market factor to get 
better an explanation for hedge fund performance. The foreign exchange market 
factor is the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index that is 
published by the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. To get a 
clearer liquidity timing ability interpretation, the foreign exchange market factor used 
in this chapter is calculated by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange 
rate index from month 𝑡 + 1 to month 𝑡. In order to better investigate hedge fund 
performance in the foreign exchange market, we follow Fung and Hsieh (2004) and 
Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) and adopt a benchmark that contains the seven 
factors in the seven-factor model, plus the foreign exchange market factor. 
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      Following the liquidity timing model used by Cao et al. (2013) and the fixed 
income market liquidity timing model in Section 5.2, our foreign exchange market 
liquidity timing model is specified as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, (6.1) 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return of hedge fund 𝑝  in month 𝑡 + 1 , 𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1  is the 
foreign exchange market factor in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 denotes the liquidity level in 
the foreign exchange market in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝐹𝑋  is the average foreign exchange 
market liquidity level, 𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1  stands for seven factors in Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s 
seven-factor model (𝐽 = 7 in this case) and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 denotes the error term in month 
𝑡 + 1. The coefficient, 𝜆𝑝, measures hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in 
the foreign exchange market. A positive value of 𝜆𝑝 indicates that the hedge fund 
manager has liquidity timing skills by increasing (decreasing) the hedge fund’s 
exposure to the foreign exchange market prior to the rise (fall) of foreign exchange 
market liquidity.  
 
6.3 Liquidity measure 
      In this section, we first review the literature about various liquidity measures in 
the foreign exchange market. Then we choose and justify the liquidity measures that 
are used in this chapter.  
      To measure foreign exchange market liquidity, many researchers employ the 
transaction data on bid and ask prices (Ates and Wang, 2005; Kaul and Stefanescu, 
2011; Kessler and Scherer, 2011; Banti and Phylaktis, 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012; 
Wrampelmeyer, 2012).  
      Some researchers adopt the price impact measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
to measure liquidity in the foreign exchange market (Banti and Phylaktis, 2012; Banti 
et al., 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012). The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity 
measure is based on price reversals. The general idea of this liquidity measure is that a 
lower liquidity level in the foreign exchange market means a larger price impact is 
caused by order flow in the market.  
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      Mancini et al. (2013) propose several liquidity measures that include price impact, 
return reversal, trading cost, price dispersion and principal component of the above 
measures. Kyle (1985) argues that the price impact measures how much an order flow 
can induce the exchange rate changes. The higher price impact indicates more 
changes in the exchange rates, which reflects lower liquidity in the foreign exchange 
market. According to Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993), a part of the price 
impact on an illiquid currency is temporary because the pressure from net selling 
(buying) to the currency can lead to excessive appreciation (depreciation), which is 
followed by a price reversal to its fundamental value. Mancini et al. (2013) model the 
price impact and return reversal as: 
𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡(𝑣𝑏,𝑡𝑖 − 𝑣𝑠,𝑡𝑖) + ∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝑣𝑏,𝑡𝑖−𝑘 − 𝑣𝑠,𝑡𝑖−𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡𝑖,                         (6.2) 
where 𝑟𝑡𝑖 is the log exchange rate return at time 𝑡𝑖, 𝑣𝑏,𝑡𝑖 and 𝑣𝑠,𝑡𝑖 denote the volumes 
of buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades, respectively, at time 𝑡𝑖 , and 𝜀𝑡𝑖 
stands for the error term at time 𝑡𝑖 . The coefficient, 𝛾𝑡,𝑘 , is the liquidity measure, 
reflecting price impact and return reversal.  
      Furthermore, Mancini et al. (2013) adopt proportional quoted bid-ask spread to 
measure illiquidity in the foreign exchange market. The proportional quoted bid-ask 
spread is modelled as: 
𝐿(𝑏𝑎) =
(𝑃𝐴−𝑃𝐵)
𝑃𝑀
,                                                                                                      (6.3) 
where 𝑃𝐴  and 𝑃𝐵  denote the ask and bid prices, respectively, and 𝑃𝑀  is equal to 
(𝑃𝐴−𝑃𝐵)
2
. Concerning that the posted ask or bid quotes are not always the executed 
prices for each trade, Mancini et al. (2013) propose effective costs to measure 
liquidity in the foreign exchange market. The effective costs are the difference 
between transaction prices and quotes. The effective cost is defined as: 
𝐿(𝑒𝑐) = {
(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑀) 𝑃𝑀 ,    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠,⁄
(𝑃𝑀 − 𝑃) 𝑃𝑀 ,    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠,⁄
                                   (6.4)  
where 𝑃 is the transaction price.  
      Stoll (1978) finds that dealers are reluctant to provide liquidity to assets with high 
volatility. Thus, a higher volatility normally implies a lower liquidity and the 
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dispersion of intraday prices can be employed to measure illiquidity (Chordia, Roll 
and Subrahmanyam, 2000). Ait-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang (2005) show that 
standard realized volatility is an improper measure due to market frictions. Zhang, 
Mykland and Ait-Sahalia (2005) use a nonparametric estimator to correct the standard 
realized volatility bias based on two time scales. Mancini et al. (2013) adopt the two-
scale realized volatility estimator to measure price dispersion in the foreign exchange 
market.  
      Finally, since the above liquidity measures capture different aspects of foreign 
exchange market liquidity, Mancini et al. (2013) use the method of principal 
component analysis to extract the common information among these liquidity 
measures. The principal components are used to measure liquidity in the foreign 
exchange market. 
      Considering the data availability and the ease of interpretation, we follow Kessler 
and Scherer (2011) to use the bid and ask prices to compute liquidity measure in the 
foreign exchange market. The transaction cost data indicates the costs of immediate 
transactions. The liquidity measure is specified as: 
𝑌𝐹𝑋,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
0.5(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,                                                                                (6.5) 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡  denote the ask and bid prices for currency 𝑖  at time 𝑡 , 
respectively.  
 
6.4 Data 
      In this section, we describe the data on hedge funds, the benchmark for hedge 
fund performance and the liquidity measure in the foreign exchange market. 
Concerning the Euro, which was introduced as an accounting currency to the 
worldwide financial markets on 1 January 1999, we use the period of all the above 
data from January 1999 to December 2012. 
      The data on hedge funds is obtained from Morningstar, which contains extensive 
data sources of hedge funds. Following previous hedge-fund-focused literature (Chen 
2007; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010; Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013), 
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we include only hedge funds with no less than 10 million dollars of assets under 
management (AUM). Furthermore, all hedge funds that are included in the sample 
should have at least 24 monthly returns (Eling and Faust, 2010; Jylha, Rinne and 
Suominen, 2010; Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013).  
      As mentioned in Chapter 5, Morningstar classifies hedge funds into 31 categories 
that are grouped in six broad strategy categories. We adopt the arithmetic mean value 
of the returns of hedge funds in the same category to measure the overall performance 
of the hedge funds’ category. Panel A of Table 6.1 summarizes monthly returns for 
the hedge funds in the sample. During the sample period of 1999-2012, the average 
monthly return for all hedge funds is 0.661% and the standard deviation of the returns 
is 1.672%. Comparing the six broad strategy categories, we find that both directional 
equity and event hedge funds deliver average monthly return of 0.879%, which is 
higher than that of hedge funds in any other category. On the other hand, 
multistrategy hedge funds generate the lowest average monthly return of 0.458%. 
Overall, the average monthly returns for all categories are positive over the sample 
period. Moreover, we find that the returns of relative value hedge funds exhibit the 
lowest volatility of 0.963%.  
      The benchmark for hedge fund returns contains the seven-factor model introduced 
by Fung and Hsieh (2004) and a foreign exchange market factor proposed by Boyson, 
Stahel and Stulz (2010). The seven factors include an equity market factor, the size 
spread factor, the bond market factor, the credit spread factor, the bond trend-
following factor, the currency trend-following factor and the commodity trend-
following factor. The foreign exchange market factor is the change in the trade-
weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index. We are really grateful that David Hsieh 
shares the data on bond, currency and commodity trend-following factors, which can 
be found through the link: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. The 
data used to calculate other factors is obtained from Datastream and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The one-month Treasury bill rate is used as 
a risk free rate that is obtained from Kenneth R. French data library with the following 
link: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The 
trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index is published by the Board of 
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. Panel B of Table 6.1 provides the 
statistical summary for the seven factors and the foreign exchange market factor. For  
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Table 6.1  
Summary statistics of the data. 
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25% 75% 
    
Panel A: Summary of average hedge fund returns    
       
Directional Equity 3914 0.897 0.973 2.668 -0.669 2.58 
Directional Debt 543 0.700 0.751 1.224 0.155 1.219 
Event 482 0.897 1.188 1.721 0.177 1.834 
Global Derivatives 1323 0.758 0.641 1.993 -0.590 2.046 
Multistrategy 5449 0.458 0.585 1.486 -0.201 1.392 
Relative value 805 0.612 0.720 0.963 0.303 1.112 
All 12516 0.661 0.768 1.672 -0.238 1.704 
       
Panel B: Summary of factor data     
      
MKT 0.155 0.768 4.568 -2.161 3.134 
SMB 0.368 0.253 3.477 -1.536 2.520 
BMF -0.017 -0.010 0.278 -0.213 0.143 
CSF 0.002 0.000 0.249 -0.120 0.093 
PTFSBD -2.539 -5.025 14.695 -13.405 3.350 
PTFSFX -0.430 -4.860 18.729 -13.628 8.340 
PTFSCOM -0.710 -4.180 14.235 -9.788 5.910 
FXF 0.127 0.101 2.146 -1.044 1.491 
      
Panel C: Summary of liquidity measures      
      
Liquidity(10) -0.054 -0.049 0.013 -0.057 -0.046 
Liquidity(G10) -0.056 -0.051 0.014 -0.060 -0.048 
Liquidity(6) -0.044 -0.041 0.011 -0.046 -0.038 
      
Note: This table provides the statistical summary of the data. Panel A in Table 6.1 summarizes average 
monthly returns on hedge funds in different strategy categories and all hedge funds. The monthly 
returns are in percent per month. N denotes the number of hedge funds that exist during the sample 
period. Panel B summarizes the Fund-Hsieh seven factors and the foreign exchange market factor 
(FXF). These eight factors are used to benchmark hedge funds’ performance.  Specifically, the Fund-
Hsieh seven factors include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), monthly change in 
the ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (BMF), monthly change in the Moody’s Baa yield less 
ten-year treasury constant maturity yield (CSF), and three trend-following factors that are PFTSBD 
(bond), PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). The foreign exchange market factor is the 
change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index. Panel C summarizes the liquidity 
measures in the foreign exchange market. Liquidity(10) denotes that the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) denotes that the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) denotes that 
the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major currencies. To get 
liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures 
are multiplied by minus one. Thus, Liquidity(10), Liquidity(G10) and Liquidity(6) in Panel C stand for 
foreign exchange market liquidity measures. The sample period lasts from January 1999 to December 
2012. 
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Fig. 6.1 Time series of monthly foreign exchange market liquidity. This figure plots three time series of 
monthly foreign exchange market liquidity measures. Liquidity(10) denotes that the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) denotes that the 
foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) 
denotes that the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. Thus, Liquidity(10), Liquidity(G10) and Liquidity(6) 
in this figure stand for foreign exchange market liquidity measures. The sample period lasts from 
January 1999 to December 2012. 
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example, the average equity market excess return during the sample period is 0.155% 
per month with a standard deviation of 4.568%.  
      The liquidity measure in the foreign exchange market is computed as percent bid-
ask spread. For robustness, we choose three baskets of currencies to calculate foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The first basket contains 10 currencies against U.S. dollar, 
including Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Swiss franc (CHF), Euro 
(EUR), British pound (GBP), Japanese yen (JPY), Norwegian krone (NOK), New 
Zealand dollar (NZD), Swedish krona (SEK), and Danish krone (DKK) (Menkhoff, 
Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012). The second currency basket contains G10 
currencies comprising AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, GBP, JPY, NOK, NZD, SEK, and the 
U.S. dollar (USD) (Jurek, 2008; Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere and Verdelhan, 
2013). The final basket has six major currencies that include AUD, CAD, EUR, JPY, 
CHF and GBP (Froot and Ramadorai, 2005). The daily bid-ask prices for all the 
currencies were downloaded from Datastream.  The monthly liquidity levels in the 
foreign exchange market were averaged by daily measures. In Panel C of Table 6.1, 
we report summary statistics of the foreign exchange market liquidity measures. It is 
not surprising to find that the three foreign exchange market liquidity measures have 
similar statistics. Figure 6.1 shows the time series of monthly foreign exchange 
market liquidity measures. We find that the three liquidity measures have similar 
patterns during the whole time period. After 2001, the foreign exchange market 
liquidity improved, which could due to the introduction of electronic trading in the 
market. During recent financial crisis period, the three liquidity measures decreased 
dramatically, which suggests that foreign exchange market was illiquid during recent 
financial crisis.  
 
6.5 Empirical results 
      In this section, we firstly describe the empirical results of liquidity timing ability 
in the foreign exchange market at the level of broad categories. Next, we deliver the 
explanations and interpretations to the empirical results based on the specifications 
and descriptions of different strategy categories. Finally, we investigate the liquidity 
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timing skills of hedge funds in the subgroups of the broad categories that show 
statistically significant liquidity timing coefficients.  
      We employ equation (6.1) to investigate the liquidity timing skills for different 
hedge fund categories. Table 6.2 reports the coefficients of the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing factor at hedge fund category level. In particular, we find that 
hedge funds in the event, global derivatives and relative value categories have 
significantly positive liquidity timing coefficients for the three liquidity measures in 
the foreign exchange market. In contrast, hedge funds in the directional debt category 
do not show any significant liquidity timing coefficients for the three liquidity 
measures. Though hedge funds in the directional equity and multistrategy categories 
have significant liquidity timing coefficients for two liquidity measures at 10% level, 
the coefficients are not statistically significant for the third liquidity measure. Thus, 
we will not undertake any more investigation for hedge funds in both the directional 
equity and multistrategy categories. Finally, we find that the sample for all hedge 
funds exhibits successful liquidity timing in the foreign exchange market for the three 
liquidity measures. 
      To explain and interpret the different liquidity timing abilities, we focus on the 
description of hedge fund investment strategies and the description is shown in Table 
6.3. According to Table 6.3, managers of event hedge funds usually use derivatives or 
short positions to hedge portfolios’ market exposure. These managers generate profit 
by taking advantage of the price changes that are related to the event and protect 
hedge funds from the impact of broad market changes. Since event hedge funds hold 
assets in a broad market, it is inevitable that they will make transactions with different 
currencies. To focus on the changes related to the event, managers should assess 
hedge funds currency risk. Hence, it is expected that these hedge fund managers have 
some management skills and liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market. 
      Hedge funds in the global derivatives category mainly invest in global markets. 
Usually, these hedge fund managers optimise their portfolios’ asset allocations by 
using various financial products, such as equity, bonds, currencies, commodities and 
derivatives in the worldwide markets. Managers always focus on the emerging trends 
that happen in industries, geopolitical institutions and countries. Although, the hedge 
fund managers take positions in different countries’ markets, their portfolios’ 
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Table 6.2 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for different hedge fund categories. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Equity 
 
7.657527  
(1.86*) 
 
7.064188  
(1.82*) 
 
5.402473  
(1.01) 
Directional 
Debt 
1.759822  
(0.76) 
1.832776  
(0.84) 
3.163675  
(1.06) 
Event 7.322928  
(2.70***) 
6.943995  
(2.72***) 
7.508337  
(2.13**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.76451  
(3.32***) 
14.83338  
(3.31***) 
19.13055  
(3.10***) 
Multistrategy 
All 
5.796272  
(1.91*) 
5.410532  
(1.90*) 
4.990264  
(1.27) 
Relative Value 3.668103  
(2.08**) 
3.533104  
(2.13**) 
5.197877  
(2.29**) 
All 
 
 
7.300252  
(2.43**) 
6.82657  
(2.41**) 
6.682019  
(1.71*) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.3  
Description of investing strategies for different hedge funds’ categories. 
 
Strategies 
 
 
Description 
 
Panel A: Description of six broad strategies 
 
Directional 
Equity 
Funds in the directional-equity category grouping primarily invest in stocks and 
may take long or short positions. Managers may also use options to leverage their 
position or to hedge. Hedge funds with more-varied degrees of short positions are 
likelier to have different risk parameters, beta exposures, and return streams than 
traditional long-only funds or indexes. These funds will usually have either net 
long or net short market exposure to equities, unlike arbitrage funds, which tend 
to balance out long and short equity-market exposures. 
 
Directional Debt Funds in the directional-debt category study broad-based changes and prices in 
fixed-income products. In many cases, the manager will select various fixed-
income products such as high-yield or emerging-markets debt to provide a fixed 
investment stream. Many debt funds leverage their returns to provide larger 
returns. Unlike debt arbitrage funds, these types of funds tend to have a net long 
market exposure. 
 
Event Funds in the broad event category grouping attempt to profit when stock or bond 
prices change in response to certain corporate actions, such as bankruptcy, 
mergers, or acquisitions. Managers will typically use short positions or 
derivatives to hedge their market exposure. These positions help the fund capture 
the price change related to the event itself and insulate the fund from broad 
market changes. 
 
Global 
Derivatives 
Funds in the global-derivatives category group study broad-based changes and 
prices in global markets. Often, these funds make tactical decisions about an 
optimal global asset-allocation mix, and they use equities, bonds, currencies, 
derivatives, and commodities in their portfolios. Many managers look for 
emerging trends in countries, industries, and geopolitical institutions. Some 
managers will also attempt to profit from general market volatility during times of 
uncertainty. 
 
Multistrategy The multistrategy broad asset class contains the hedge funds that merge multiple 
techniques into one single fund. 
 
Relative Value Funds in the relative-value category grouping study the pricing relationship 
between pairs of related securities. Managers take a long position in the security 
that appears to be underpriced and a short position in the security that appears to 
be overpriced. The manager will hold the positions until the pricing discrepancy 
disappears. These strategies are usually market neutral. Because markets are 
generally efficient, pricing discrepancies are typically very small and short-lived. 
Therefore, these funds are frequently highly leveraged, using borrowed money to 
increase the size of possible gains. 
 
Panel B: Description of hedge funds in Event category 
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Distressed 
Securities 
These funds specialize in financially troubled companies that may face 
bankruptcies, distressed sales, corporate restructurings, or financial 
reorganizations. A fund might take long positions only in the company stock or 
debt, or it might exploit pricing discrepancies between different parts of the 
company’s capital structure, for example by buying senior debt and shorting 
preferred stock. The hedge fund may try to accumulate a controlling stake in the 
company in order to influence the outcome. During bankruptcy proceedings, debt-
holders often exchange their debt for an equity stake in the post-bankrupt entity. 
 
Event-Driven These funds attempt to profit from price changes related to a variety of corporate 
actions, including bankruptcy, emergence from bankruptcy, divestitures, stock 
buybacks, dividend issuance, major shifts in corporate strategy, and other atypical 
events. Many of these funds undertake activist techniques to spur further 
corporate changes at the underlying companies. 
 
Merger 
Arbitrage 
These funds attempt to profit from price changes related to mergers, acquisitions, 
and divestitures of the underlying companies. These strategies typically involve 
the purchase of stock of an acquisition target and sell the shares of the acquiring 
company. 
Panel C: Description of hedge funds in Global Derivatives category 
 
Currency Currency portfolios invest in multiple currencies through the use of short-term 
money market instruments; derivative instruments, including and not limited to, 
forward currency contracts, index swaps and options; and cash deposits. These 
funds include both systematic currency traders and discretionary traders. 
 
Global Macro These funds base investment decisions on an assessment of the broad 
macroeconomic environment. They look for investment opportunities by studying 
such factors as the global economy, government policies, interest rates, inflation, 
and market trends. As opportunists, these funds are not restricted by asset class 
and may invest across such disparate assets as global equities, bonds, currencies, 
derivatives, and commodities. These funds primarily invest through derivatives 
markets. They typically make discretionary trading decisions rather than using a 
systematic strategy. At least 60% of the funds' exposure is obtained through 
derivatives. 
 
Systematic 
Futures 
These funds trade liquid global futures, options, and foreign-exchange contracts 
largely according to trend-following strategies (such as linking greater than 50% 
of fund's exposure to such strategies). These strategies are price-driven 
(technical), and systematic (automated) rather than fundamental or discretionary. 
Trend-followers typically trade in diversified global markets, including 
commodities, currencies, government bonds, interest rates, and equity indexes. 
However, some trend followers may concentrate in certain markets, such as 
interest rates. These strategies prosper when markets demonstrate sustained 
directional trends, either bullish or bearish. Some systematic futures strategies 
involve mean-reversion or counter-trend strategies rather than momentum or 
trend following strategies. At least 60% of the funds' exposure is obtained through 
derivatives. 
 
Volatility Volatility strategies trade volatility as an asset class. Directional volatility 
strategies aim to profit from the trend in the implied volatility embedded in 
derivatives referencing other asset classes. Volatility arbitrage seeks to profit 
from the implied volatility discrepancies between related securities. 
 
Panel D: Description of hedge funds in Relative Value category 
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Convertible 
Arbitrage 
These funds study the relationship between a company’s stock and its convertible 
bonds. Convertible bonds contain an option that allows the bondholder to trade 
the bond for common stock at a certain price and under certain conditions. 
Usually, the bond is undervalued, so managers buy the bond and short the stock to 
hedge equity risk. These funds craft strategies to manage their exposure to 
interest-rate risk, default risk, and illiquidity in the convertible-bond market, and 
pricing volatility in both the stock and bond markets. Because the pricing 
discrepancies are usually very small, many of these funds employ leverage to 
maximize return. 
 
Debt Arbitrage These funds seek out pricing discrepancies between various private and public 
fixed-income instruments, usually looking for global opportunities. Portfolio 
managers in this category primarily invest in fixed-income derivative instruments. 
These funds tend to have low beta exposures (less than 0.3 in absolute value) to 
bond-market indexes such as the Barclay's Capital Aggregate Bond index. This is 
in contrast to other debt categories, which have higher net market exposures. 
 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
These funds seek out pricing discrepancies between pairs or combinations of 
securities regardless of the asset class. These funds often employ combinations of 
the debt arbitrage, equity arbitrage, and convertible arbitrage among other 
relative-value strategies. These funds exhibit little market directionality. These 
funds tend to have low beta exposures to all risky indexes.  
 
Equity-Market 
Neutral 
These funds attempt to reduce systematic risk created by factors such as 
exposures to sectors, market-cap ranges, investment styles, currencies, and/or 
countries. They try to achieve this by matching short positions within each area 
against long positions. These strategies are often managed as beta-neutral, dollar-
neutral, or sector-neutral. A distinguishing feature of funds in this category is that 
they typically have low beta exposures (less than 0.3 in absolute value) to equity-
market indexes such as the MSCI World. In attempting to reduce systematic risk, 
these funds put the emphasis on issue selection, with profits dependent on their 
ability to sell short and buy long the correct securities. 
 
Note: Sources come from the Morningstar Category Classifications for Hedge funds 
(http://corporate.morningstar.com/uk/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/Mornin
gstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf).  
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exposure to the currency market is low because of their high frequency of alternation 
between long and short positions (Chen, 2007). Liquidity timing ability, shown in 
Table 6.2, is one of the hedge fund managers’ skills in the foreign exchange market.  
      Table 6.3 shows that relative value hedge funds invest in the price relation 
between pairs of related financial products. Hedge fund managers take long or short 
positions in those underpriced and overpriced assets, respectively. Managers only 
hold the positions in assets when the pairs of asset prices are discrepant. With both 
long and short positions, relative value hedge funds’ portfolios are always market 
neutral. Since the discrepancies of pairs of prices are normally quite small and last a 
short period of time in efficient markets, relative hedge fund managers use high 
leverage to expand the scale of potential profit. The reason for significant evidence of 
liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market could be that relative value 
hedge funds show liquidity timing ability to hedge the influence of the changes in the 
foreign exchange market liquidity.  
      Table 6.3 reveals that directional equity hedge funds primarily invest in equity 
markets. These hedge funds usually take net long or short position on the equity 
market, unlike arbitrage hedge funds that take arbitrage opportunities and offset 
exposure to the equity market by balancing long and short equity market positions. 
Hedge fund managers could employ equity market related options and other 
derivatives to leverage and hedge portfolios’ positions in the equity market. 
Compared to traditional funds with long positions or market indexes, hedge funds 
taking short positions are likely to have different equity market beta exposure, 
distribution of returns and risk characteristics. Hence, we can logically predict that 
directional equity hedge funds do not exhibit liquidity timing skill in the foreign 
exchange market because of their heavy equity market concentration. As the results in 
the Table 6.2 show weak evidence of liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange 
market for directional equity hedge funds, we will not carry out further exploration in 
liquidity timing ability for these hedge funds.  
      According to the description in Table 6.3, directional debt hedge funds focus on 
the price changes in fixed income products. Usually, hedge fund managers generate 
fixed investment portfolios by using various fixed income products. Hedge fund 
managers usually use leverage for higher returns. Compared with debt arbitrage hedge 
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funds, directional debt hedge funds tend to show a net long exposure to the fixed 
income market. Therefore, combining the market concentration, products used and 
investment strategies adopted, it is reasonable to expect that the managers of 
directional debt hedge funds do not have the ability to time the liquidity in the foreign 
exchange market. 
      Table 6.3 reports that hedge funds in the multistrategy category employ multiple 
investment strategies. In most cases, the portfolios of multistrategy hedge funds are 
divided into many different sub-portfolios that are allocated to a range of portfolio 
managers. Each of these managers concentrates on a different investment strategy. 
Fund of funds adopt external investment strategies and managers are paid with second 
layer of performance and management fees. The strategies adopted by multistrategy 
hedge fund managers could change slightly over time to adapt the target market 
movements. The weak evidence of liquidity timing coefficients for hedge funds in the 
multistrategy category could be attributed to the adoption of multiple investment 
strategies, which may make the hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the 
foreign exchange market less obvious.  
      We now turn to focus on liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market 
for hedge funds in the event, global derivatives and relative value categories. The 
subgroups of event hedge funds include distressed securities, event-driven and merger 
arbitrage categories. Global derivatives hedge funds include four subgroups: currency, 
global macro, systematic futures and volatility categories. Hedge funds in the relative 
value category can be divided into convertible arbitrage, debt arbitrage, diversified 
arbitrage and equity market neutral sub-categories. The results of the foreign 
exchange market liquidity timing coefficients for all these sub-categories are shown in 
Table 6.4.  
      Panel A of Table 6.4 shows that two of three subcategories of event hedge funds, 
i.e. distressed securities and event-driven categories, exhibit significant coefficients of 
liquidity timing factor in the foreign exchange market. Panel B in Table 6.3 gives the 
description of event hedge funds’ three sub-categories. Hedge funds in the distressed 
securities category specifically invest in companies that may face corporate 
restructuring, distressed sales or bankruptcies. During the procedure of bankruptcy, 
hedge funds usually liquidate their debt holdings for equity shares in the post- 
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Table 6.4 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for different hedge fund sub-categories. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: sub-categories of event hedge funds 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.041635  
(2.46**) 
7.677045  
(2.49**) 
9.112989  
(2.15**) 
Event-driven 8.049631  
(2.61***) 
7.585689  
(2.61***) 
7.526228  
(1.87*) 
Merger 
Arbitrage 
2.593051  
(1.14) 
2.529881  
(1.18) 
2.689703  
(0.92) 
 
Panel B: sub-categories of global derivatives hedge funds 
Currency 15.512  
(4.02***) 
14.69285  
(4.05***) 
24.44698  
(5.04***) 
Global Macro 4.795733  
(1.66*) 
4.587134  
(1.69*) 
5.463043  
(1.46) 
Systematic 
Futures 
24.26198  
(3.40***) 
22.76551  
(3.38***) 
28.59336  
(3.08***) 
Volatility 6.429846  
(1.08) 
5.837665  
(1.04) 
4.860686  
(0.63) 
 
Panel C: sub-categories of relative value hedge funds 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
3.42148  
(1.02) 
3.144824  
(1.00) 
5.283234  
(1.22) 
Debt Arbitrage 4.094979  
(2.09**) 
4.051219  
(2.19**) 
6.986613  
(2.78***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
1.950143  
(0.73) 
1.79823  
(0.71) 
2.997768  
(0.87) 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
 
2.911917  
(1.43) 
2.796976  
(1.46) 
3.110751  
(1.18) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as: 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The 
dependent variables include a foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change 
in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung 
and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size 
spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, 
currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and ?̅?𝐹𝑋  is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign 
exchange market liquidity timing ability. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, 
in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 
currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is 
calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange 
market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics 
are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
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bankrupt entities. Distressed securities hedge funds’ target companies are normally 
illiquid. When target companies are located overseas, the issue of liquidity in the 
foreign exchange market matters to these hedge funds. The successful liquidity timing 
ability for these hedge funds reflects managers’ superior portfolio management. 
Hedge funds in the event-driven categories generate profit from price changes that are 
relevant to corporate events, such as divestitures, bankruptcy and strategy shifts. All 
these corporate events are related to the liquidity issue and international transactions 
to multinational companies. Thus, liquidity management in the foreign exchange 
market is important for event-driven hedge funds. According to the results in Panel A 
of Table 6.4, hedge fund managers show the skills to time foreign exchange market 
liquidity. 
      In Panel B of Table 6.4, only currency and systematic futures hedge funds exhibit 
strong evidence of liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market. Based on 
the description in Panel C in Table 6.3, currency hedge funds set up currency 
portfolios with multiple currencies by using short-term foreign exchange market 
instruments, derivatives and cash deposits. Hedge funds in the systematic futures 
category trade global options, futures and foreign exchange contracts. Their holdings 
are diversified global assets, including currencies, equities, bonds and commodities. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find evidence that hedge funds in both currency 
andsystematic futures categories show successful liquidity timing ability in the 
foreign exchange market.  
      Panel C of Tale 6.4 reports that debt arbitrage hedge funds can time foreign 
exchange market liquidity. According to the description in Panel D in Table 6.3, 
hedge funds in the debt arbitrage category focus on various fixed income related 
products. They look for global opportunities and face risks in the foreign exchange 
market. Handling liquidity risk in the foreign exchange market can facilitate hedge 
fund managers to focus on their main target investments.  
 
6.6 Alternative interpretations 
      In this section, we examine some alternative explanations for the robustness of our 
empirical results. We investigate whether the leverage and funding constraints can 
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influence hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability. Moreover, we are concerned 
with the different redemption restrictions to hedge fund investors. We also test the 
effect of hedge funds’ size on market liquidity. Finally, we consider the effect of 
financial crisis on managers’ liquidity timing ability.  
6.6.1 Leverage and funding constraints 
      One of our concerns is that the usage of leverage and funding liquidity may drive 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market. The 
prime brokers normally use short-term funding to provide leverage to hedge funds. 
However, hedge funds can be forced to liquidate their assets’ positions by sudden 
margin calls. During a liquidity crisis period, these forced liquidations could happen 
to many hedge funds simultaneously. Due to the destabilization of margins, funding 
liquidity and market liquidity of the assets can be mutually reinforcing during market 
liquidity shocks, which leads to liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). 
It is possible that the hedge funds’ reduction of foreign exchange market exposure 
during liquidity crisis periods is caused by the increase of borrowing costs or cutting 
of funding by prime brokers. Furthermore, the variation of hedge funds’ foreign 
exchange market exposure could come from the fluctuations in managers’ usage of 
leverage and funding liquidity provided by prime brokers. 
      Tables 6.5 and 6.6 report the coefficients of foreign exchange market liquidity 
timing factor for hedge funds that use and do not use leverage, respectively. Except 
for relative value and debt arbitrage categories, hedge funds with the usage of 
leverage in the other categories exhibit successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign 
exchange market. In Table 6.6, many hedge funds that do not use leverage have no 
ability to time foreign exchange market liquidity. Comparing to the previous findings 
in Table 6.4, Tables 6.5 and 6.6, this shows weaker evidence of managers’ liquidity 
timing ability. It should be noted, however, that these results may not be reliable 
because only about one-third of hedge funds in the relative value, debt arbitrage and 
Distressed Securities categories and one-fifth of currency hedge funds in our sample 
release the information about their usage of leverage, which could induce biased 
interpretation. In summary, for some hedge funds, the usage of leverage or not does 
not affect managers’ liquidity timing ability and more information is needed for 
further investigation. 
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Table 6.5 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds that use leverage. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
9.977248  
(3.16***) 
 
9.515531  
(3.20***) 
 
10.29793  
(2.50**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
11.98608  
(3.14***) 
11.48799  
(3.20***) 
13.73418  
(2.77***) 
Event-driven 11.34598  
(2.80***) 
 
10.78981  
(2.83***) 
10.84648  
(2.05**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
17.21434  
(3.54***) 
16.22742  
(3.54***) 
20.75696  
(3.29***) 
Currency 19.36506  
(5.82***) 
18.17548  
(5.79***) 
24.71678  
(5.73***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
25.27331  
(3.33***) 
 
23.72199  
(3.31***) 
30.45434  
(3.09***) 
Relative Value 1.884082  
(0.78) 
1.880259  
(0.83) 
4.349094  
(1.40) 
Debt Arbitrage -1.683972  
(-0.48) 
 
-1.563774  
(-0.47) 
1.55856  
(0.34) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.6 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds that do not use leverage. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.410703  
(1.91*) 
 
7.092301  
(1.94*) 
 
5.629789  
(1.12) 
Distressed 
Securities 
5.460676  
(1.36) 
5.189833  
(1.37) 
3.652363  
(0.70) 
Event-driven 10.14946  
(2.16**) 
 
9.785999  
(2.21**) 
9.309657  
(1.53) 
Global 
Derivatives 
17.39032  
(2.65***) 
16.03957  
(2.59**) 
14.09123  
(1.64) 
Currency 5.079324  
(0.31) 
5.123572  
(0.32) 
17.11963  
(0.70) 
Systematic 
Futures 
41.38287  
(4.17***) 
 
38.54471  
(4.11***) 
40.25783  
(3.07***) 
Relative Value 7.21072  
(2.74***) 
6.88774  
(2.78***) 
9.935358  
(2.94***) 
Debt Arbitrage 18.048  
(4.06***) 
 
17.59389  
(4.22***) 
26.89032  
(4.77***) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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      To control for the impact of market funding constraints, we use the TED measure, 
which is the difference between the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury bill rate (Brunnermeier et al., 2008; Banti and 
Phylaktis, 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Nucera and Valente, 2013). The TED spread 
can reflect the market perceived counterparty default risk. A wider TED spread 
indicates an increase of counterparty default risk, which implies that prime brokers 
are willing to provide higher leverage to the market. Considering the impact of TED 
spread, we modify equation (6.1) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                            (6.6) 
where 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 is the TED spread in month 𝑡 + 1. 
      Table 6.7 reports the liquidity timing results by considering the effect of funding 
constraints. We find that all the liquidity timing coefficients of hedge funds are 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the findings of successful liquidity 
timing skills in Table 6.4. Moreover, a large proportion of coefficients are significant 
at 1% level, which strongly supports that hedge funds managers have the ability to 
time foreign exchange market liquidity. Therefore, the evidence of successful 
liquidity timing ability does not change after controlling for the effect of TED spread.  
6.6.2 Investor restrictions 
      Besides the leverage and funding constraints discussed above, the restrictions to 
investor redemptions could cause changes in the hedge funds’ exposure to the foreign 
exchange market. Under pressure from the withdrawal from hedge funds’ investors, 
hedge fund managers need to liquidate their positions, leading to the reduction of 
portfolios’ market exposure (Khandani and Lo, 2011). In this section, we focus on 
three aspects of investor restrictions – advance notice period, redemption frequency 
and lockup period – to investigate the impact of these restrictions on hedge fund 
managers’ liquidity timing ability. 
      We consider three important issues. First, we investigate the liquidity timing skills 
for hedge funds with advance notice period of 60 days or over. The advance notice 
period is the amount of period that hedge fund investors are required to provide before  
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Table 6.7 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for the 
impact of funding constraints. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.227614  
(2.66***) 
 
6.855266  
(2.68***) 
 
7.218983  
(1.98**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
7.907209  
(2.41**) 
7.552069  
(2.45**) 
8.650224  
(1.97**) 
Event-driven 8.004521  
(2.59**) 
 
7.5435  
(2.58**) 
7.562294  
(1.82*) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.83374  
(3.32***) 
14.89718  
(3.31***) 
20.53169  
(3.23***) 
Currency 15.13954  
(3.96***) 
14.34631  
(3.98***) 
23.22636  
(4.64***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
24.41832  
(3.41***) 
 
22.90984  
(3.39***) 
31.03018  
(3.25***) 
Relative Value 3.430589  
(1.98**) 
3.312388  
(2.03**) 
3.871668  
(1.68*) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.768646  
(1.98**) 
 
3.748205  
(2.09**) 
5.170366  
(2.05**) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1and 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 denotes the TED 
spread in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹 ), 
which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that 
include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include 
an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three 
trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market 
liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity. The 
coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in 
the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. 
Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major currencies. To get liquidity measures in 
the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus 
one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, ** and *, respectively. 
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withdrawing their capital (Aragon, 2007). Second, we consider the liquidity timing 
ability by using hedge funds with redemption frequency of one-quarter or longer. 
Redemption frequency is the frequency with which investors can withdraw their 
capital. Finally, we investigate managers’ liquidity timing skills in the foreign 
exchange market by using hedge funds with lockup period of 12 months or over. 
Lockup period is the period during which an hedge fund investor is not allowed to 
withdraw their capital (Aragon, 2007). The lockup period helps hedge fund managers 
avoid liquidating market positions during the period. 
      According to Aragon (2007), hedge funds that adopt investor restrictions, such as 
advance notice period and lockup period, generate higher alpha than those without 
restrictions. The investor restrictions allow hedge fund managers to efficiently 
manage illiquid assets and the higher alpha can be viewed as compensation for 
illiquid positions. The changes in the holdings of illiquid assets can reflect whether 
hedge fund managers have the ability to time market liquidity.  
      Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 report the empirical results of the coefficients of the 
liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with investor restrictions of advance notice 
period, redemption frequency and lockup period, respectively. We find that our 
previous interpretation that hedge fund managers can time foreign exchange market 
liquidity remains unchanged for hedge funds in event, distressed securities and event- 
driven categories. More than half of the coefficients of the liquidity timing factor are 
statistically significant at 1% level, which strongly supports these hedge fund 
managers’ successful liquidity timing skill. Results for event, distressed securities and 
event-driven hedge funds with long advance notice period, low redemption frequency 
and long lockup period suggest that liquidity timing ability is derived from hedge 
fund managers’ skills of liquidity management in the foreign exchange market and not 
from the forced redemption decisions. 
      In contrast, according to the results in Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10, the coefficients of 
the liquidity timing factor for global derivatives, currency and systematic futures 
hedge funds are all statistically significant only when these hedge funds impose the 
investor restriction of redemption frequency. The coefficients for hedge funds in the 
relative value and debt arbitrage categories are all insignificant when these hedge 
funds impose any of the three investor restrictions. Thus, Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 do  
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Table 6.8 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with advance notice period 
of 60 days or over. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
8.907447  
(2.69***) 
 
8.459238  
(2.71***) 
 
8.811173  
(2.04**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.193676  
(2.22**) 
7.880187  
(2.26**) 
8.046925  
(1.67*) 
Event-driven 9.878364  
(2.70***) 
 
9.283051  
(2.69***) 
9.940041  
(2.09**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
7.405019  
(1.39) 
6.849182  
(1.36) 
4.219143  
(0.61) 
Currency -1.155446  
(-0.20) 
-1.010583  
(-0.19) 
-4.790396  
(-0.57) 
Systematic 
Futures 
14.62524  
(1.40) 
 
13.68851  
(1.37) 
-3.964609  
(-0.26) 
Relative Value 2.231349  
(0.80) 
2.209204  
(0.84) 
3.424388  
(0.95) 
Debt Arbitrage 2.19846  
(0.81) 
 
2.139493  
(0.84) 
5.10496  
(1.47) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.9 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with redemption frequency 
of one quarter or longer. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
8.701033  
(2.91***) 
 
8.255831  
(2.93***) 
 
8.831129  
(2.26**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.83146  
(2.73***) 
8.45535  
(2.78***) 
9.194176  
(2.19**) 
Event-driven 9.352485  
(2.66***) 
 
8.807046  
(2.66***) 
9.231739  
(2.01**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
16.57624  
(2.91***) 
15.96429  
(2.98***) 
19.37526  
(2.62***) 
Currency 34.85063  
(4.71***) 
33.00459  
(4.73***) 
50.5438  
(5.39***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
17.8398  
(2.40**) 
 
16.78091  
(2.40**) 
23.78387  
(2.48**) 
Relative Value 2.197012  
(1.00) 
2.083814  
(1.01) 
4.536687  
(1.61) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.006649  
(1.09) 
 
2.916103  
(1.12) 
5.456288  
(1.54) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.10 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with lockup period of 12 
months or over. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
10.02506  
(2.95***) 
 
9.501205  
(2.97***) 
 
9.452905  
(2.13**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.315868  
(2.36**) 
8.001609  
(2.41**) 
7.940707  
(1.73*) 
Event-driven 11.83486  
(2.93***) 
 
11.1236  
(2.92***) 
11.1098  
(2.10**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
28.33947  
(2.84***) 
27.08458  
(2.88***) 
32.64323  
(2.52**) 
Currency 4.369023  
(0.68) 
4.361113  
(0.71) 
.510332  
(0.05) 
Systematic 
Futures 
18.25032  
(1.56) 
 
17.42228  
(1.58) 
18.23379  
(1.20) 
Relative Value 3.120906  
(1.35) 
2.948348  
(1.35) 
3.71925  
(1.25) 
Debt Arbitrage 5.471269  
(1.48) 
 
5.139047  
(1.47) 
6.369509  
(1.33) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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not support liquidity timing ability for these hedge funds with investor restrictions, 
which is inconsistent with the findings in Table 6.4. However, this interpretation 
could be unreliable because of lack of investor restriction information. For example, 
only about half of global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative value and 
debt arbitrage hedge funds expose their investor restriction information, which may 
bias the results. More relevant information is needed for further investigation in 
liquidity timing skills for hedge funds with investor restrictions.  
6.6.3 The impact of trades on foreign exchange market liquidity 
      In this subsection, we consider the impact of hedge fund trades on the empirical 
results for foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Hedge fund managers’ 
liquidity timing ability is the ability to adjust portfolios’ market exposure in month 𝑡 
based on managers’ forecasts on the changes in market liquidity in month 𝑡 + 1. 
However, it is possible that the hedge funds’ trades in month 𝑡 could affect the foreign 
exchange market liquidity in month 𝑡 + 1. For example, if hedge funds with large size 
simultaneously liquidate their positions in the foreign exchange market in month 𝑡, 
then liquidity level in the foreign exchange market could fall in month 𝑡 + 1, leading 
to a possible relation between hedge funds’ exposure to the foreign exchange market 
and foreign exchange market liquidity (Cao et al., 2013). 
      In order to reduce the effect of large trades on foreign exchange market liquidity, 
we investigate the empirical studies for two hedge fund subgroups with assets under 
management (AUM) less than $150 million and less than $50 million, respectively. 
The regulation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 is applied only to hedge funds with AUM of at least $150 million, which 
is used to differentiate large size and small size hedge funds. 
      Tables 6.11 and 6.12 give the liquidity timing coefficient results for hedge funds 
with AUM less than $150 million and $50 million, respectively. Except for the 
relative value and debt arbitrage hedge funds, hedge funds in the other categories 
show successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market, which 
indicates that hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing ability in the foreign 
exchange market is not driven by hedge fund trades in the foreign exchange market. 
According to the results in Tables 6.11 and 6.12, large trades in the foreign exchange 
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Table 6.11 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with AUM less than $150 
million. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
12.5238  
(4.11***) 
 
11.8796  
(4.14***) 
 
11.84315  
(2.94***) 
Distressed 
Securities 
17.9107  
(3.86***) 
17.28148  
(3.96***) 
21.49797  
(3.57***) 
Event-driven 15.45221  
(3.67***) 
 
14.5492  
(3.67***) 
13.06596  
(2.35**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
21.15207  
(3.50***) 
20.00679  
(3.51***) 
25.65191  
(3.27***) 
Currency 19.61282  
(4.08***) 
18.74429  
(4.15***) 
30.41679  
(5.02***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
28.90886  
(3.54***) 
 
27.20346  
(3.54***) 
34.20131  
(3.23***) 
Relative Value 3.804616  
(1.82*) 
3.635588  
(1.85*) 
5.997146  
(2.23**) 
Debt Arbitrage .8572386  
(0.50) 
 
.8707569  
(0.54) 
1.465804  
(0.66) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.12 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with AUM less than $50 
million. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
12.88466  
(4.09***) 
 
12.28106  
(4.14***) 
 
12.0926  
(2.90***) 
Distressed 
Securities 
22.30467  
(4.03***) 
21.65749  
(4.17***) 
27.02389  
(3.76***) 
Event-driven 13.23265  
(3.09***) 
 
12.47165  
(3.09***) 
10.23828  
(1.82*) 
Global 
Derivatives 
19.66055  
(3.39***) 
18.6374  
(3.41***) 
24.3795  
(3.25***) 
Currency 20.08856  
(4.01***) 
19.21518  
(4.08***) 
30.88482  
(4.88***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
26.32433  
(3.24***) 
 
24.79044  
(3.24***) 
31.07538  
(2.95***) 
Relative Value 2.087102  
(0.95) 
2.034256  
(0.99) 
3.340117  
(1.19) 
Debt Arbitrage .8233399  
(0.45) 
 
.8489184  
(0.50) 
.9671992  
(0.41) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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market may affect relative value and debt arbitrage hedge funds’ liquidity timing 
ability. Compared to the other hedge funds, small proportion, less than one-third, of 
relative value and debt arbitrage hedge funds report their size information, which 
could bias the results. Moreover, it is possible that these hedge funds with large size 
exhibit successful liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market, but they 
only have small trades, which do not influence the market liquidity. Therefore, further 
research needs to be done for hedge funds in the relative value and debt arbitrage 
categories.  
6.6.4 The impact of financial crisis 
      Hedge fund managers could show diverse managerial skills during different 
market conditions. Schaub and Schmid (2013) examine the hedge funds’ performance 
in financial crisis and non-crisis periods and find that the impact of recent financial 
crisis on hedge funds’ performance is much more severe than those of other financial 
crisis periods that include the collapse of LTCM and the burst of the dot-com. 
According to Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012) and Schaub and Schmid 
(2013), the recent financial crisis started in July 2007. Hence, we divide our sample 
into the period of before the start of financial crisis from January 1999 to June 2007 
and the period of after the start of financial crisis from July 2007 to December 2012.  
We examine hedge fund managers’ foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability 
in these two periods, which are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. According to the 
results in Tables 6.13 and 6.14, we find that hedge funds in global derivatives, 
currency and systematic futures categories show consistent liquidity timing skills in 
the foreign exchange market during the two periods. Event, distressed securities and 
event-driven hedge funds do not have liquidity timing skills during the period before 
the start of financial crisis, but exhibit successful liquidity timing ability during the 
period after the start of financial crisis. On the other hand, relative value and debt 
arbitrage hedge funds can time foreign exchange market liquidity before the recent 
financial crisis, but do not have the liquidity timing skills after the start of the recent 
financial crisis. Thus, hedge funds in various categories use diverse managerial skills 
to react to the recent financial crisis differently. Managers’ liquidity management can 
be reflected by their liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market during the 
two periods shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.  
 133 
 
Table 6.13 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds up to June 2007. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
4.291398  
(1.62) 
 
4.153905  
(1.67*) 
 
4.140358  
(1.30) 
Distressed 
Securities 
5.677733  
(1.69*) 
5.481316  
(1.73*) 
6.449125  
(1.60) 
Event-driven 3.910973  
(1.31) 
 
3.774269  
(1.34) 
3.245864  
(0.90) 
Global 
Derivatives 
9.159061  
(1.62) 
8.686143  
(1.63) 
11.42096  
(1.69*) 
Currency 14.67312  
(2.97***) 
14.03312  
(3.01***) 
21.46276  
(3.70***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
14.81477  
(1.73*) 
 
13.92387  
(1.72*) 
17.72828  
(1.73*) 
Relative Value 3.017428  
(1.97*) 
2.973209  
(2.05**) 
4.323612  
(2.37**) 
Debt Arbitrage 5.331446  
(3.05***) 
 
5.293338  
(3.22***) 
7.3154  
(3.54***) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.14 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds from July 2007. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
19.2406  
(2.88***) 
 
18.0734  
(2.91***) 
 
32.9322  
(2.51**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
16.64798  
(1.94*) 
15.7998  
(1.97*) 
23.57467  
(1.40) 
Event-driven 24.50054  
(3.34***) 
 
22.89151  
(3.35***) 
45.61387  
(3.20***) 
Global 
Derivatives 
30.9961  
(2.93***) 
28.83307  
(2.92***) 
52.7681  
(2.54**) 
Currency 20.28745  
(2.77***) 
18.59517  
(2.72***) 
36.17763  
(2.53**) 
Systematic 
Futures 
45.99116  
(2.92***) 
 
42.90591  
(2.92***) 
74.62476  
(2.40**) 
Relative Value 3.437028  
(0.71) 
3.480476  
(0.77) 
3.314128  
(0.35) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.430609  
(0.67) 
 
3.005404  
(0.63) 
13.37847  
(1.36) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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      In summary, we have found some evidence that our findings of successful 
liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market are not driven by the usage of 
leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions and the impact of 
hedge fund trades. More information about hedge funds’ investor restrictions and size 
is needed for further research. Furthermore, we have found that hedge funds in 
different categories demonstrate diverse liquidity timing skills with the effect of the 
recent financial crisis. 
 
6.7 The impact of data biases 
      As mentioned in Section 5.7, the hedge fund data biases could influence the 
accuracy of empirical results. In this section, we consider the impact of hedge fund 
data biases on the findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the 
foreign exchange market.  
      First, we consider survivorship bias that could lead to a high estimation for hedge 
funds’ performance. To reduce the effect of survivorship bias, we include both live 
and dead hedge funds in our sample. The database does not contain dead hedge funds 
before 1994, which induces survivorship bias for the period prior to 1994. However, 
the early period problem does not apply to us for the reason that our sample in this 
chapter covers only the period from January 1999 to December 2012.  
      Next, we turn to backfill bias. The backfill bias exists because hedge fund 
managers usually self-disclose their performance to data vendors only after their track 
records are established. Managers normally use good track records to advertise 
themselves. To reduce the effect of backfill bias, we delete each hedge fund’s first 12 
monthly returns by following previous literature (Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; 
Patton, 2009; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010; Eling and Faust 2010; Avramov, Kosowski, 
Naik and Teo, 2011; Fung and Hsieh, 2011; Siegmann and Stefanova, 2011; Teo, 
2011; Cao et al., 2013). Table 6.15 shows the coefficients of the liquidity timing 
factor after controlling for backfill bias. We find that the results are consistent with 
the findings in Table 6.4 and the majority of coefficients are statistically significant at 
1% level. Thus, hedge fund managers have successful liquidity timing skills in the 
foreign exchange market after controlling for backfill bias. It should be noticed that  
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Table 6.15 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for backfill 
bias. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.216074  
(2.65***) 
 
6.844743  
(2.67***) 
 
7.252908  
(2.04**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
7.117172  
(2.10**) 
6.82254  
(2.14**) 
7.810603  
(1.78*) 
Event-driven 8.571268  
(2.73***) 
 
8.072218  
(2.73***) 
8.104561  
(1.98**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
16.62138  
(3.36***) 
15.63787  
(3.36***) 
20.3049  
(3.17***) 
Currency 16.2722  
(4.01***) 
15.45328  
(4.04***) 
25.25668  
(4.93***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
25.48059  
(3.47***) 
 
23.88666  
(3.45***) 
30.07778  
(3.15***) 
Relative Value 3.825747  
(2.10**) 
3.697147  
(2.15**) 
5.430996  
(2.31**) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.820756  
(1.70*) 
 
3.785442  
(1.79*) 
6.457412  
(2.24**) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 
is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign 
exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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the sample used for Table 6.15 tends to have a longer history because we set a 
requirement that each hedge fund should have no less than 24 monthly returns after 
deleting the first 12 monthly returns. Therefore, some hedge funds with short return 
history could be excluded from the sample for analysis.  
      As for selection bias, we note that the selection bias may induce upward bias. 
However, Fung and Hsieh (1997) find that the selection bias for hedge funds should 
be limited because some hedge funds with superior performance choose not to report 
their information. Therefore, both the top and bottom performing hedge funds are less 
motivated to disclose their information to the database. Moreover, even if some hedge 
funds are excluded from the database, those hedge funds that still report their 
information to the database must exhibit strong persistence of performance to bias the 
results (Asness, Krail and Liew, 2001).  
      In addition, Fung and Hsieh (2000) examine the effect of requiring hedge funds 
with a minimum return history and conclude that multi-period sampling bias has very 
small impact.  
      According to Ang, Rhodes-Kropf and Zhao (2008), hedge funds without receiving 
funding can never be observed, which induces funding bias. However, investors 
should not care about the funding bias because a hedge fund that cannot be observed 
is not an approachable investment vehicle to investors. Denvir and Hutson (2006) find 
that liquidity bias occurs to a disappearing hedge fund that stops reporting in the lead 
up to liquidation. However, the impact of liquidity bias is limited (Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999).  
      In summary, we have investigated hedge fund liquidity timing ability in the 
foreign exchange market after controlling for data biases, including survivorship bias, 
backfill bias, selection bias, multi-period sampling bias, funding bias and liquidity 
bias. We have shown that our findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills 
are not driven by these hedge fund data biases. 
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6.8 Other robustness checks 
      In this section, we investigate our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful 
liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market with several different 
robustness checks. We employ alternative liquidity timing models by controlling for 
market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and 
option factors, respectively.  
6.8.1 Foreign exchange market return and volatility timing 
      Foreign exchange market liquidity has positive relation with foreign exchange 
market returns and negative relation with foreign exchange market volatility (Berger, 
Chaboud and Hjalmarsson, 2009; Melvin and Taylor, 2009; Bubak, Kocenda and 
Zikes, 2011; Danielsson and Payne, 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Mancini et al., 
2013). Hedge fund managers may have the skills to time foreign exchange market 
returns or volatility. Thus, managers’ liquidity timing skills could partially reflect 
their ability of timing returns or volatility. To investigate this possibility, we control 
for foreign exchange market returns and volatility timing skills and adjust equation 
(6.1) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 =
𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑1𝐹𝑋𝐹
2
𝑡+1 +
𝜑2𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                     (6.7) 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the realized foreign exchange market volatility in month 𝑡 + 1, 
which is calculated as the standard deviation of daily market returns in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋 is the mean value of foreign exchange market volatility. 
      Table 6.16 reports the results of liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange 
market after controlling for foreign exchange market return and volatility timing. 
Most of the coefficients of liquidity timing factor are statistically significant at 1% 
level, which strongly supports that hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills. 
Therefore, managers’ liquidity timing ability is not attributed to the positive link 
between foreign exchange market liquidity and returns or the negative connection 
between foreign exchange market liquidity and volatility. The results of successful 
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liquidity timing skills in Table 6.16 emphasize that timing foreign exchange market 
liquidity is important for hedge funds’ professional portfolio management.  
6.8.2 Liquidity risk factor 
      The benchmark we use to evaluate hedge funds’ performance contains eight 
factors, including seven factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model and 
a foreign exchange market factor. However, liquidity risk could be useful to 
determine hedge fund returns. Sadka (2010) finds a significant relation between the 
hedge fund returns’ variation and the innovations in market liquidity, which highlights 
the importance of investigation in hedge funds’ market systematic liquidity exposure 
for evaluation of hedge funds’ performance. Kessler and Scherer (2011) increase their 
factor model’s explanatory power to hedge funds’ performance by adding a global 
latent liquidity risk factor. Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) find evidence that there 
was significant contagion among hedge funds during the liquidity crisis in 2008. Ding, 
Shawky and Tian (2009) show that positive liquidity shocks can help hedge funds 
promote their performance. Assets owned by hedge funds have negative abnormal 
returns during liquidity crises (Cao and Petrasek, 2011). To address this concern, we 
propose a factor model to include a liquidity risk factor and investigate hedge fund 
performance as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑?̃?𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                                                      (6.8) 
where ?̃?𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 denotes the liquidity risk factor or innovation in the foreign exchange 
market liquidity from an AR(2) process, which is the unpredictable component of 
foreign exchange market liquidity, in month 𝑡 + 1. Cao et al. (2013) also use the 
AR(2) process of equity market liquidity as the liquidity innovation. We employ 
?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 as a proxy of liquidity risk factor in the foreign exchange market.  
      Table 6.17 reports the empirical results of liquidity timing ability by employing 
equation (6.8). We find that all the coefficients of liquidity timing factor are positively 
significant. Although, generally, the t-statistics values of coefficients in Table 6.17 are 
slightly smaller than those in Tables 6.2 and 6.4, the statistically significant results 
reveal that our findings that hedge fund managers have the ability to time foreign 
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Table 6.16 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for foreign 
exchange market return and volatility timing. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.670185  
(2.78***) 
 
7.26963  
(2.80***) 
 
8.099498  
(2.27**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
9.013353  
(2.80***) 
8.580473  
(2.82***) 
10.89198  
(2.63***) 
Event-driven 7.997263  
(2.53**) 
 
7.538004  
(2.53**) 
7.457782  
(1.82*) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.64906  
(3.28***) 
14.68667  
(3.26***) 
20.23361  
(3.31***) 
Currency 15.38064  
(3.91***) 
14.56552  
(3.93***) 
24.75136  
(5.05***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
24.08102  
(3.34***) 
 
22.55022  
(3.31***) 
29.81426  
(3.21***) 
Relative Value 4.332709  
(2.44**) 
4.170631  
(2.49**) 
5.861774  
(2.57**) 
Debt Arbitrage 5.103868  
(2.60***) 
 
5.026635  
(2.73***) 
7.852756  
(3.15***) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑1𝐹𝑋𝐹
2
𝑡+1 + 𝜑2𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 −
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 
𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by 
the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a 
size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for 
bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 
𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 denotes the realized 
foreign exchange market volatility in month 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐹𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean value of foreign exchange 
market volatility. The coefficient 𝝀  measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.17 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
liquidity risk factor. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.274738  
(2.63***) 
 
6.886874  
(2.64***) 
 
7.542318  
(2.10**) 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.070921  
(2.41**) 
7.727352  
(2.45**) 
9.002815  
(2.07**) 
Event-driven 8.044592  
(2.56**) 
 
7.549075  
(2.55**) 
7.710385  
(1.89*) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.79185  
(3.26***) 
14.77321  
(3.23***) 
19.2035  
(3.04***) 
Currency 14.863  
(3.84***) 
14.02023  
(3.84***) 
23.12316  
(4.73***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
24.70526  
(3.41***) 
 
23.06947  
(3.37***) 
29.05917  
(3.06***) 
Relative Value 3.459815  
(1.93*) 
3.314988  
(1.96*) 
5.113748  
(2.22**) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.27877  
(1.66*) 
 
3.222269  
(1.73*) 
6.187522  
(2.45**) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑?̃?𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a 
foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. 
dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-
factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market 
factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 
𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1  is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝐹𝑋  is the mean level of 
foreign exchange market liquidity and ?̃?𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 denotes the innovation in the foreign exchange market 
liquidity from an AR(2) process, which is the unpredictable component of foreign exchange market 
liquidity, in month 𝑡 + 1. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. 
Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the 
regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major 
currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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exchange market liquidity remain unchanged. Thus, hedge funds’ liquidity timing 
skills are not driven by liquidity risk factor. 
6.8.3 Systematic stale pricing 
      As mentioned in Section 5.8, hedge funds returns can be serially correlated 
because hedge funds’ illiquid holdings are infrequently traded and show stale prices. 
Following Chen et al. (2010), we consider a liquidity timing model, including two 
lagged foreign exchange market factors and two lagged interaction terms between 
lagged foreign exchange market factors and lagged foreign exchange market liquidity 
terms, as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑1𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) +
𝜑2𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡−1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑3𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.       (6.9)                                                                                                                           
Table 6.18 gives the results of the coefficients of liquidity timing factor after 
controlling for systematic stale pricing. According to the results in Table 6.18, except 
for debt arbitrage hedge funds, hedge funds in other categories exhibit the ability to 
time foreign exchange market liquidity. Debt arbitrage hedge funds only show 
liquidity timing skills when the foreign exchange market liquidity is computed by six 
major currencies, which reflects that debt arbitrage hedge funds may focus on the 
liquidity measured by the six major currencies. Overall, we find evidence that hedge 
fund managers exhibit liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market, which is 
not driven by the impact of systematic stale pricing. 
6.8.4 Option factors 
      As explained in Section 5.8, some hedge funds exhibit option-like returns because 
of the investment strategies they use. The evidence of timing ability could be 
attributed to the investments in options and assets with option-like payoffs 
(Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 1986). Thus, timing evidence could not indicate 
managers’ real timing skills, which can be applied to hedge fund managers because 
these managers are well known to invest in derivatives, like options.  
      In addition, Weisman (2002) find that the “St. Petersburg” or “doubling” trading 
strategy, which is “informationless investing”, is widely used in the hedge fund  
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Table 6.18 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
systematic stale pricing. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
6.722131  
(2.41**) 
 
6.317209  
(2.40**) 
 
6.868443  
(1.90*) 
Distressed 
Securities 
6.261874  
(1.92*) 
5.967291  
(1.94*) 
7.268547  
(1.70*) 
Event-driven 8.117894  
(2.54**) 
 
7.57638  
(2.51**) 
7.590848  
(1.84*) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.00751  
(3.04***) 
14.07978  
(3.02***) 
18.37692  
(2.91***) 
Currency 14.56438  
(3.73***) 
13.78689  
(3.74***) 
22.54412  
(4.62***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
23.91957  
(3.23***) 
 
22.43454  
(3.21***) 
28.25505  
(2.98***) 
Relative Value 3.112665  
(1.73*) 
2.949556  
(1.73*) 
4.593159  
(2.00**) 
Debt Arbitrage 2.53371  
(1.28) 
 
2.517671  
(1.35) 
5.363881  
(2.13**) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑1𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑2𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡−1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡−1 −
?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜑3𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund 
category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), 
which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that 
include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include 
an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three 
trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market 
liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐹𝑋 is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity. The 
coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in 
the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. 
Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by 
bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the regression, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major currencies. To get liquidity measures in 
the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus 
one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.19 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for option 
factors. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
6.201816  
(2.05**) 
 
5.870907  
(2.05**) 
 
6.230562  
(1.61) 
Distressed 
Securities 
6.851343  
(1.95*) 
6.579772  
(1.99**) 
7.528421  
(1.68**) 
Event-driven 6.533804  
(1.84*) 
 
6.10071  
(1.82*) 
6.074577  
(1.34) 
Global 
Derivatives 
10.33505  
(2.06**) 
9.743719  
(2.05**) 
12.08462  
(1.89*) 
Currency 13.66379  
(3.11***) 
13.04906  
(3.15***) 
21.72243  
(4.00***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
15.49052  
(2.06**) 
 
14.46886  
(2.04**) 
17.83525  
(1.87*) 
Relative Value 4.063972  
(2.00**) 
3.862315  
(2.01**) 
5.843514  
(2.28**) 
Debt Arbitrage 5.121691  
(2.30**) 
 
5.017977  
(2.39**) 
8.261496  
(2.97***) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a foreign 
exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model and four option factors. The seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a 
bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and 
commodities. The four option factors are returns on highly liquid at-the-money an out-of –the-money 
call and put options in the S&P 500 index. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in 
month 𝑡 + 1 , and ?̅?𝐹𝑋  is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, 
the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) 
means that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of 
G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is 
calculated by bid-ask prices of  six major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange 
market, the foreign exchange market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics 
are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
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industry.  
      The payment structure can also be considered as a call-option-like fee structure 
with option-like payoff.  
      To address the concern of option-like payoff that is not related timing ability, we 
adjust the benchmark for hedge funds’ performance by including four option factors, 
which are introduced by Agarwal and Naik (2004), to equation (6.1). The four option 
factors are returns on highly liquid at-the-money an out-of–the-money call and put 
options in the S&P 500 index and are used to measure hedge funds’ nonlinear returns. 
We thank Vikas Agarwal for providing us with the option factor data. 
      Table 6.19 reports the empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
skills in the foreign exchange market after controlling for option factors. Overall, the 
coefficients of liquidity timing factor are statistically significant and hedge fund 
managers still hold liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market. Thus, we 
find evidence that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability is not driven by 
investments in derivatives, “St. Petersburg” or “doubling” trading strategy or call-
option-like fee structure. 
      In summary, we have evaluated hedge funds’ liquidity timing ability in the foreign 
exchange market by controlling for the impacts of foreign exchange market return and 
volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors. We 
have not found evidence that hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing skills 
in the foreign exchange market are driven by these impacts. 
 
6.9 Bootstrap analysis 
      Our previously empirical analysis is based on the normality assumption. As 
mentioned in Section 5.9, hedge fund returns are not always normally distributed and 
could exhibit high kurtosis and negative skewness, which indicates the distribution of 
fat tails. To avoid the normality assumption and examine whether the evidence of 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills comes from pure luck, we investigate the 
liquidity timing skills via a bootstrap approach where the normality assumption is not 
required (Efron, 1979; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen and 
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Liang, 2007; Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and 
French, 2010 and Cao et al., 2013). The arithmetic mean values of hedge fund returns 
in the same category are used to measure the hedge fund category’s overall 
performance. 
      More specifically, we apply bootstrap analysis to randomly resample the residuals 
of the regression to generate hedge funds with the same risk factor loadings but no 
liquidity timing skills. Then, we examine whether the t-statistics of the liquidity 
timing coefficients for the actual hedge funds are significantly different from those for 
bootstrapped hedge funds. We bootstrap the t-statistics rather than the liquidity timing 
coefficients because the t-statistics are pivotal (Chen and Liang, 2007). Our bootstrap 
analysis contains four steps.  
      First, for hedge fund returns in the same category, we run equation (6.10): 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.  (6.10) 
We save the estimated coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … } and the time series of residuals 
{𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝 stands for the number of monthly returns. Next, 
we randomly resample the residuals with replacements and generate time series of 
residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 } . We resample 𝐵  times, and therefore 𝑏 = 1, 2, … , 𝐵 . Then, we 
generate hypothetical monthly excess returns by setting the liquidity timing 
coefficient to zero, which is based on equation (6.11).  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (6.11) 
Third, we estimate equation (6.10) by using the hypothetical monthly excess returns 
and save the estimated liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic. Because the 
hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity timing ability, any nonzero liquidity timing 
coefficient and t-statistic is contributed to sampling variation. Fourth, we repeat the 
first three steps for 𝐵 times to generate hypothetical distributions of t-statistics. We 
set 𝐵 to 5,000 in our bootstrap analysis. For a given statistic, the p-value is defined as 
the frequency that the statistical values of hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵  time 
simulations exceed the statistical value for actual hedge funds. See Davidson and 
Hinkley (1997) for an overview of bootstrap methods. 
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Table 6.20 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: the foreign exchange market liquidity timing 
coefficients and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.322928  
(0.0144) 
 
6.943995  
(0.0111) 
 
7.508337  
(0.0303) 
Distressed 
Securities 
8.041635  
(0.0401) 
7.677045  
(0.0405) 
9.112989  
(0.0556) 
Event-driven 8.049631  
(0.0120) 
 
7.585689  
(0.0158) 
7.526228  
(0.0568) 
Global 
Derivatives 
15.76451  
(0.0098) 
14.83338  
(0.0086) 
19.13055  
(0.0309) 
Currency 15.512  
(0.0069) 
14.69285  
(0.0061) 
24.44698  
(0.0025) 
Systematic 
Futures 
24.26198  
(0.0049) 
 
22.76551  
(0.0054) 
28.59336  
(0.0153) 
Relative Value 3.668103  
(0.0758) 
3.533104  
(0.0747) 
5.197877  
(0.0206) 
Debt Arbitrage 4.094979  
(0.1372) 
 
4.051219  
(0.1201) 
6.986613  
(0.0154) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the p-values 
for these liquidity timing coefficients, which are obtained by bootstrap analysis. The liquidity timing 
model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly 
returns. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is 
calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for 
that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six 
major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are the liquidity 
timing coefficients and the corresponding p-values that are in the parentheses. The number of bootstrap 
simulations for each hedge fund is 5,000. 
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      Table 6.20 reports the bootstrap analysis results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills in the foreign exchange market. We find that all the p-values are less 
than 10%, which indicates that hedge fund managers in the event, distressed securities, 
event-driven, global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative value and debt 
arbitrage categories still exhibit the ability to time foreign exchange market liquidity 
without imposing the normality assumption. Therefore, the evidence that hedge fund 
managers have liquidity timing skills is not dependent on the normality assumption. 
 
6.10 Empirical results at individual fund level 
      The research so far has focused on liquidity timing skills at the strategy level. This 
section investigates the hedge managers’ liquidity timing ability at individual fund 
level. First, we investigate whether each of the individual hedge funds has timing 
skills. Since each category includes a large number of hedge funds, we show the 
results by using the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge 
funds’ liquidity timing coefficients by using equation (6.1). Next, we employ the 
method of bootstrap analysis to investigate the statistical significance of liquidity 
timing ability in the foreign exchange market. The bootstrap approach ensures the 
results do not rely on the normality assumption in the statistical analysis. 
6.10.1 Timing ability at individual level 
      We undertake the analysis in Section 6.5 at individual hedge fund level. For each 
fund, we estimate the regression coefficients using equation (6.1). Then the null 
hypothesis of 𝜆𝑝 = 0 is tested and the corresponding t-statistic is calculated. Table 
6.21 displays the distribution of t-statistics for individual hedge funds’ liquidity 
timing coefficients. The numbers in the table are the percentage of hedge funds with t-
statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the indicated values. For 
example, 14.73% of hedge funds in the event category have t-statistics of the liquidity 
timing coefficients that are greater than 1.96. In general, a substantial portion of hedge 
funds in each category are associated with t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficient 
greater than 1.28. This provides strong evidence of liquidity timing skills at the 
individual fund level. 
 149 
 
      However, some hedge funds have t-statistics that are smaller than -1.28, which 
indicates that these hedge funds exhibit negative liquidity timing ability. As discussed 
in Cao et al. (2013), it is difficult to interpret the negative liquidity timing coefficient, 
which suggests that fund managers adjust portfolios’ market exposure in the opposite 
direction to the direction used by those managers with successful liquidity timing 
skills. We can see that the right tails of the distribution of t-statistics are thicker than 
those left tails. 
      Overall, the distribution of t-statistics for liquidity timing coefficients reflects 
successful liquidity timing skills. We note, however, these tests were based on the 
normality assumption, which could be misleading in practice. First, hedge fund 
returns may not be normally distributed because hedge funds usually use dynamic 
trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001). Secondly, the investigation of 
liquidity timing skills for a large number of hedge funds could induce a multiple 
comparison problem (Cao et al., 2013). Some hedge funds without true liquidity 
timing skills will show significant t-statistics by random chance. To deal with the 
above potential problems, we use bootstrap analysis to investigate the significance of 
the liquidity timing coefficients at individual fund level. Bootstrap analysis can 
investigate whether liquidity timing skills are contributed to hedge fund managers’ 
managerial skills or pure luck without imposing the normality assumption.  
6.10.2 Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing skills 
      We adopt bootstrap analysis to investigate the significance of liquidity timing 
coefficients at individual hedge fund level by following previous literature (Efron, 
1979; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen and Liang, 2007; 
Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and French, 2010 and 
Cao et al., 2013). The principle of performing bootstrap analysis at individual fund 
level is similar to that outlined in Section 6.9. It includes five steps.  
      First, for hedge fund 𝑝, we run equation (6.12) and save the estimated  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.  (6.12) 
coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … }  and the time series of regression residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 =
0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝 stands for the number of monthly returns for hedge fund 𝑝. 
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Table 6.21 
Distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ liquidity timing 
coefficients. 
  
t≤-2.326 
 
 
t≤-1.960 
 
t≤-1.645 
 
t≤-1.282 
 
t ≥1.282 
 
t ≥1.645 
 
t ≥1.960 
 
t ≥2.326 
 
Panel A: Distribution of t-statistics (Liquidity(10)) 
Event 
 
0.0062 0.0207 0.0290 0.0539 0.3112 0.2054 0.1473 0.0726 
Distressed 
Securities 
0 0.0321 0.0374 0.0535 0.3369 0.2567 0.1765 0.0749 
Event-
driven 
0.0115 0.0154 0.0269 0.0538 0.3038 0.1846 0.1385 0.0808 
Global 
Derivatives 
0.0257 0.0370 0.0590 0.0983 0.3643 0.2804 0.2154 0.1602 
Currency 
 
0.0143 0.0286 0.0571 0.0714 0.4000 0.3714 0.2857 0.2143 
Systematic 
Futures 
0.0071 0.0113 0.0240 0.0580 0.4342 0.3494 0.2702 0.2150 
Relative 
Value 
0.0348 0.0571 0.1019 0.1478 0.1988 0.1317 0.0795 0.0497 
Debt 
Arbitrage 
0.0269 0.0538 0.1211 0.1928 0.1614 0.1256 0.0852 0.0673 
Panel B: Distribution of t-statistics (Liquidity(G10)) 
Event 
 
0.0062 0.0207 0.0290 0.0539 0.3071 0.2220 0.1515 0.0788 
Distressed 
Securities 
0 0.0321 0.0374 0.0535 0.3369 0.2727 0.1872 0.0856 
Event-
driven 
0.0115 0.0154 0.0269 0.0538 0.2962 0.2038 0.1385 0.0846 
Global 
Derivatives 
0.0265 0.0393 0.0597 0.0960 0.3643 0.2766 0.2124 0.1602 
Currency 
 
0.0143 0.0143 0.0571 0.0714 0.3857 0.3714 0.2857 0.2143 
Systematic 
Futures 
0.0071 0.0141 0.0240 0.0580 0.4328 0.3423 0.2716 0.2150 
Relative 
Value 
0.0348 0.0571 0.1006 0.1491 0.2037 0.1292 0.0807 0.0509 
Debt 0.0314 0.0538 0.1166 0.1928 0.1659 0.1211 0.0897 0.0628 
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Arbitrage 
Panel C: Distribution of t-statistics (Liquidity(6)) 
Event 
 
0.0083 0.0104 0.0207 0.0519 0.2593 0.1598 0.0913 0.0456 
Distressed 
Securities 
0.0053 0.0107 0.0321 0.0481 0.2834 0.1711 0.1016 0.0481 
Event-
driven 
0.0077 0.0077 0.0115 0.0577 0.2423 0.1577 0.0885 0.0500 
Global 
Derivatives 
0.0242 0.0385 0.0597 0.0862 0.3348 0.2464 0.1943 0.1383 
Currency 
 
0.0143 0.0286 0.0571 0.0571 0.4286 0.2857 0.2714 0.1714 
Systematic 
Futures 
0.0042 0.0156 0.0311 0.0537 0.3748 0.2900 0.2277 0.1697 
Relative 
Value 
0.0248 0.0497 0.0783 0.1304 0.1913 0.1205 0.0832 0.0547 
Debt 
Arbitrage 
0.0448 0.0717 0.0897 0.1883 0.1704 0.1166 0.0897 0.0493 
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing coefficients based on the equation (6.1), which is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund in the sample has at least 
24 monthly returns. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market 
illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, 
the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) 
stands for that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices 
of  six major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are the 
percentage of hedge funds with t-statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the indicated 
values. 
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Secondly, we randomly resample the hedge fund’s residuals with replacements and 
generate time series of residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 } . We resample 𝐵  times, and thus 𝑏 =
1, 2, … , 𝐵. Then, we obtain a hypothetical hedge fund’s monthly excess returns by 
setting the liquidity timing coefficient to zero based on equation (6.13):  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (6.13) 
Third, we estimate equation (6.12) by employing the hypothetical hedge fund’s 
monthly excess returns and save the estimated liquidity timing coefficient and t-
statistic. Because the hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity timing ability, any 
nonzero liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic are contributed to sampling 
variation. Fourth, we repeat the first three steps for all actual hedge funds in the 
sample. Then we can obtain the cross-sectional statistics, such as the top 5 percentile, 
of estimated liquidity timing coefficients and t-statistics for all sample hedge funds. 
Finally, we repeat the first four steps for 𝐵 times to obtain hypothetical hedge funds’ 
distributions of t-statistics, such as the top 5 percentile. We set 𝐵 to 5,000 in our 
bootstrap analysis. The p-value is defined as the frequency that the statistical values of 
hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵  time simulations exceed the statistical value for 
actual hedge funds. 
      Bootstrap analysis can be used to investigate how likely it is that hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing ability is contributed to pure luck without imposing the normality 
assumption. Table 6.22 reports the t-statistics and the corresponding p-values, which 
are obtained from bootstrap analysis at different extreme percentiles. The extreme 
percentiles we choose include the bottom 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% and the top 1%, 3%, 
5% and 10%. Based on the p-values in Table 6.22, we find that hedge funds with top 
t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficients have liquidity timing skills, which do not 
come from pure luck. For example, the t-statistic of hedge funds in the global 
derivatives category is 3.7324 and its corresponding p-value is 0, which indicates that 
global derivatives hedge funds in the top 3% percentile have liquidity timing ability in 
the foreign exchange market. Although for hedge funds in the event, distressed 
securities, event-driven, global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative 
value and debt arbitrage categories, some hedge funds have significantly negative 
timing ability, it is more important to find that a portion of hedge funds in these 
categories exhibit successful liquidity timing skills. Therefore, the evidence in Table 
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Table 6.22 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: t-statistics with the corresponding p-values in 
parentheses. 
 Bottom t-statistics for ?̂? Top t-statistics for ?̂? 
  
1% 
 
3% 
 
5% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
5% 
 
3% 
 
1% 
 
Panel A: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Liquidity(10)) 
Event 
 
-2.2553 
(0) 
-1.6274 
(0) 
-1.2918 
(0) 
-0.9701 
(0) 
2.1289 
(0) 
2.5961 
(0.0172) 
2.8475 
(0.2704) 
3.3178 
(0.9174) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.2553 
(0) 
-1.9720 
(0.0032) 
-1.4359 
(0) 
-0.8188 
(0) 
2.1530 
(0.0454) 
2.5131 
(0.3940) 
2.6503 
(0.7978) 
3.1602 
(0.9538) 
Event-
driven 
-2.4691 
(0.0090) 
-1.6179 
(0) 
-1.2918 
(0) 
-1.0784 
(0.0002) 
2.1492 
(0) 
2.7821 
(0.0032) 
2.9701 
(0.1448) 
3.4752 
(0.6728) 
Global 
Derivatives 
-3.1005 
(0.1062) 
-2.1152 
(0.0002) 
-1.7424 
(0) 
-1.2446 
(0) 
2.7940 
(0) 
3.2735 
(0) 
3.7324 
(0) 
4.3066 
(0.0010) 
Currency 
 
-2.3881 
(0.1180) 
-1.8367 
(0.1358) 
-1.6667 
(0.1448) 
-1.1224 
(0.0402) 
3.5234 
(0) 
3.9797 
(0) 
4.3564 
(0.0002) 
4.5046 
(0.1250) 
Systematic 
Futures 
-2.0069 
(0) 
-1.4487 
(0) 
-1.3440 
(0) 
-0.8676 
(0) 
2.9678 
(0) 
3.5896 
(0) 
3.8085 
(0) 
4.4108 
(0.0026) 
Relative 
Value 
-3.0012 
(0.0038) 
-2.3550 
(0.0078) 
-2.0916 
(0.0674) 
-1.6621 
(0.5098) 
1.7795 
(0.0756) 
2.3166 
(0.3218) 
2.7206 
(0.5072) 
3.5078 
(0.7948) 
Debt 
Arbitrage 
-3.2138 
(0.3252) 
-2.3079 
(0.1406) 
-1.9653 
(0.2132) 
-1.7346 
(0.8370) 
1.8857 
(0.1160) 
2.4989 
(0.2466) 
2.9281 
(0.4796) 
3.7299 
(0.6668) 
Panel B: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Liquidity(G10)) 
Event 
 
-2.2854 
(0) 
-1.6153 
(0) 
-1.3247 
(0) 
-0.9504 
(0) 
2.1350 
(0) 
2.6221 
(0.0194) 
2.8719 
(0.2882) 
3.3185 
(0.9334) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.2854 
(0) 
-2.0539 
(0.0068) 
-1.5038 
(0) 
-0.7878 
(0) 
2.1586 
(0.0526) 
2.5134 
(0.4294) 
2.7772 
(0.7254) 
3.1541 
(0.9636) 
Event-
driven 
-2.4553 
(0.0082) 
-1.5897 
(0) 
-1.3247 
(0) 
-1.0617 
(0) 
2.1376 
(0) 
2.8086 
(0.0028) 
2.9074 
(0.2026) 
3.5009 
(0.6924) 
Global 
Derivatives 
-3.0648 
(0.0684) 
-2.1194 
(0) 
-1.7683 
(0) 
-1.2592 
(0) 
2.7443 
(0) 
3.2559 
(0) 
3.7149 
(0) 
4.3636 
(0.0006) 
Currency 
 
-2.3579 
(0.1078) 
-1.7836 
(0.1100) 
-1.7683 
(0.2370) 
-1.1921 
(0.0742) 
3.5707 
(0) 
4.0020 
(0.0002) 
4.3500 
(0.0002) 
4.5148 
(0.1270) 
Systematic 
Futures 
-2.0900 
(0) 
-1.5023 
(0) 
-1.3573 
(0) 
-0.9184 
(0) 
2.9475 
(0) 
3.5625 
(0) 
3.7798 
(0) 
4.3996 
(0.0052) 
Relative 
Value 
-3.0358 
(0.0040) 
-2.4164 
(0.0192) 
-2.0636 
(0.0304) 
-1.6496 
(0.4108) 
1.7964 
(0.0694) 
2.3564 
(0.2692) 
2.6804 
(0.6390) 
3.5485 
(0.7894) 
Debt -3.2109 -2.4187 -1.9688 -1.7122 1.8677 2.4984 2.9910 3.7637 
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Arbitrage (0.2996) (0.2240) (0.1976) (0.7796) (0.1556) (0.2756) (0.4476) (0.6704) 
Panel C: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Liquidity(6)) 
Event 
 
-2.0839 
(0) 
-1.4567 
(0) 
-1.3230 
(0) 
-0.9003 
(0) 
1.9079 
(0.0010) 
2.2596 
(0.1268) 
2.5074 
(0.4896) 
2.9948 
(0.9374) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.0839 
(0.0002) 
-1.6872 
(0) 
-1.2796 
(0) 
-0.8689 
(0) 
1.9828 
(0.0342) 
2.3233 
(0.3208) 
2.5074 
(0.6692) 
2.9907 
(0.9078) 
Event-
driven 
-1.7313 
(0) 
-1.4306 
(0) 
-1.3389 
(0) 
-1.0413 
(0.0002) 
1.8937 
(0.0032) 
2.2596 
(0.0900) 
2.6429 
(0.2602) 
3.3237 
(0.6264) 
Global 
Derivatives 
-3.0735 
(0.1492) 
-2.1738 
(0.0048) 
-1.7691 
(0) 
-1.1398 
(0) 
2.6197 
(0) 
3.1628 
(0) 
3.4885 
(0) 
4.1754 
(0.0010) 
Currency 
 
-2.5716 
(0.1950) 
-1.7996 
(0.1108) 
-1.7299 
(0.1704) 
-1.2220 
(0.0682) 
3.2798 
(0) 
3.7984 
(0) 
3.9526 
(0.0006) 
4.9507 
(0.0748) 
Systematic 
Futures 
-2.0477 
(0) 
-1.7226 
(0) 
-1.3221 
(0) 
-0.8616 
(0) 
2.8685 
(0) 
3.2334 
(0) 
3.4780 
(0) 
4.1604 
(0.0038) 
Relative 
Value 
-2.7280 
(0.0016) 
-2.2235 
(0.0140) 
-1.9439 
(0.0468) 
-1.5011 
(0.2186) 
1.8227 
(0.0016) 
2.4435 
(0.0084) 
2.8208 
(0.0574) 
3.5264 
(0.4596) 
Debt 
Arbitrage 
-3.1616 
(0.4722) 
-2.4095 
(0.4110) 
-2.2491 
(0.8206) 
-1.5795 
(0.7200) 
1.8133 
(0.0674) 
2.3055 
(0.2398) 
2.7224 
(0.3980) 
3.9822 
(0.2878) 
Note: This table summarizes the bootstrap analysis results for cross-sectional individual hedge funds. 
The liquidity timing model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures foreign exchange market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly 
returns. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is 
calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for 
that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six 
major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The numbers in the table are the sorted t-
statistics of liquidity timing coefficients for cross-sectional individual hedge funds and the 
corresponding p-values that are in the parentheses. The number of bootstrap simulations for each hedge 
fund is 5,000. 
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6.22 reveals that the top-ranked hedge fund managers have successful liquidity timing 
skills in the foreign exchange market. 
 
6.11 Conclusions 
      In this chapter, we have investigated whether hedge fund managers have the skills 
to time foreign exchange market liquidity by adjusting hedge fund portfolios’ 
exposure to the foreign exchange market based on managers’ forecasts about the 
future foreign exchange market liquidity. We have examined hedge funds’ liquidity 
timing ability in the foreign exchange market because hedge funds are actively 
managed with highly dynamic investment strategies and the management of foreign 
exchange market liquidity risk is crucial for hedge fund  managers to professionally 
manage hedge funds’ portfolios.  
      We find that hedge fund managers have successful liquidity timing ability in the 
foreign exchange market. Hedge fund managers increase (decrease) hedge funds’ 
foreign exchange market exposure prior to the rise (fall) of foreign exchange market 
liquidity. Furthermore, we have carried out a range of robustness tests and hedge 
funds’ successful liquidity timing skills remain unchanged. In particular, our findings 
are shown to be robust to usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption 
restrictions, hedge funds trades on foreign exchange market liquidity, financial crisis, 
hedge fund data biases, foreign exchange market return and volatility timing, liquidity 
risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors. We have also undertaken 
bootstrap analysis to ensure the results of hedge funds’ liquidity timing skills are not 
dependent on the normality assumption.  
      There is not much literature that focuses on the timing skills in the foreign 
exchange market and the evidence of timing ability varies. Chen (2007) finds 
successful timing ability for future hedge funds in the foreign exchange market. On 
the other hand, Cumby (1987), who investigates foreign exchange advisors’ timing 
skills, shows that these advisors have no timing skills in the foreign exchange market. 
In this chapter, we find that hedge fund managers have the ability to time foreign 
exchange market liquidity. Our investigation provides a better understanding of the 
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importance of foreign exchange market liquidity to hedge funds’ professional 
portfolio management.  
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Chapter 7 
Liquidity timing ability for hedge funds 
in the commodity market  
 
7.1 Introduction 
      In this chapter, we explore whether hedge fund managers have liquidity timing 
ability in the commodity market. We focus on whether managers have the ability to 
time commodity market liquidity by strategically adjusting hedge funds’ commodity 
market exposure based on managers’ forecasts about the conditions of commodity 
market liquidity. So far, this research topic has not been investigated in the literature. 
      Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2013) investigate the commodity futures’ 
liquidity commonality by adopting 16 commodity futures that cover agricultural, 
livestock, industrial metal, energy, and previous metal commodities. They find a 
significant systematic liquidity factor among commodities. Chen (2007) shows that 
managed futures hedge funds focus on the commodity market. However, they find 
weak evidence that managed futures hedge funds exhibit market timing skills in the 
commodity market. By using 15 major commodity futures, Marshall, Cahan and 
Cahan (2008) examine whether applying quantitative market timing strategies to 
commodity futures can consistently generate profit. According to their results, 
although the quantitative market timing strategies help commodity futures produce 
profits, which are statistically significant at 5 percent level, the profits become 
insignificant after controlling for data-snooping bias.  
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      Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) investigate whether hedge fund managers have 
liquidity timing ability in the equity market by adjusting their portfolios’ equity 
market exposure based on managers’ forecasts about future changes in equity market 
liquidity. After examining equity-oriented hedge funds, Cao et al. (2013) find that 
hedge fund managers can time equity market liquidity, which are robust to the hedge 
fund data biases, alternative explanations and other risk factors, timing models and 
liquidity measures. Buyuksahin and Robe (2014) investigate the correlation between 
the returns on commodity futures and equity indices. They find that the correlation 
increases when hedge funds participate in investing in both the commodity and equity 
market. Kessler and Scherer (2011) state that hedge fund managers can use various 
financial vehicles and investment strategies among different markets, like the 
commodity market. However, it is not clear whether hedge fund managers have 
liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. In this chapter, we investigate 
whether managers have the liquidity timing skills in the commodity market by 
strategically adjusting hedge fund portfolios’ exposure to the commodity market 
based on managers’ forecasts about the future changes in conditions of commodity 
market liquidity. 
      The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we describe our 
liquidity-timing model and discuss the liquidity measure of the commodity market, 
respectively. Section 4 gives the description of data. In Section 5 we show the 
empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity-timing ability. In Section 6, we 
explore alternative explanations that are relevant to funding liquidity, investor 
redemption restrictions, and the impacts of hedge fund trades on commodity market 
liquidity and financial crisis. Section 7 concerns the impacts of different hedge fund 
data biases. In Section 8, we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative 
liquidity timing model specifications and risk factors. Section 9 shows the empirical 
results of liquidity timing skills by applying bootstrap analysis. In Section 10, we 
examine the liquidity timing skills at individual fund level. Finally, Section 11 gives 
the conclusion of this chapter.  
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7.2 Liquidity timing model 
      In this chapter, we examine whether hedge fund managers have the skills to time 
commodity market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the commodity 
market based on managers’ forecasts about future commodity market liquidity 
conditions. We employ Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure to compute commodity 
market illiquidity. The monthly illiquidity measure in the commodity market is the 
weighted average of daily commodity market illiquidity. In order to get liquidity 
measure in the commodity market, the commodity market illiquidity measure is 
multiplied by minus one.  
      As explained in Chapter 6, hedge funds usually adopt dynamic trading strategies 
(Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001) and invest in derivatives 
(Chen, 2011). Fung and Hsieh (2004) propose a seven-factor model as the benchmark 
for hedge fund performance. The seven factors include equity market factor, the size 
spread factor, the bond market factor, the credit spread factor, the bond trend-
following factor, the currency trend-following factor and the commodity trend-
following factor; see Chapters 5 and 6 for details.  
      Following the existing literature (Agarwal and Naik, 2004; Capocci, Corhay and 
Hubner, 2005; Aragon, 2007; Chen, 2007; Meligkotsidou, Vrontos and Vrontos, 2009; 
Chen, 2011), we add a commodity market factor to get a better explanation of hedge 
fund performance. The commodity market factor is the month-end returns of Standard 
and Poor Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P GSCI). In order to better 
investigate hedge fund performance in the commodity market, we adopt a benchmark 
that contains the seven factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model and 
the commodity market factor. 
      Following the liquidity timing model used by Cao et al. (2013) and the fixed 
income market liquidity timing model in Section 5.2, our commodity market liquidity 
timing model is specified as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀)
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1
,                                 (7.1) 
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where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return of hedge fund 𝑝 in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 is the 
commodity market factor in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 stands for the liquidity level in the 
commodity market in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀 is the average commodity market liquidity 
level, 𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1 denotes the seven factors in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor 
model (𝐽 = 7 in this case) and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 is the error term in month 𝑡 + 1. The coefficient, 
𝜆𝑝, measures hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. 
A positive value of 𝜆𝑝  indicates that the hedge fund manager has liquidity timing 
ability by increasing (decreasing) the hedge fund’s exposure to the commodity market 
prior to the rise (fall) of commodity market liquidity.  
 
7.3 Liquidity measure 
      In this section, we briefly review the literature on various liquidity measures in the 
commodity market. Then we choose and justify the commodity market liquidity 
measures used in this chapter. 
      Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012) investigate the performance of 
liquidity proxies in the commodity market by using daily data. They use three high-
frequency liquidity benchmarks: Effective Spread, Quoted Spread and Five-minute 
Price Impact. The low-frequency liquidity proxies can be divided into two groups, 
including low-frequency spread proxies and low-frequency price-impact proxies. 
Low-frequency spread proxies used by Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012) 
are Roll, Effective Tick, Gibbs, Zero, High-low spread estimator and FHT. Low-
frequency price-impact proxies include Amihud, Amivest, Pastor and Stambaugh and 
Extend Amihud Proxies. The details of all liquidity measures mentioned above can be 
found in the Section 3.2. Comparing with other low-frequency proxies, Marshall, 
Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012) find that Amihud (2002) measure has the best 
performance.  
      We follow Kessler and Scherer (2011) and Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti 
(2012, 2013) and use Amihud (2002) measure as the commodity market liquidity 
measure. Amihud (2002) proposes an illiquidity measure that is the ratio of daily 
absolute asset return to its daily trading volume. Other measures, like bid ask spread, 
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need a lot of microstructure data. For many financial markets, this microstructure data 
is not available or does not cover long enough periods. Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) 
also choose Amihud (2002)’s measure because it only requires daily data and allows 
them to focus on a much longer time period. The illiquidity measure proposed by 
Amihud (2002) is defined as:  
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑦
𝑡=1 ,                                                                                 (7.2) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 stands for the number of available trading days for asset 𝑖 over time interval 
𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑 denotes the return on asset 𝑖 over time interval 𝑡 and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑑 is daily trading 
for asset 𝑖  over time interval 𝑡 . To obtain a liquidity measure, Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by one.  
 
7.4 Data 
      In this section, we describe the data on hedge funds, the benchmark for hedge 
fund performance and the liquidity measure in the commodity market. Concerning the 
data availability, we use the period of all the above data from January 1994 to 
December 2012. 
      The data on hedge funds is obtained from the database of Morningstar that 
contains extensive data sources of hedge funds. Following previous literature (Chen 
2007; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010; Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013), 
we include only hedge funds with at least 10 million dollars of assets under 
management (AUM) in our sample. Furthermore, all hedge funds should have at least 
24 monthly returns (Eling and Faust, 2010; Jylha, Rinne and Suominen, 2010; 
Stefanova and Siegmann, 2012; Cao et al., 2013).  
      Morningstar classifies hedge funds into 31 categories that can be grouped in six 
broad strategy categories; see Section 5.4 and 6.4 for a detailed description for hedge 
fund classifications. 
      The arithmetic mean value of the returns of hedge funds in the same category is 
used to measure the hedge fund category’s overall performance. Panel A of Table 7.1 
gives the summary of monthly returns for the hedge funds in the sample. During the 
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sample period of 1994-2012, the average monthly return for all hedge funds is 0.777% 
and the standard deviation of the returns is 1.685%. We find that directional equity 
hedge funds show the highest average monthly return of 1.016% among the six broad 
strategy categories. In contrast, multistrategy hedge funds generate the lowest average 
monthly return of 0.534%. Overall, the average monthly returns for all six broad 
strategy categories are positive over the whole sample period. Furthermore, we find 
that the returns of hedge funds in the relative value categories exhibit the lowest 
volatility of 1.000%.  
      The benchmark for hedge fund returns are the seven factors from Fung and Hsieh 
(2004)’s seven-factor model and a commodity market factor proposed by Agarwal 
and Naik (2004), Capocci, Corhay and Hubner (2005), Aragon (2007), Chen (2007), 
Meligkotsidou, Vrontos and Vrontos (2009) and Chen (2011); see Sections 5.4 and 
6.4 for a detailed description of the seven factors in the seven-factor model. The data 
can be found through the link: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. 
The data used for other factors comes from Datastream and the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. The one-month Treasury bill rate is used as the risk free 
rate obtained from the Kenneth R. French data library, which can be found by the link: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Panel B of 
Table 7.1 provides the statistical summary for the seven factors. For example, the 
average equity market excess return during the sample period is 0.506% per month 
with a standard deviation of 4.454%.  
      The commodity market factor is the month-end returns of S&P GSCI. There are 
three published S&P GSCI indices that are S&P GSC Total Return index, S&P GSCI 
Spot index and S&P GSCI Excess Return index. S&P GSC Total Return index 
measures a fully collateralized commodity futures investment rolled forward from the 
fifth to the ninth business day of each month. S&P GSCI Spot index tracks the price 
of the nearby future contracts instead of returns available to investors. S&P GSC 
Total Return index and S&P GSCI Spot index are not directly comparable, either with 
a single mathematical operation or conceptually. S&P GSCI Excess Return index 
measures the return from investing in nearby S&P GSCI futures and rolling them 
forward each month by always keeping the investment in nearby commodity futures. 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index is not the return above cash. S&P GSCI Excess 
Return index is not comparable to S&P GSC Total Return index or S&P GSCI Spot  
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Table 7.1  
Summary statistics of the data. 
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25% 75% 
    
Panel A: Summary of average hedge fund returns    
       
Directional Equity 3914 1.016 1.160 2.635 -0.590 2.593 
Directional Debt 543 0.790 0.793 1.902 0.048 1.442 
Event 482 0.944 1.235 1.682 0.168 1.926 
Global Derivatives 1323 0.961 0.808 2.519 -0.636 2.289 
Multistrategy 5450 0.534 0.635 1.500 -0.194 1.481 
Relative value 805 0.710 0.793 1.000 0.333 1.289 
All 12517 0.777 0.815 1.685 -0.232 1.857 
       
Panel B: Summary of factor data     
      
MKT 0.506 1.013 4.454 -2.047 3.474 
SMB 0.051 -0.066 3.386 -2.304 2.163 
BMF -0.018 -0.015 0.276 -0.203 0.150 
CSF 0.004 0.000 0.221 -0.090 0.080 
PTFSBD -1.555 -4.530 15.528 -13.078 3.703 
PTFSFX -0.594 -5.285 19.589 -14.335 8.732 
PTFSCOM -0.582 -3.043 13.709 -9.539 6.055 
S&P GSCI Total Return 0.334 0.602 6.419 -3.720 4.415 
S&P GSCI Spot 0.807 1.296 6.328 -3.392 5.061 
S&P GSCI Excess Return 0.326 0.595 6.404 -3.769 4.410 
      
Panel C: Summary of liquidity measure      
      
Amihud -0.00117 -0.00062 0.00181 -0.00137 -0.00033 
      
Note: This table provides the statistical summary of the data. Panel A in Table 7.1 summarizes average 
monthly returns on hedge funds in different strategy categories and all hedge funds. The monthly 
returns are in percent per month. N denotes the number of hedge funds that exist during the sample 
period. Panel B summarizes the Fund-Hsieh seven factors and the commodity market factor. These 
eight factors are used to benchmark hedge funds’ performance.  Specifically, the Fund-Hsieh seven 
factors include the market excess return (MKT), a size factor (SMB), monthly change in the ten-year 
treasury constant maturity yield (BMF), monthly change in the Moody’s Baa yield less ten-year 
treasury constant maturity yield (CSF), and three trend-following factors that are PFTSBD (bond), 
PFTSFX (currency), and PFTSCOM (commodity). The commodity market factor is the month-end 
returns of S&P GSCI. For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using three 
different S&P GSCI indices. S&P GSCI Total Return denotes that the commodity market factor is 
calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. S&P GSCI Spot means that the commodity market factor 
is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. S&P GSCI Excess Return indicates that the commodity market 
factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. Panel C summarizes the liquidity measure in 
the commodity market. Amihud denotes that the commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud 
(2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. Thus, Amihud in Panel C stands for commodity market 
liquidity measure. The sample period lasts from January 1994 to December 2012. 
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Fig. 7.1 Time series of monthly commodity market liquidity. This figure plots three time series of 
monthly commodity market liquidity measures. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by 
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the 
commodity market illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. Thus, this figure shows commodity 
market liquidity measure. The sample period lasts from January 1994 to December 2012. 
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index (http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/securities/products-and-business-
groups/products/gsci/components-weights-index-levels.html). In order to get robust 
results, we compute the commodity market factor by using the above three different 
S&P GSCI indices. Panel B of Table 7.1 gives the statistics of three commodity 
factors. We find that the commodity factor computed by S&P GSCI Spot index has 
higher average return than other two commodity factors. These three commodity 
factors have similar values of volatility.  
      There are twenty-four commodities that comprise the S&P GSCI. The commodity 
market liquidity is the weighted average of liquidity measure for these twenty-four 
commodities. The twenty-four commodities include eight agricultural commodities, 
three livestock commodities, six energy commodities, five industrial metals and two 
precious metals. The eight agricultural commodities are Chicago wheat, Kansas wheat, 
corn, soybeans, coffee, sugar, cocoa and cotton. Three livestock commodities include 
lean hogs, live cattle and feeder cattle. The six energy commodities contain West 
Texas crude oil, Brent crude oil, RBOB gasoline, heating oil, gasoil and natural gas. 
The five industrial metals are aluminium, copper, lead, nickel and zinc. The two 
precious metals include gold and silver (Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti, 2012, 
2013). Although some commodities are traded on multiple exchanges, we only focus 
on their primary exchanges by following S&P GSCI information and Marshall, 
Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012, 2013). The primary exchange of Kansas wheat data 
is the Kansas Board of Trade (KBT). The primary exchange of Chicago wheat, corn 
and soybeans is the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The primary exchange of Brent 
crude oil, gasoil, coffee, sugar, cocoa and cotton is the Intercontinental Exchange 
(ICE). The primary exchange of live cattle, feeder cattle and lean hog is the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME). The primary exchange of West Texas crude oil, RBOB 
gasoline and heating oil is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The 
primary exchange of gold and silver is the COMEX that is a division of the NYMEX. 
COMEX was known as the Commodity Exchange Inc. before its merger with the 
NYMEX. The primary exchange of aluminium, copper, lead, nickel and zinc is 
London Metals Exchange (LME). Though the CBOT, CME, NYMEX and COMEX 
are not part of the CME group, they still remain their individual identities. The daily 
price data of twenty-four commodities is obtained from Datastream. Following 
Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2012, 2013), we obtain the data of contract size, 
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number of contracts traded and settlement price in USD for all twenty-four 
commodities and compute Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure by multiplying the 
contract size by the number of contracts traded and then multiplying this result by the 
settlement price for each commodity. To obtain a liquidity measure, we multiply 
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure with minus one. We use the weighted average 
liquidity measures of twenty-four commodities to measure liquidity in the commodity 
market. The weights of twenty-four are obtained from the S&P GSCI Methodology 
that published in August 2013. Panel C of Table 7.1 gives the statistical information 
about the commodity market liquidity measure. Fig. 7.1 shows the time series of 
monthly commodity market liquidity measure. We find that the liquidity measure 
fluctuated over time. The commodity market liquidity dropped dramatically around 
2001.  However, the changes of liquidity measure during recent financial crisis are not 
significant compared to its overall performance. From the Fig. 7.1, we find that the 
commodity liquidity measure has different patterns with other financial market 
liquidity measures. 
 
7.5 Empirical results 
      In this section, we firstly describe the empirical results of liquidity timing ability 
in the commodity market at broad categories level. Next, we give the explanations 
and interpretations to the empirical results that are based on the specifications and 
descriptions of different strategy categories. Finally, we examine the liquidity timing 
ability of hedge funds in the subgroups of those broad categories that show 
statistically significant coefficients of liquidity timing factor. 
      We employ equation (7.1) to examine the liquidity timing skills for different 
hedge fund categories. Table 7.2 gives the coefficients of the commodity market 
liquidity timing factor at broad hedge fund category level. In particular, we find that 
hedge funds in the event and relative value categories have significantly positive 
coefficients of commodity market liquidity timing factor. All these coefficients are 
statistically significant at 5% level. In contrast, hedge funds in other categories or all 
hedge funds do not show any significant liquidity timing coefficients. Therefore, 
managers of hedge funds in the event and relative value categories have shown the  
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Table 7.2 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for different hedge fund categories. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Equity 
 
5.171079  
(0.98) 
 
5.382563  
(0.97) 
 
5.199094  
(0.98) 
Directional 
Debt 
-.4763836  
(-0.08) 
-.5192382  
(-0.08) 
-.4896293  
(-0.08) 
Event 7.223797  
(1.99**) 
7.772986  
(2.03**) 
7.256518  
(1.99**) 
Global 
Derivatives 
1.409675  
(0.17) 
1.729342  
(0.20) 
1.393194  
(0.17) 
Multistrategy 
All 
4.582539  
(1.40) 
4.592905  
(1.32) 
4.603784  
(1.40) 
Relative Value 5.521274  
(2.10**) 
5.978194  
(2.15**) 
5.548492  
(2.10**) 
All 
 
 
4.651773 
(1.13) 
4.9685  
(1.15) 
4.671226  
(1.13) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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ability to increase (decrease) portfolios’ exposure to the commodity market prior to a 
rise (fall) of liquidity in the commodity market, which induces a concavity connection 
between hedge fund returns and commodity market liquidity level.   
      To explain and interpret the different liquidity timing abilities in the commodity 
market, we focus on the description of hedge fund investment strategies shown in 
Table 7.3. According to Table 7.3, event hedge fund managers adopt derivatives or 
short positions to reduce hedge fund portfolios’ market exposure, which helps 
managers focus on profit opportunities that are related to event and insulate portfolios 
from the changes of broad markets. Thus, derivatives, like commodity futures, 
provide good vehicles for hedge fund managers to hedge the risks of broad financial 
markets. Event hedge fund managers also need to concern the risks related to 
commodity futures. It is expected that these managers have some management skills 
in the commodity market, such as liquidity timing ability.  
      Table 7.3 reports that relative value hedge fund managers invest in the prices 
relation between pairs of connected financial products. Managers take long or short 
positions in those underpriced and overpriced assets, respectively and only hold the 
asset positions when the pairs of prices are discrepant. With both long and short 
positions, the portfolios of hedge funds in the relative value category are always 
market neutral. Since the discrepancies of pairs of prices are normally quite small and 
last a short period of time in efficient markets, hedge fund managers usually adopt 
high leverage to enlarge the scale of potential profit. The reason for significant 
evidence of liquidity timing skills in the commodity market could be that relative 
value hedge fund managers use commodity futures to hedge portfolios’ market 
exposure for being market neutral and generate high leverage. 
      Table 7.3 shows that hedge funds in the directional equity category primarily 
invest in equity markets. These hedge funds usually take net long or short position on 
the equity market. Hedge fund managers use equity-market-related derivatives to 
leverage and hedge portfolios’ positions in the equity market. Compared to traditional 
funds with long positions or market indexes, hedge funds with short positions tend to 
have different risk characteristics, equity market beta exposure and distribution of 
returns. We can logically predict that directional equity hedge funds do not show 
liquidity timing skill in the commodity market because of their heavy equity market  
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Table 7.3  
Description of investing strategies for different hedge funds’ categories. 
 
Strategies 
 
 
Description 
 
Panel A: Description of six broad strategies 
 
Directional 
Equity 
Funds in the directional-equity category grouping primarily invest in stocks and 
may take long or short positions. Managers may also use options to leverage their 
position or to hedge. Hedge funds with more-varied degrees of short positions are 
likelier to have different risk parameters, beta exposures, and return streams than 
traditional long-only funds or indexes. These funds will usually have either net 
long or net short market exposure to equities, unlike arbitrage funds, which tend 
to balance out long and short equity-market exposures. 
 
Directional Debt Funds in the directional-debt category study broad-based changes and prices in 
fixed-income products. In many cases, the manager will select various fixed-
income products such as high-yield or emerging-markets debt to provide a fixed 
investment stream. Many debt funds leverage their returns to provide larger 
returns. Unlike debt arbitrage funds, these types of funds tend to have a net long 
market exposure. 
 
Event Funds in the broad event category grouping attempt to profit when stock or bond 
prices change in response to certain corporate actions, such as bankruptcy, 
mergers, or acquisitions. Managers will typically use short positions or 
derivatives to hedge their market exposure. These positions help the fund capture 
the price change related to the event itself and insulate the fund from broad 
market changes. 
 
Global 
Derivatives 
Funds in the global-derivatives category group study broad-based changes and 
prices in global markets. Often, these funds make tactical decisions about an 
optimal global asset-allocation mix, and they use equities, bonds, currencies, 
derivatives, and commodities in their portfolios. Many managers look for 
emerging trends in countries, industries, and geopolitical institutions. Some 
managers will also attempt to profit from general market volatility during times of 
uncertainty. 
 
Multistrategy The multistrategy broad asset class contains the hedge funds that merge multiple 
techniques into one single fund. 
 
Relative Value Funds in the relative-value category grouping study the pricing relationship 
between pairs of related securities. Managers take a long position in the security 
that appears to be underpriced and a short position in the security that appears to 
be overpriced. The manager will hold the positions until the pricing discrepancy 
disappears. These strategies are usually market neutral. Because markets are 
generally efficient, pricing discrepancies are typically very small and short-lived. 
Therefore, these funds are frequently highly leveraged, using borrowed money to 
increase the size of possible gains. 
 
Panel B: Description of hedge funds in Event category 
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Distressed 
Securities 
These funds specialize in financially troubled companies that may face 
bankruptcies, distressed sales, corporate restructurings, or financial 
reorganizations. A fund might take long positions only in the company stock or 
debt, or it might exploit pricing discrepancies between different parts of the 
company’s capital structure, for example by buying senior debt and shorting 
preferred stock. The hedge fund may try to accumulate a controlling stake in the 
company in order to influence the outcome. During bankruptcy proceedings, debt-
holders often exchange their debt for an equity stake in the post-bankrupt entity. 
 
Event-Driven These funds attempt to profit from price changes related to a variety of corporate 
actions, including bankruptcy, emergence from bankruptcy, divestitures, stock 
buybacks, dividend issuance, major shifts in corporate strategy, and other atypical 
events. Many of these funds undertake activist techniques to spur further 
corporate changes at the underlying companies. 
 
Merger 
Arbitrage 
These funds attempt to profit from price changes related to mergers, acquisitions, 
and divestitures of the underlying companies. These strategies typically involve 
the purchase of stock of an acquisition target and sell the shares of the acquiring 
company. 
Panel C: Description of hedge funds in Relative Value category 
 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
These funds study the relationship between a company’s stock and its convertible 
bonds. Convertible bonds contain an option that allows the bondholder to trade 
the bond for common stock at a certain price and under certain conditions. 
Usually, the bond is undervalued, so managers buy the bond and short the stock to 
hedge equity risk. These funds craft strategies to manage their exposure to 
interest-rate risk, default risk, and illiquidity in the convertible-bond market, and 
pricing volatility in both the stock and bond markets. Because the pricing 
discrepancies are usually very small, many of these funds employ leverage to 
maximize return. 
 
Debt Arbitrage These funds seek out pricing discrepancies between various private and public 
fixed-income instruments, usually looking for global opportunities. Portfolio 
managers in this category primarily invest in fixed-income derivative instruments. 
These funds tend to have low beta exposures (less than 0.3 in absolute value) to 
bond-market indexes such as the Barclay's Capital Aggregate Bond index. This is 
in contrast to other debt categories, which have higher net market exposures. 
 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
These funds seek out pricing discrepancies between pairs or combinations of 
securities regardless of the asset class. These funds often employ combinations of 
the debt arbitrage, equity arbitrage, and convertible arbitrage among other 
relative-value strategies. These funds exhibit little market directionality. These 
funds tend to have low beta exposures to all risky indexes.  
 
Equity-Market 
Neutral 
These funds attempt to reduce systematic risk created by factors such as 
exposures to sectors, market-cap ranges, investment styles, currencies, and/or 
countries. They try to achieve this by matching short positions within each area 
against long positions. These strategies are often managed as beta-neutral, dollar-
neutral, or sector-neutral. A distinguishing feature of funds in this category is that 
they typically have low beta exposures (less than 0.3 in absolute value) to equity-
market indexes such as the MSCI World. In attempting to reduce systematic risk, 
these funds put the emphasis on issue selection, with profits dependent on their 
ability to sell short and buy long the correct securities. 
 
Note: Sources come from the Morningstar Category Classifications for Hedge funds 
(http://corporate.morningstar.com/uk/documents/MethodologyDocuments/MethodologyPapers/Mornin
gstarHedgeFundCategories_Methodology.pdf).  
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concentration, which is confirmed in Table 7.2. 
      Table 7.3 reports that directional debt hedge funds focus on the price changes in 
fixed income products. Hedge fund managers usually generate fixed investment 
portfolios with various fixed income products such as emerging-market, high-yield or 
high-volatility debts. Compared with debt arbitrage hedge funds, directional debt 
hedge funds are more likely to have a net long exposure to the fixed income market. 
Combining the market concentration, investment strategies adopted and products used, 
it is not surprising that hedge fund managers do not exhibit liquidity timing skills in 
the commodity market.  
      Global derivatives hedge funds mainly invest in global financial markets. Hedge 
fund managers normally optimise their portfolios’ asset allocations by using a range 
of financial products, such as equity, bonds, currencies, commodities and derivatives. 
Managers focus on the emerging trends that happen in industries, geopolitical 
institutions and countries and may try to generate profit from the volatility of financial 
markets during uncertain periods. These hedge funds’ main investment strategy is 
trend following, which could be considered as a timing ability. However, our 
empirical results in Table 7.2 show that hedge funds in the global derivatives category 
do not have the liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. The hedge funds’ 
diversified investments in the equity, fixed income, foreign exchange and commodity 
markets could lead to the insignificant coefficients of liquidity timing ability specified 
in the commodity market. 
      According to the description in Table 7.3, hedge funds in the multistrategy 
category adopt multiple investment strategies. Multistrategy hedge funds’ portfolios 
are divided into many sub-portfolios that are allocated to a range of portfolio 
managers, each of whom focuses on a different investment strategy. Fund of funds 
employ external investment strategies and these portfolio managers are paid with 
second layer of performance and management fees. In order to adapt the movements 
of markets, the investment strategies used by hedge fund managers may have slight 
changes over time. Table 7.2 shows that hedge funds in the multistrategy category do 
not exhibit significant coefficients of liquidity timing factor. The results of 
insignificant liquidity timing coefficients could be attributed to the adoption of 
multiple investment strategies, which induce the hedge fund managers’ liquidity  
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Table 7.4 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for different hedge fund sub-categories. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Panel A: sub-categories of event hedge funds 
Distressed 
Securities 
10.46404  
(2.36**) 
11.61344  
(2.49**) 
10.52115  
(2.36**) 
Event-Driven 7.776706  
(1.83*) 
8.310836  
(1.85*) 
7.810161 
(1.83*) 
Merger 
Arbitrage 
-2.585865  
(-0.83) 
-2.974619  
(-0.91) 
-2.590843  
(-0.83) 
 
Panel B: sub-categories of relative value hedge funds 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.02816  
(2.87***) 
13.14747  
(3.00***) 
12.08518  
(2.87***) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.940965  
(0.99) 
4.147817  
(0.99) 
3.955773  
(0.99) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
7.430325 
 (2.06**) 
7.892205  
(2.09**) 
7.456647  
(2.06**) 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
 
4.146766  
(1.40) 
4.412776  
(1.41) 
4.163236  
(1.39) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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timing skills in the commodity market not obvious.  
      We now turn to focus on liquidity timing ability in the commodity market for 
hedge funds in the event and relative value categories. Hedge funds in the event 
category can be divided into distressed securities, event-driven and merger arbitrage 
sub-categories. Relative value hedge funds include four subgroups: convertible 
arbitrage, debt arbitrage, diversified arbitrage and equity market neutral sub-
categories. The results of the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients for all 
these sub-categories are shown in Table 7.4. 
      Panel A of Table 7.4 shows that two of the three subcategories of event hedge 
funds have liquidity timing ability in the commodity market, which are the distressed 
securities and event-driven categories. Panel B in Table 7.3 reports the description of 
the three sub-categories of event hedge funds. The investments of hedge funds in the 
distressed securities category focus on companies that may face bankruptcies, 
corporate restructuring or distressed sales. During the procedure of bankruptcy, hedge 
fund managers usually liquidate their debt holdings for equity shares in the post-
bankrupt entities. The companies distressed securities hedge funds invest in are 
normally illiquid. Hedge funds in the event-driven categories generate profit from 
price changes related to corporate events, such as bankruptcy, divestitures and 
strategy shifts. According to the results in Panel A of Table 7.4, the managers of 
hedge funds in both distressed securities and event-drive categories show the skills to 
time commodity market liquidity. The successful liquidity timing ability for these 
hedge funds could be attributed to the fact that managers employ commodity futures 
to hedge their portfolios’ market exposure for concentration on related events, which 
reflects hedge fund managers’ superior portfolio management.  
      Panel B of Table 7.4 reports that hedge funds in the convertible arbitrage and 
diversified arbitrage categories show the skills to time commodity market liquidity. 
According to the description in Panel C in Table 7.3, hedge funds in the convertible 
arbitrage category focus on the relation between companies’ stocks and their 
convertible bonds. Hedge funds employ craft investment strategies to hedge their 
exposure to various market risks. They also adopt leverage to maximize their profit. 
Diversified arbitrage hedge funds look for pricing discrepancies of different assets. 
Hedge funds employ relative-value strategies to show little exposure to financial 
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markets or all risky indexes. Managers of hedge funds in both convertible arbitrage 
and diversified arbitrage categories could employ commodity futures to achieve little 
market exposure and hedge risks, like liquidity risk, which is confirmed in Table 7.4 
that these managers exhibit successful liquidity timing ability in the commodity 
market.  
 
7.6 Alternative interpretations 
      In this section, we focus on some alternative interpretations for the robustness of 
our empirical results. We investigate whether the leverage and funding constraints can 
impact hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in the commodity market. 
Furthermore, we are concerned with the redemption restrictions to hedge fund 
investors. We also examine the size effects on commodity market liquidity. Finally, 
we investigate the impact of financial crisis on managers’ liquidity timing ability.  
7.6.1 Leverage and funding constraints 
      Following the argument in Section 5.6 and 6.6, one of our concerns is that hedge 
fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the commodity market may be driven by 
hedge funds’ usage of leverage and funding liquidity. It is possible that the hedge 
funds’ reduction of exposure to the commodity market during liquidity crisis periods 
is induced by the increase of borrowing costs or cutting of funding by prime brokers. 
Furthermore, the variation of hedge funds’ commodity market exposure could be 
attributed to the fluctuations in hedge fund managers’ usage of leverage and funding 
liquidity that is provided by prime brokers. 
      Tables 7.5 and 7.6 report the coefficients of liquidity timing factor for two hedge 
funds that use and do not use leverage, respectively. Except for distressed securities 
and diversified arbitrage categories, hedge funds with the usage of leverage in other 
categories show liquidity timing ability in the commodity market. According to Table 
7.6, event, distressed securities and event-driven hedge funds that do not use leverage 
show the skills to time commodity market liquidity. In contrast, relative value, 
convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage hedge funds do not have liquidity 
timing skills. Thus, the evidence of successful liquidity timing ability for hedge funds  
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Table 7.5 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds that use leverage. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.648737  
(1.90*) 
 
8.24353  
(1.94*) 
 
7.690033  
(1.90*) 
Distressed 
Securities  
7.978851  
(1.50) 
8.460172 
(1.51) 
8.034614  
(1.51) 
Event-Driven 12.39837  
(2.47**) 
13.53038  
(2.56**) 
12.46265  
(2.47**) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
7.706113  
(2.40**) 
 
7.955346  
(2.33**) 
 
7.728188  
(2.39**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
15.88759  
(3.12***) 
16.7705  
(3.14***) 
15.94209  
(3.11***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
3.365764  
(0.79) 
3.664372  
(0.82) 
3.364754  
(0.78) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.6 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds that do not use leverage. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
16.39681  
(3.20***) 
 
17.3806  
(3.23***) 
 
16.4701  
(3.20***) 
Distressed 
Securities  
13.41422  
(2.49**) 
14.66132  
(2.60***) 
13.4811  
(2.49***) 
Event-Driven 19.26552  
(2.94***) 
19.57603  
(2.84***) 
19.33599  
(2.94***) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
-.4574745  
(-0.12) 
 
-1.040159  
(-0.25) 
 
-.4717843  
(-0.12) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
6.791641  
(1.30) 
7.490479  
(1.37) 
6.833204  
(1.30) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
1.025196  
(0.37) 
1.882214  
(0.64) 
1.038266  
(0.37) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.7 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for the 
impact of funding constraints. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.249706  
(2.00**) 
 
7.883815  
(2.06**) 
 
7.284001  
(2.00**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.47698  
(2.36**) 
11.64754  
(2.49**) 
10.5347  
(2.36**) 
Event-Driven 7.810744  
(1.84*) 
8.475109  
(1.89*) 
7.84626  
(1.84*) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.575414  
(2.14**) 
 
6.207841  
(2.26**) 
 
5.60654  
(2.14**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.13878  
(2.95***) 
13.57203  
(3.16***) 
12.20384  
(2.95***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.515626  
(2.12**) 
8.217105  
(2.21**) 
7.54825  
(2.11**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 denotes the 
TED spread in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), 
which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a 
size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for 
bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures commodity 
market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using 
three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the regression, the 
commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) means that, in 
the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. Amihud(Excess 
Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI 
Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity 
measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market illiquidity measure 
is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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in event, distressed securities and event-driven categories is not driven by hedge fund 
managers’ usage of leverage. We note that, however, the weak evidence of liquidity 
timing skills for relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage hedge 
funds may not be unreliable. This is because only about one-third of these hedge 
funds disclose whether they use leverage or not, which could bias the results. 
Therefore, more information on relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified 
arbitrage hedge funds is needed for further investigation.  
      To control for the effect of market funding constraints, we adopt the TED measure 
that is the difference between the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury bill rate (Brunnermeier et al., 2008; Banti and 
Phylaktis, 2012; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Nucera and Valente, 2013). The TED spread 
is able to reflect the market perceived counterparty default risk. The increase of 
counterparty default risk indicated by a wider TED spread implies that prime brokers 
are willing to provide higher leverage to the market. Considering the effect of TED 
spread, we adjust equation (7.1) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                            (7.3) 
where 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡+1 stands for the TED spread in month 𝑡 + 1. 
      Table 7.7 delivers the results of liquidity timing coefficients by considering the 
impact of funding constraints. We find that all the coefficients of liquidity timing 
factor are statistically significant, which is consistent with the findings in Table 7.4. 
Furthermore, the majority of liquidity timing coefficients are significant at 5% or 1% 
levels, which strongly supports that hedge fund managers have the liquidity timing 
skills in the commodity market. Therefore, the evidence of hedge fund managers’ 
successful liquidity timing skills does not change after controlling for the impact of 
TED spread. 
7.6.2 Investor restrictions 
      As argued in Section 5.6 and 6.6, the restrictions to investor redemptions could 
cause changes in the hedge funds’ exposure to the commodity market. In this section, 
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we consider three aspects of investor restrictions to examine the impact of these 
restrictions on hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills.  
      As in Section 5.6 and 6.6, we first investigate the liquidity timing skills for hedge 
funds with advance notice period of 60 days or over. The advance notice period is the 
amount of period that investors are required by hedge funds to provide before 
withdrawing capital (Aragon, 2007). Second, we investigate the liquidity timing 
ability for hedge funds with redemption frequency of one-quarter or longer. 
Redemption frequency is the frequency given to investors to withdraw their capital. 
Finally, we examine managers’ liquidity timing skills by using hedge funds with 
lockup period of 12 months or over. Lockup period is the period during which hedge 
fund investors are not allowed to withdraw capital (Aragon, 2007). The lockup period 
helps hedge fund managers avoid liquidating positions during the lockup period.  
      According to Aragon (2007), hedge funds with investor restrictions, such as 
advance notice period and lockup period, generate higher alpha than hedge funds 
without restrictions. The restrictions allow hedge fund managers to efficiently manage 
portfolios’ illiquid assets and the higher alpha can be considered as the compensation 
for their illiquid holdings. The ways of dealing with illiquid holdings can reflect 
whether hedge fund managers have the liquidity timing skills in the commodity 
market. 
      Tables 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 report the empirical results of the coefficients of the 
liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with investor restrictions of advance notice 
period, redemption frequency and lockup period, respectively. We find that, except 
for results of relative value hedge funds with lockup period of 12 months or over, all 
coefficients of hedge funds with investor restrictions are statistically significant, 
which indicates that our previous findings that hedge fund managers can time 
commodity market liquidity remain unchanged after considering investor restrictions. 
Two sub-categories of the relative value hedge fund category, convertible arbitrage 
and diversified arbitrage, show successful liquidity timing ability; the insignificant 
results of relative value hedge funds could be attributed to the impact of insignificant 
evidence from relative value category’s the other two sub-categories, debt arbitrage 
and equity market neutral. Thus, combining the results of Tables 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10, we 
find evidence that successful liquidity timing ability in the commodity market is 
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Table 7.8 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with advance notice period 
of 60 days or over. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
11.36493  
(2.62***) 
 
12.4191  
(2.72***) 
 
11.41759  
(2.62***) 
Distressed 
Securities  
13.45245  
(2.70***) 
14.73986  
(2.82***) 
13.52179  
(2.70***) 
Event-Driven 11.14367  
(2.35**) 
12.17851  
(2.44**) 
11.19153  
(2.35**) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
6.42862  
(1.69*) 
 
6.839405  
(1.70*) 
 
6.440262 
(1.68*) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
18.78569  
(2.86***) 
19.90442  
(2.89***) 
18.85323  
(2.86***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
15.5713  
(2.44**) 
16.4318  
(2.46**) 
15.62134 
(2.43**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.9 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with redemption frequency 
of one quarter or longer. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
8.477443  
(2.16**) 
 
9.18439  
(2.22**) 
 
8.516219 
(2.16**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
9.883483  
(2.17**) 
11.04699  
(2.31**) 
9.939934  
(2.17**) 
Event-Driven 9.618061  
(2.13**) 
10.33438  
(2.17**) 
9.658369  
(2.13**) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
7.609169  
(2.57**) 
 
8.103719  
(2.59***) 
 
7.633777  
(2.56**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
16.05249  
(3.43***) 
17.18749  
(3.51***) 
16.11058  
(3.42***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
6.580652  
(2.01**) 
7.204631  
(2.10**) 
6.608064  
(2.00**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.10 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with lockup period of 12 
months or over. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
10.66133  
(2.35**) 
 
11.48129  
(2.41**) 
 
10.70624  
(2.35**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
12.40014  
(2.46**) 
13.7945  
(2.61***) 
12.46852  
(2.46**) 
Event-Driven 11.04165  
(2.07**) 
11.67233  
(2.08**) 
11.07976  
(2.06**) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
2.568289  
(0.77) 
 
2.729517  
(0.78) 
 
2.554505  
(0.77) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
16.34517  
(3.19***) 
17.07847  
(3.18***) 
16.39473  
(3.18***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
15.85747  
(2.15**) 
17.93483  
(2.30**) 
15.93063  
(2.14**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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derived from hedge fund managers’ liquidity managerial skills, but not from forced 
redemption decisions.  
7.6.3 The impact of trades on commodity market liquidity 
      In this subsection, we consider the impact of hedge fund trades on empirical 
results on commodity market liquidity timing ability. As mentioned before, hedge 
funds’ trades in month 𝑡 may impact the commodity market liquidity in month 𝑡 + 1. 
For instance, if hedge funds with large size simultaneously liquidate their positions in 
the commodity market in month 𝑡, then commodity market liquidity could reduce in 
month 𝑡 + 1, inducing a possible relation between hedge fund portfolios’ exposure to 
the commodity market and the commodity market liquidity (Cao et al., 2013).  
      Following Sections 5.6 and 6.6, to reduce the impact of large trades on commodity 
market liquidity, we investigate the liquidity timing ability for two hedge fund 
subgroups with assets under management (AUM) under $150 million and under $50 
million, respectively. According to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the regulation is applied only to hedge funds with 
AUM of at least $150 million, which is used to distinguish large size and small size 
hedge funds.  
      Tables 7.11 and 7.12 deliver the results of liquidity timing coefficients for hedge 
funds with AUM less than $150 million and $50 million, respectively. According to 
the results in Tables 7.11 and 7.12, there is some evidence that managers of hedge 
funds with AUM under $150 million or under $50 million still show liquidity timing 
ability in the commodity market. For example, the coefficients of hedge funds in the 
relative value and convertible arbitrage categories are statistically significant in two 
tables. Hedge funds in the distressed securities and diversified arbitrage categories 
only have significant results in Table 7.11 and Table 7.12, respectively. The 
significant results indicate that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills are not 
caused by hedge funds’ trades on commodity market liquidity. However, we note that 
only about one-third of hedge funds in our sample report their AUM information, 
which may bias the results. Thus, more information is needed, especially for those 
hedge funds that have insignificant results in Tables 7.11 and 7.12, for further 
investigation on the impact on liquidity timing ability in the commodity market. 
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Table 7.11 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with AUM less than $150 
million. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
5.336023  
(1.32) 
 
5.807195  
(1.36) 
 
5.364452  
(1.31) 
Distressed 
Securities  
11.20566  
(1.66*) 
13.09319  
(1.84*) 
11.30007  
(1.66*) 
Event-Driven 6.139798  
(1.07) 
6.470818  
(1.07) 
6.155275  
(1.06) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
6.403375  
(2.27**) 
 
7.225202  
(2.44**) 
 
6.440791  
(2.27**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.13299  
(2.27**) 
13.52709  
(2.42**) 
12.19009  
(2.27**) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.811154  
(1.58) 
8.460283  
(1.64) 
7.826867  
(1.57) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.12 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds with AUM less than $50 
million. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
4.784925  
(1.07) 
 
5.456745  
(1.16) 
 
4.819723  
(1.07) 
Distressed 
Securities  
9.141473  
(1.11) 
11.19151  
(1.29) 
9.25201  
(1.12) 
Event-Driven 5.103727  
(0.85) 
5.569309  
(0.89) 
5.11595  
(0.85) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
7.014385  
(2.14**) 
 
7.92599  
(2.31**) 
 
7.054713  
(2.14**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
11.57859  
(1.98**) 
12.47522  
(2.04**) 
11.62796  
(1.97*) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
9.317752  
(1.72*) 
10.4254  
(1.84*) 
9.35451  
(1.71*) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.13 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds up to June 2007. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
3.884231  
(1.03) 
 
3.793251  
(0.96) 
 
3.922239  
(1.03) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.14382  
(2.19**) 
11.01807  
(2.28**) 
10.22205  
(2.20**) 
Event-Driven 2.677119  
(0.60) 
2.182172  
(0.46) 
2.710865  
(0.60) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
4.540745  
(1.62) 
 
4.387077  
(1.49) 
 
4.577272  
(1.62) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
7.714454  
(2.04**) 
7.687607  
(1.95*) 
7.780373  
(2.05**) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
5.830739  
(1.68*) 
5.775152  
(1.59) 
5.873647  
(1.69*) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.14 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds from July 2007. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
25.37751  
(0.65) 
 
32.40095  
(0.79) 
 
25.2902  
(0.64) 
Distressed 
Securities  
-22.69623  
(-0.46) 
-18.56241  
(-0.35) 
-22.89987  
(-0.46) 
Event-Driven 64.68539  
(1.49) 
73.34924  
(1.62) 
64.63899  
(1.48) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
-9.9584  
(-0.41) 
 
-9.384342  
(-0.37) 
 
-10.14183  
(-0.41) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
-50.45024  
(-0.91) 
-44.04719  
(-0.76) 
50.84056  
(-0.92) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
-65.38257  
(-1.36) 
-68.21265  
(-1.35) 
-65.76233  
(-1.36) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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7.6.4 The impact of financial crisis 
      As mentioned earlier, hedge fund managers could show different managerial skills 
during different financial market conditions. According to Ben-David, Franzoni and 
Moussawi (2012) and Schaub and Schmid (2013), the start of the recent financial 
crisis was in July 2007. In this section, we divide our sample into the period before 
the start of the financial crisis from January 1994 to June 2007 and the period after the 
start of financial crisis from July 2007 to December 2012. 
      We investigate hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in the commodity 
market in these two periods and the results are shown in Tables 7.13 and 7.14. 
According to the results, only hedge funds in distressed securities, convertible 
arbitrage and diversified arbitrage categories show the ability to time commodity 
market liquidity in the period before the start of the financial crisis. However, no 
hedge funds exhibit evidence of liquidity timing skills in the period after the start of 
the financial crisis. The results indicate that our previous finding of hedge fund 
managers’ liquidity timing ability lasts over the whole period of our sample, but not 
for some specific short periods.  
      In summary, we have found some evidence that our findings that hedge fund 
managers have successful liquidity timing skills in the commodity market are not 
driven by managers’ usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption 
restrictions and the impact of hedge funds’ trades. More information about hedge 
funds’ usage of leverage and size is needed for further investigation. Moreover, we 
have found that hedge funds show weak evidence of liquidity timing skills in the 
commodity market for some specific short periods.   
 
7.7 The impact of data biases   
      Hedge fund data biases could impact the accuracy of empirical results that are 
related to hedge funds. In this section, we are concerned with the impact of hedge 
fund data biases on the findings of hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing 
skills in the commodity market.  
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      To alleviate the impact of survivorship bias, we use both live and dead hedge 
funds in our sample. The database does not include dead hedge funds before 1994, 
which leads to the existence of survivorship bias for the period before 1994. However, 
our investigation does not have the early period problem for the reason that the 
sample that we use covers only the period from January 1994 to December 2012.  
      In order to reduce the effect of backfill bias, we delete each hedge fund’s first 12 
monthly returns by following previous literature (Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; 
Patton, 2009; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010; Eling and Faust 2010; Avramov, Kosowski, 
Naik and Teo, 2011; Fung and Hsieh, 2011; Siegmann and Stefanova, 2011; Teo, 
2011; Cao et al., 2013). Table 7.15 shows the coefficients of the liquidity timing 
factor after controlling for backfill bias. We find that the majority of liquidity timing 
coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level, which confirms previous findings 
and strongly supports that hedge fund managers still have successful liquidity timing 
skills in the commodity market. One thing that should be noticed is that the sample, 
which is used for Table 7.15, is likely to have a longer period. This is because we set 
a requirement that each hedge fund needs to have at least 24 monthly returns after 
deleting its first 12 monthly returns. Therefore, some hedge funds with short return 
history are not considered for the analysis. 
      According to the existing studies (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2000)), the selection 
bias for hedge funds should be limited and multi-period sampling bias has very small 
effect. In addition, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) find that the impact 
of liquidity bias is limited.  
      In summary, we have investigated hedge fund liquidity timing ability in the 
commodity market after controlling for different data biases that include survivorship 
bias, backfill bias, selection bias, multi-period sampling bias, funding bias and 
liquidity bias. We have found that our findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills are not driven by hedge fund data biases. 
 
7.8 Other robustness checks 
      In this section, we examine our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful 
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Table 7.15 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for backfill 
bias. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
8.322889  
(2.29**) 
 
9.026474  
(2.35**) 
 
8.362891  
(2.29**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
11.02488  
(2.36**) 
12.10415  
(2.46**) 
11.07864  
(2.35**) 
Event-Driven 9.619573  
(2.26**) 
10.40704  
(2.32**) 
9.665679  
(2.26**) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
6.164442  
(2.27**) 
 
6.746628  
(2.35**) 
 
6.197625  
(2.27**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
11.10829  
(2.61***) 
12.21102  
(2.74***) 
11.15955  
(2.61***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.253098  
(2.14**) 
7.787272  
(2.19**) 
7.284803  
(2.13**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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liquidity timing skills in the commodity market with several different robustness 
checks. We adopt alternative liquidity timing models by controlling for commodity 
market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and 
option factors, respectively.  
7.8.1 Commodity market return and volatility timing 
      Commodity market liquidity is positively related to commodity market returns and 
negatively related to commodity market volatility (Pindyck, 2004; Tang and Xiong, 
2012; Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 2013; Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti, 
2012, 2013). Hedge fund managers may be able to time commodity market returns or 
volatility and managers’ liquidity timing skills could partially reflect their skills of 
timing return or volatility. In order to investigate this possibility, we control for 
commodity market return and volatility timing skills and adjust equation (7.1) as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑1𝐶𝑂𝑀
2
𝑡+1 +
𝜑2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                               (7.4) 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 denotes the realized commodity market volatility in month 𝑡 + 1, 
which is calculated as the standard deviation of daily market returns in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀 is the mean value of commodity market volatility. 
      Table 7.16 shows the empirical results for liquidity timing skills in the commodity 
market after controlling for commodity market return and volatility timing. It can be 
seen that most of the coefficients of liquidity timing factor are statistically significant 
at 5% level, which supports that hedge fund managers have the skills to time 
commodity market liquidity. Therefore, managers’ liquidity timing skills are not 
attributed to the positive relation between commodity market liquidity and returns or 
the negative relation between commodity market liquidity and volatility. The 
positively significant results in Table 7.16 emphasize that timing commodity market 
liquidity is important for hedge funds’ professional portfolio management. 
7.8.2 Liquidity risk factor 
      The benchmark we use to evaluate hedge funds’ performance includes eight 
factors, which contain seven factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor  
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Table 7.16 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
commodity market return and volatility timing. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.528033  
(2.08**) 
 
8.357717  
(2.19**) 
 
7.561706  
(2.07**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.86743  
(2.45**) 
12.28827  
(2.64***) 
10.92321  
(2.45**) 
Event-Driven 8.004579  
(1.88*) 
8.851359  
(1.97**) 
8.040922  
(1.88*) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.79155  
(2.22**) 
 
6.571091  
(2.39**) 
 
5.816063  
(2.22**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.51104  
(3.06***) 
14.46733  
(3.45***) 
12.55767  
(3.06***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.772024  
(2.16**) 
8.597343  
(2.30**) 
7.800355  
(2.16**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑1𝐶𝑂𝑀
2
𝑡+1 + 𝜑2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 −
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 
𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the 
month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s 
seven-factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond 
market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and 
commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1  is the commodity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the 
mean level of commodity market liquidity, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1  denotes the realized commodity market 
volatility in month 𝑡 + 1 , and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐶𝑂𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  is the mean value of commodity market volatility. The 
coefficient 𝝀 measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the 
commodity market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes 
that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. 
Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI 
Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is 
calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by 
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the 
commodity market illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.17 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
liquidity risk factor. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
5.044102  
(1.14) 
 
5.643729  
(1.25) 
 
5.067998  
(1.14) 
Distressed 
Securities  
8.642668  
(1.60) 
9.99259  
(1.82*) 
8.694013  
(1.61) 
Event-Driven 6.113682  
(1.18) 
6.593192  
(1.24) 
6.138872  
(1.18) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.470508  
(1.70*) 
 
5.843571  
(1.77*) 
 
5.497135  
(1.70*) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
10.20708 
(1.99**) 
11.2659  
(2.17**) 
10.25073  
(1.99**) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
6.8967  
(1.58) 
7.120115  
(1.60) 
6.913444  
(1.57) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑?̃?𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , 
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables 
include a commodity market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, 
and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven 
factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, 
and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1  is the commodity 
market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀 is the mean level of commodity market liquidity and 
?̃?𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 denotes the innovation in the commodity market liquidity from an AR(2) process, which is 
the unpredictable component of commodity market liquidity, in month 𝑡 + 1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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model and a commodity market factor. However, liquidity risk could be used to 
determine hedge fund returns. In the literature, it is documented that there is a 
significant link between the variation of hedge fund returns and the innovations in 
market liquidity (Sadka, 2010). In order to address this concern, we follow Cao et al. 
(2013) and employ the AR(2) process of equity market liquidity as the innovation. We 
consider a factor model to include a liquidity risk factor and evaluate hedge fund 
performance as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑?̃?𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1,                                                                                            (7.5) 
where ?̃?𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1  is the liquidity risk factor or innovation in the commodity market 
liquidity from an AR(2) process, which is the unpredictable component of commodity 
market liquidity, in month 𝑡 + 1. We use ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 as a proxy of liquidity risk factor in 
the commodity market.  
      Table 7.17 shows the empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
ability by using equation (7.5). We find that only hedge funds in the relative value and 
convertible arbitrage categories have statistically significant results, which indicates 
that these hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills are not driven by liquidity risk 
factor. Even though other hedge funds’ have insignificant coefficients of liquidity 
timing factor, their coefficients of liquidity risk factor are not significant (not shown 
here). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the liquidity timing ability of hedge funds 
with insignificant liquidity timing coefficient is driven by liquidity risk factor. It is 
possible that liquidity risk factor and liquidity timing factor are correlated and they 
share the explanatory power of hedge fund performance. We propose that further 
research could start by focusing on the relation between liquidity risk factor and 
liquidity timing factor.  
7.8.3 Systematic stale pricing 
      Now we consider the issue of systematic stale pricing. Following Chen et al. 
(2010), we consider a liquidity timing model that includes two lagged commodity 
market factors and two lagged interaction terms between lagged commodity market 
factors and lagged commodity market liquidity terms, as:  
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𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑1𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡 −
?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡−1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1.                                                                                                                      (7.6)       
      Table 7.18 reports the empirical results of the coefficients of liquidity timing 
factor after controlling for systematic stale pricing. We find that all hedge funds in 
Table 7.18 show successful liquidity timing skills, which confirms the findings in     
Tables 7.2 and 7.4. Therefore, we are confident to conclude that hedge fund managers’ 
liquidity timing ability in the commodity market is not driven by the impact of 
systematic stale pricing.   
7.8.4 Option factors 
      Next, we consider option factors. According to Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986), 
the evidence of timing ability could be attributed to the investments in options and 
assets with option-like payoffs. Therefore, the timing evidence may not imply that 
managers have real timing skills in financial markets, which can be applied to hedge 
fund managers who are well known to invest in derivatives. In addition, the payment 
structure is viewed as a call-option-like fee structure with option-like payoff. 
      By using the “St. Petersburg” or “doubling” trading strategy, investors increase 
their holdings in risky assets that are on a loss to bet of recouping on a profit in future. 
Such trading strategy used by hedge funds can generate concave or option-like payoff 
(Brown, Swan, Steenbeek and Gallagher, 2005). 
      In order to address the concern of option-like payoff, which is not related to 
timing ability, we add four option factors, which are introduced by Agarwal and Naik 
(2004), to equation (7.1). The four option factors that are used to measure hedge funds’ 
nonlinear returns are returns on highly liquid at-the-money an out-of–the-money call 
and put options in the S&P 500 index. We thank Vikas Agarwal for providing us with 
the option factor data. 
      Table 7.19 reports the empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
ability in the commodity market after controlling for option factors. We find that all 
the liquidity timing coefficients are statistically significant and hedge funds still 
exhibit successful liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. Thus, we find                                                                                                         
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Table 7.18 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for 
systematic stale pricing. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.084411  
(1.94*) 
 
7.745275  
(2.01**) 
 
7.115754  
(1.94*) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.25008  
(2.31**) 
11.46198  
(2.45**) 
10.30399  
(2.31**) 
Event-Driven 7.66565  
(1.78*) 
8.384504  
(1.85*) 
7.69865  
(1.78*) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.241953  
(1.98**) 
 
5.785383  
(2.07**) 
 
5.265974  
(1.98**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
11.92882  
(2.81***) 
12.98409  
(2.92***) 
11.98443  
(2.80***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.41095  
(2.06**) 
7.705837  
(2.04**) 
7.436849  
(2.05**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑1𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) +
𝜑2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡−1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + 𝜑3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an 
equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-
following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity 
measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the commodity 
market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the 
regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) 
means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. 
Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the commodity market 
illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7.19 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for hedge funds after controlling for option 
factors. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.657592  
(2.02**) 
 
7.88589  
(1.96*) 
 
7.695376  
(2.02**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.92048  
(2.40**) 
11.60646  
(2.42**) 
10.98415  
(2.40**) 
Event-Driven 7.961442  
(1.76*) 
8.23148  
(1.71*) 
7.99868  
(1.76*) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.884711  
(2.10**) 
 
6.132326  
(2.06**) 
 
5.914671  
(2.10**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
13.18408  
(2.97***) 
14.20005  
(3.05***) 
13.24865  
(2.97***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
9.131124  
(2.59***) 
9.648724  
(2.61***) 
9.173769  
(2.59***) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1, where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 is the 
excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variables include a commodity 
market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include 
seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model and four option factors. The seven 
factors include an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, 
and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. The four option factors are 
returns on highly liquid at-the-money an out-of –the-money call and put options in the S&P 500 index. 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 is the commodity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of 
commodity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. 
For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. 
Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the commodity market 
factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, 
the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market 
illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the 
commodity market, the commodity market illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-
statistics are in the parentheses. Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 
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evidence that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in the commodity market 
is not driven by hedge funds’ investments in derivatives, “St. Petersburg” or 
“doubling” trading strategy or call-option-like fee structure. 
      In summary, we have evaluated hedge funds’ liquidity timing ability in the 
commodity market by controlling for the impacts of commodity market return and 
volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and four option 
factors.We have not found evidence that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills 
in the commodity market are driven by these impacts. 
 
7.9 Bootstrap analysis 
      Our previously empirical results are based on the normality assumption. As 
mentioned in Section 5.9, hedge fund returns are not always normally distributed and 
could show high kurtosis and negative skewness or fat tails. To avoid the normality 
assumption and investigate whether the evidence of hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills is down to pure luck, we follow previous literature (Efron, 1979; 
Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen and Liang, 2007; Jiang, 
Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and French, 2010 and Cao 
et al., 2013) to investigate liquidity timing skills by employing a bootstrap approach 
where the normality assumption is not required. To measure the hedge fund 
category’s overall performance, we apply the arithmetic mean value of the returns of 
hedge funds in the same category. 
      More specifically, we employ bootstrap analysis to randomly resample the 
residuals of the regression to generate hedge funds with the same risk factor loadings 
but no liquidity timing skills. Then, we test whether the t-statistics of the liquidity 
timing coefficients for the actual hedge funds are statistically different from those for 
bootstrapped hedge funds that do not have liquidity timing skills. We bootstrap the t-
statistics rather than the liquidity timing coefficients because the t-statistics are pivotal 
(Chen and Liang, 2007). Our bootstrap analysis has four steps.  
      First, for hedge fund returns in a certain category, we run equation (7.7): 
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𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀)
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1
.                                (7.7) 
We save the estimated coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … } and the time series of regression 
residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝 is the number of monthly returns for the 
hedge fund category. Next, we randomly resample the residuals with replacements 
and generate time series of residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 }. We resample 𝐵 times, and thus 𝑏 =
1, 2, … , 𝐵 . Then, we obtain hypothetical monthly excess returns by setting the 
liquidity timing coefficient to zero, which is based on equation (7.8).  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (7.8) 
Third, we estimate equation (7.7) by employing the hypothetical monthly excess 
returns from the second step and save the liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic. 
Because the hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity timing ability based on 
construction, any nonzero liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic is contributed to 
sampling variation. Fourth, to obtain hypothetical distributions of cross-sectional t-
statistics, we repeat the first three steps for 𝐵  times. We set 𝐵  to 5,000 in our 
bootstrap analysis. The p-value for a given statistic is defined as the frequency that the 
statistical values of hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵  time simulations exceed the 
statistical value for actual hedge funds. See Davidson and Hinkley (1997) for an 
overview of bootstrap methods. 
      Table 7.20 reports the bootstrap analysis results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills in the commodity market. We find that all the p-values are less than 10%, 
which indicates that hedge fund managers in the event, distressed securities, event-
driven, relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage categories 
exhibit the skills to time commodity market liquidity without imposing the normality 
assumption. Therefore, the conclusion that hedge fund managers show liquidity 
timing skills is not dependent on the normality assumption. 
 
7.10 Empirical results at individual fund level 
      The research so far has focused on liquidity timing ability at the strategy level. 
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Table 7.20 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: the commodity market liquidity timing 
coefficients and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.223797  
(0.0380) 
 
7.772986  
(0.0392) 
 
7.256518  
(0.0423) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.46404  
(0.0382) 
11.61344  
(0.0307) 
10.52115  
(0.0405) 
Event-Driven 7.776706  
(0.0454) 
8.310836  
(0.0394) 
7.810161 
(0.0445) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.521274  
(0.0575) 
 
5.978194  
(0.0617) 
 
5.548492  
(0.0550) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.02816  
(0.0079) 
13.14747  
(0.0034) 
12.08518  
(0.0075) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.430325 
 (0.0173) 
7.892205  
(0.0145) 
7.456647  
(0.0203) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the p-values for 
these liquidity timing coefficients, which are obtained by bootstrap analysis. The liquidity timing 
model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly returns. 
For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. 
Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the commodity market 
factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, 
the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market 
illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measures in the 
commodity market, the commodity market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The 
numbers in the table are the liquidity timing coefficients and the corresponding p-values that are in the 
parentheses. The number of bootstrap simulations for each hedge fund is 5,000. 
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This section investigates hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skill at individual 
fund level. First, we investigate whether each of the individual hedge funds has timing 
ability. Since each strategy includes a very large number of funds, we display the 
results by using the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge 
funds’ liquidity timing coefficients by employing equation (7.1). Next, we adopt the 
method of bootstrap analysis to investigate the statistical significance of liquidity 
timing ability. The bootstrap approach ensures the obtained results do not rely on the 
normality assumption in the statistical analysis. 
7.10.1 Timing ability at individual level 
      We undertake the analysis in Section 7.5 at individual fund level. For each fund, 
we estimate the regression coefficients using equation (7.1). Then we test the null 
hypothesis of 𝜆𝑝 = 0 and calculate the corresponding t-statistic. Table 7.21 reports 
the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ liquidity 
timing coefficients. The numbers in the table are the percentage of hedge funds with t-
statistics of the liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the indicated values. For 
example, 6.68% of hedge funds in the event category have t-statistics of the liquidity 
timing coefficients that are greater than 1.96. Overall, a substantial portion of hedge 
funds in each category have t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficient greater than 1.28. 
This provides strong evidence of liquidity timing ability in the commodity market at 
the individual hedge fund level. 
      However, we also find that some hedge funds have negative liquidity timing 
ability with t-statistics smaller than -1.28. As discussed in Cao et al. (2013), it is 
difficult to interpret the negative liquidity timing coefficient, which indicates that 
hedge fund managers adjust portfolios’ market exposure in the opposite direction to 
the direction used by those hedge fund managers with successful liquidity timing 
skills. In general, we find that the right tails of the distribution of t-statistics are 
thicker than the left tails.  
      Overall, the distribution of t-statistics for liquidity timing coefficients indicates 
successful liquidity timing skills. However, these tests are based on the assumption of 
normal distributions, which could be misleading. First, hedge fund returns may not be 
normally distributed because hedge funds usually adopt dynamic trading strategies  
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Table 7.21 
Distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ liquidity timing 
coefficients. 
  
t≤-2.326 
 
 
t≤-1.960 
 
t≤-1.645 
 
t≤-1.282 
 
t ≥1.282 
 
t ≥1.645 
 
t ≥1.960 
 
t ≥2.326 
 
Panel A: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Total Return)) 
Event 
 
0.0125 0.0167 0.0418 0.0960 0.1879 0.1044 0.0668 0.0313 
Distressed 
Securities 
0.0109 0.0109 0.0435 0.1033 0.2174 0.1033 0.0707 0.0272 
Event-
Driven 
0.0077 0.0115 0.0308 0.0846 0.1654 0.1077 0.0654 0.0385 
Relative 
Value 
0.0112 0.0248 0.0335 0.0733 0.2385 0.1466 0.1019 0.0621 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
0 0.0060 0.0120 0.0361 0.3554 0.2771 0.1988 0.1205 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
0.0556 0.0741 0.0741 0.1296 0.2593 0.2037 0.1852 0.1481 
Panel B: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Spot)) 
Event 
 
0.0125 0.0188 0.0459 0.0939 0.1795 0.1106 0.0605 0.0418 
Distressed 
Securities 
0.0109 0.0163 0.0326 0.0924 0.2174 0.1304 0.0815 0.0543 
Event-
Driven 
0.0077 0.0115 0.0462 0.0846 0.1538 0.1038 0.0538 0.0385 
Relative 
Value 
0.0087 0.0186 0.0360 0.0733 0.2472 0.1665 0.1031 0.0696 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
0 0.0060 0.0060 0.0241 0.3434 0.2651 0.1928 0.1386 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
0.0370 0.0556 0.0926 0.1481 0.2593 0.2407 0.1852 0.1296 
Panel C: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Excess Return)) 
Event 
 
0.0125 0.0167 0.0418 0.0960 0.1879 0.1044 0.0668 0.0292 
Distressed 
Securities 
0.0109 0.0109 0.0435 0.1033 0.2174 0.1033 0.0707 0.0272 
Event-
Driven 
0.0077 0.0115 0.0308 0.0846 0.1654 0.1077 0.0654 0.0346 
 203 
 
Relative 
Value 
0.0112 0.0236 0.0348 0.0733 0.2385 0.1466 0.1019 0.0609 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
0 0.0060 0.0120 0.0361 0.3554 0.2771 0.1988 0.1205 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
0.0556 0.0741 0.0741 0.1296 0.2593 0.2037 0.1852 0.1481 
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of t-statistics for cross-sectional individual hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing coefficients based on the equation (7.1), which is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund in the sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using three different 
S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the regression, the commodity market factor 
is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the 
commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for 
that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. 
The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get 
liquidity measures in the commodity market, the commoidty market illiquidity measures are multiplied 
by minus one. The numbers in the table are the percentage of hedge funds with t-statistics of the 
liquidity timing coefficients that exceed the indicated values. 
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(Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001). Secondly, the evaluation of liquidity timing ability for 
a large number of hedge funds could lead to a multiple comparison problem (Cao et 
al., 2013). Some hedge funds without true liquidity timing ability will have significant 
t-statistics by random chance. In order to deal with these potential problems, we use 
bootstrap analysis to test the significance of the liquidity timing coefficients at 
individual hedge fund level. The bootstrap analysis can investigate whether 
theliquidity timing skills are contributed to hedge fund managers’ managerial skills or 
pure luck without imposing the normality assumption.  
7.10.2 Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing skills 
      We adopt bootstrap analysis to investigate the significance of liquidity timing 
coefficients at individual hedge fund level by following previous literature (Efron, 
1979; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White, 2006; Chen and Liang, 2007; 
Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Fama and French, 2010 and 
Cao et al., 2013). The principle of performing bootstrap analysis at individual hedge 
fund level is similar to that outlined in Section 7.9. It has five steps.  
      First, for hedge fund 𝑝, we run equation (7.9) and save the estimated  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀)
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1
.                                  (7.9) 
coefficients {?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, ?̂?𝑝, … }  and the time series of regression residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1, 𝑡 =
0, … , 𝑇𝑝 − 1}, where 𝑇𝑝 is the number of monthly returns for hedge fund 𝑝. Then, we 
randomly resample the hedge fund’s residuals with replacements and generate time 
series of residuals {𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 }. We resample 𝐵 times, and 𝑏 = 1, 2, … , 𝐵. We generate a 
hypothetical hedge fund’s monthly excess returns by setting the liquidity timing 
coefficient to zero based on equation (7.10).  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑝 + ?̂?𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑡+1
𝑏 .                                              (7.10) 
Third, we estimate equation (7.9) by using the hypothetical hedge fund’s monthly 
excess returns from the second step and save the estimated liquidity timing coefficient 
and t-statistic. Because the hypothetical hedge fund has no liquidity timing ability, 
any nonzero liquidity timing coefficient and t-statistic come from sampling variation.  
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Table 7.22 
Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing: t-statistics with the corresponding p-values in 
parentheses. 
 Bottom t-statistics for ?̂? Top t-statistics for ?̂? 
  
1% 
 
3% 
 
5% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
5% 
 
3% 
 
1% 
 
Panel A: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Total Return)) 
Event 
 
-2.4053 
(0.0040) 
-1.7382 
(0.0004) 
-1.5876 
(0.0016) 
-1.2606 
(0.0398) 
1.7219 
(0) 
2.1703 
(0.0064) 
2.3286 
(0.1504) 
3.6011 
(0.0682) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.7733 
(0.1410) 
-1.8125 
(0.0348) 
-1.5031 
(0.0298) 
-1.2907 
(0.2302) 
1.6662 
(0.0150) 
2.0607 
(0.1052) 
2.2718 
(0.3354) 
3.8381 
(0.1880) 
Event-
Driven 
-2.1029 
(0.0016) 
-1.6823 
(0.0016) 
-1.5266 
(0.0070) 
-1.2032 
(0.0298) 
1.7499 
(0.0006) 
2.1739 
(0.0170) 
2.5213 
(0.1002) 
3.3114 
(0.2326) 
Relative 
Value 
-2.3310 
(0) 
-1.7194 
(0) 
-1.4283 
(0) 
-1.1262 
(0) 
1.9993 
(0) 
2.4246 
(0.0002) 
2.8958 
(0.0012) 
3.4129 
(0.4282) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
-1.6671 
(0) 
-1.3733 
(0) 
-1.2169 
(0) 
-0.6492 
(0) 
2.4246 
(0) 
3.0528 
(0.0004) 
3.5409 
(0.0194) 
3.8309 
(0.3582) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
-3.6701 
(0.6944) 
-2.5067 
(0.6148) 
-2.4884 
(0.8468) 
-1.5123 
(0.6242) 
2.5254 
(0.0016) 
2.5748 
(0.1482) 
3.1085 
(0.1882) 
3.1870 
(0.5498) 
Panel B: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Spot)) 
Event 
 
-2.4145 
(0.0020) 
-1.7716 
(0.0002) 
-1.6314 
(0.0064) 
-1.2516 
(0.0246) 
1.7296 
(0) 
2.1619 
(0.0132) 
2.3943 
(0.1292) 
3.5141 
(0.1404) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.7532 
(0.1222) 
-1.6944 
(0.0084) 
-1.4735 
(0.0138) 
-1.2516 
(0.1398) 
1.7487 
(0.0074) 
2.3277 
(0.0178) 
2.3810 
(0.2722) 
3.7861 
(0.2350) 
Event-
Driven 
-2.2820 
(0.0084) 
-1.8170 
(0.0082) 
-1.6442 
(0.0270) 
-1.1583 
(0.0098) 
1.6489 
(0.0070) 
1.9901 
(0.1566) 
2.5438 
(0.1208) 
3.1844 
(0.3896) 
Relative 
Value 
-2.1849 
(0) 
-1.7063 
(0) 
-1.4633 
(0) 
-1.1321 
(0) 
2.0263 
(0) 
2.4894 
(0) 
2.9228 
(0.0036) 
3.3700 
(0.5080) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
-1.5421 
(0) 
-1.2394 
(0) 
-1.2212 
(0) 
-0.7144 
(0) 
2.4681 
(0) 
3.1359 
(0.0008) 
3.3775 
(0.0476) 
3.9823 
(0.3466) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
-3.2397 
(0.5218) 
-2.6337 
(0.6412) 
-2.3182 
(0.7180) 
-1.6193 
(0.6998) 
2.3567 
(0.0054) 
2.6751 
(0.1240) 
2.7301 
(0.3446) 
3.2214 
(0.5564) 
Panel C: Bootstrap analysis of liquidity timing (Amihud(Excess Return)) 
Event 
 
-2.4016 
(0.0040) 
-1.7341 
(0.0004) 
-1.5894 
(0.0020) 
-1.2579 
(0.0366) 
1.7227 
(0) 
2.1688 
(0.0068) 
2.3232 
(0.1598) 
3.6041 
(0.0690) 
Distressed 
Securities 
-2.7724 
(0.1398) 
-1.8137 
(0.0340) 
-1.5071 
(0.0310) 
-1.2952 
(0.2380) 
1.6600 
(0.0162) 
2.0576 
(0.1084) 
2.2735 
(0.3338) 
3.8472 
(0.1856) 
Event-
Driven 
-2.1034 
(0.0016) 
-1.6815 
(0.0016) 
-1.5319 
(0.0076) 
-1.2056 
(0.0322) 
1.7519 
(0.0004) 
2.1761 
(0.0176) 
2.5234 
(0.0996) 
3.3195 
(0.2294) 
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Relative 
Value 
-2.3408 
(0) 
-1.7224 
(0) 
-1.4287 
(0) 
-1.1238 
(0) 
1.9983 
(0) 
2.4307 
(0.0002) 
2.8923 
(0.0012) 
3.4048 
(0.4372) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
-1.6787 
(0) 
-1.3719 
(0) 
-1.2260 
(0) 
-0.6499 
(0) 
2.4307 
(0) 
3.0453 
(0.0006) 
3.5329 
(0.0198) 
3.8260 
(0.3602) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage 
-3.6695 
(0.6952) 
-2.5064 
(0.6150) 
-2.4985 
(0.8526) 
-1.5129 
(0.6258) 
2.5229 
(0.0018) 
2.5724 
(0.1478) 
3.1098 
(0.1874) 
3.1828 
(0.5510) 
Note: This table summarizes the bootstrap analysis results for cross-sectional individual hedge funds. 
The liquidity timing model is defined as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 . The coefficient 𝝀 
measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. Each hedge fund has at least 24 monthly returns. 
For robustness, we compute the commodity market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. 
Amihud(Total Return) denotes that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by 
S&P GSCI Total Return index. Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the commodity market 
factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, 
the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market 
illiquidity is calculated by Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measures in the 
commodity market, the commodity market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The 
numbers in the table are the sorted t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficients for cross-sectional 
individual hedge funds and the corresponding p-values that are in the parentheses. The number of 
bootstrap simulations for each hedge fund is 5,000. 
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Fourth, we repeat the first three steps for all actual hedge funds in the sample. Then 
we can obtain the cross-sectional statistics, such as the top 10 percentile, of liquidity 
timing coefficients and t-statistics for all sample hedge funds. Finally, we repeat the 
first four steps for 𝐵  times to obtain hypothetical hedge funds’ distributions of t-
statistics, such as the top 10 percentile. We set 𝐵 to 5,000 in our bootstrap analysis. 
We define the p-value for a given statistic as the frequency that the statistical values 
of hypothetical hedge funds from 𝐵 time simulations exceed the statistical value for 
actual hedge funds.  
      Bootstrap analysis can be used to investigate how likely it is that hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing skills are down to pure luck without imposing the normality 
assumption. Table 7.22 reports the t-statistics and the corresponding p-values, which 
are obtained from bootstrap analysis at different extreme percentiles. The extreme 
percentiles include the bottom 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% and the top 1%, 3%, 5% and 
10%. Based on the p-values for different percentile t-statistics, we find that hedge 
funds with the top t-statistics of liquidity timing coefficients have successful liquidity 
timing skills. For example, the t-statistic of hedge funds in the relative value category 
is 2.8958 and its corresponding p-value is 0.0036, which indicates that relative value 
hedge funds in the top 3% percentile have liquidity timing ability in the commodity 
market. Although for hedge funds in the event, distressed securities, event-driven, 
relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage, some hedge funds have 
significantly negative timing ability, it is more important to find that a portion of 
hedge funds in these categories show successful liquidity timing skills. Therefore, the 
evidence in Table 7.22 supports that the top-ranked hedge fund managers show 
liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. 
 
7.11 Conclusions 
      In this chapter, we have focused on the commodity market and investigated 
whether hedge fund managers have the liquidity timing skills in the commodity 
market by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the commodity market based on 
managers’ forecasts about future commodity market liquidity. 
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      The empirical evidence found in this chapter indicates that hedge fund managers 
have successful liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. To further validate 
the findings, we have carried out a range of robustness tests to verify if hedge funds’ 
liquidity timing skills still exist using these tests. In particular, our findings are shown 
to be robust to usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions, 
hedge funds trades on the commodity market liquidity, financial crisis, hedge fund 
data biases, commodity market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, 
systematic stale pricing and option factors. We have also undertaken bootstrap 
analysis to ensure the findings are not dependent on the normality assumption.  
      Chen (2007) finds weak evidence that the managers of managed future hedge 
funds, which focus on the commodity market, have market timing ability in the 
commodity market. According to Marshall, Cahan and Cahan (2008), managing 
commodity futures by applying quantitative market timing strategies cannot generate 
profits after controlling for data-snooping bias. The main contribution of this chapter 
is that we have investigated a new dimension, i.e. hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills in the commodity market. Based on our results, hedge fund managers 
show successful liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. Our investigation is 
helpful to understand the importance of commodity market liquidity to hedge funds 
portfolio management.  
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Chapter 8 
Evaluation of empirical results 
 
8.1 Empirical result summary 
      This thesis focuses on the investigation of whether hedge funds hedge fund 
managers have liquidity timing skills in different financial markets. Based on the 
results of three main empirical analysis chapters 5, 6 and 7, we find that hedge funds 
in certain categories show successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market, foreign exchange market and commodity market, respectively. Table 8.1 
summarizes those hedge funds with liquidity timing skills. According to Table 8.1, we 
find that hedge funds in the directional debt, long/short debt and long-only debt 
categories have the ability to time fixed income market liquidity. Hedge funds in the 
directional debt category focus on the price changes in fixed income products. In this 
case, fund managers generate investment portfolios by investing in a wide range of 
fixed income product. Hedge funds in the long/short debt category primarily take 
independent long and short positions in the global debt market and invest in debts and 
debt related investments. Long-only debt hedge funds adopt investment strategies, 
such as private debt, mezzanine financing, DIP financing, leverage debt strategies and 
high yield debt. Therefore, combining the market concentration, products used and 
investment strategies adopted, it would be expected that hedge funds in the directional 
debt, long/short debt and long-only debt categories have the ability to time the 
liquidity in the fixed income market. 
      Table 8.1 reports that hedge funds in the event, distressed securities, event-driven,  
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Table 8.1 
Summary of hedge funds’ liquidity timing skills in different financial markets. 
  
Fixed income market 
 
Foreign exchange market 
 
Commodity market 
 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
Long/short 
Debt 
*   
Long-only Debt 
 
*   
Event 
 
 * * 
Distressed 
Securities 
 * * 
Event-driven  * * 
Global 
Derivatives 
 *  
Currency  *  
Systematic 
Futures 
 *  
Relative Value  * * 
Debt Arbitrage  *  
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
  * 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
  * 
Note: Based on the empirical results in chapters 5, 6 and 7, this table summarizes those hedge funds 
that exhibit successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and 
commodity market, respectively. * indicates that the corresponding hedge funds have liquidity timing 
skills in the corresponding financial market. 
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global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative value and debt arbitrage 
categories have successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market. 
Event hedge funds generate profit by taking advantage of the price changes that are 
related to the event and protect hedge funds from the impact of broad market changes. 
It is inevitable that they will make transactions with different currencies, which 
involves currency risks. Distressed securities and event-driven categories are two 
subcategories of event hedge funds. The target companies of distressed securities 
hedge funds are normally illiquid. The issue of foreign exchange market liquidity 
matters to distressed securities hedge funds when target companies are located 
overseas. Hedge funds in the event-driven categories generate profit from price 
changes that are relevant to corporate events, which are related to the liquidity issue 
and international transactions to multinational companies. Hedge funds in the global 
derivatives category mainly invest in global markets by using various financial 
products, such as currencies. Currency hedge funds use short-term foreign exchange 
market instruments, derivatives and cash deposits to set up currency portfolios. 
Systematic futures hedge funds trade global options, futures and foreign exchange 
contracts. Relative value hedge funds’ portfolios adopt market neutral investment 
strategies, including hedging the influence of the changes in the foreign exchange 
market liquidity. Hedge funds in the debt arbitrage category look for global 
opportunities and handle risks in the foreign exchange market. Hence, it is expected 
that hedge funds mentioned above have liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange 
market. 
      Based on Table 8.1, we find that hedge funds in the event, distressed securities, 
event-driven, relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage categories 
have liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. Event, securities and event-
driven hedge funds adopt derivatives, like commodity futures, or short positions to 
reduce hedge fund portfolios’ market exposure for concentration on related corporate 
events. Relative value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage hedge funds 
could use commodity futures to be market neutral. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that hedge funds mentioned above have the ability to time the liquidity in the 
commodity market. 
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8.2 Effect of equity market 
      Hedge funds normally invest in different financial markets and equity market is 
one of the most important financial markets to hedge funds. They could adopt active 
trading strategies and show timing skills in the equity market. For example, Chen and 
Liang (2007) investigate whether hedge funds in the market timing category have the 
timing skills in the U.S. equity market. The results show that these hedge fund 
managers can time market return, time market volatility and jointly time market return 
and volatility at both aggregate level and individual fund level. Furthermore, hedge 
funds show better timing skills in the bear and volatile conditions of the equity market. 
Chen (2007) defines the focus market as the market in which a hedge fund has most 
active trading and finds that market timing hedge funds can time the U.S. equity 
market. Cao et al. (2013) find that hedge fund managers can time equity market 
liquidity by adjusting the equity market exposure of hedge funds’ portfolios based on 
the forecasts of changes in the equity market liquidity. The findings are robust to the 
data biases of hedge funds, alternative explanations and other risk factors, timing 
models and liquidity measures. 
      It is found that equity market is correlated with other financial markets. Chordia et 
al. (2005) investigate the liquidity dynamics across the equity and bond markets and 
find significant correlation between innovation to equity market liquidity and 
innovation to bond market liquidity. Golyenko and Ukhov (2009) find that there is a 
lead-lag liquidity linkage between equity and bond markets. According to Kaul and 
Stefanescu (2011), currency liquidity has strong relation with aggregate liquidity in 
the U.S. equity market. Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) find that foreign 
exchange market liquidity is likely to fall when the equity market liquidity is low. 
Buyuksahin and Robe (2014) examine the correlation between the returns on 
commodity futures and equity indices and find that the correlation increases when 
hedge funds participate in investing in both the commodity and equity market. 
      Considering the correlations between equity market and other financial markets 
and hedge funds’ liquidity timing skills, we conducts the following tests to investigate 
whether the liquidity timing skills found in empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7 can be 
attributed to hedge fund managers’ timing skills in the equity market. Table 8.2 
reports the correlations matrix for different liquidity measures in equity market, fixed  
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Table 8.2 
Correlation matrix for different liquidity measures. 
 Equity 10(Fixed) 7 (Fixed) 5 (Fixed) 10(FX) 10G(FX) 6(FX) Com 
 
Equity 1        
 
10(Fixed) 0.3827 1       
 
7(Fixed) 0.406 0.9882 1      
 
5(Fixed) 0.3463 0.9593 0.9299 1     
 
10(FX) 0.278 0.5975 0.5688 0.6209 1    
 
10G(FX) 0.2985 0.6148 0.5872 0.6345 0.9977 1   
 
6(FX) 0.0796 0.2814 0.2084 0.3834 0.8058 0.7933 1  
 
Com -0.058 0.0121 0.0642 -0.118 -0.0357 -0.031 -0.2327 1 
         
Note: This table summarizes the correlations for all the liquidity measures used in this thesis. Equity 
denotes the equity market liquidity measure from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 10(Fixed), 7(Fixed) 
and 5(Fixed) stand for three fixed income market liquidity measures used in Chapter 5, respectively. 
10(FX), 10G(FX) and 6(FX) denote three foreign exchange market liquidity measures used in Chapter 
6, respectively. Com indicates the commodity market liquidity measure used in Chapter 7.  
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Table 8.3 
Correlation matrix for different liquidity measures after the start of recent financial 
crisis. 
 Equity 10(Fixed) 7 (Fixed) 5 (Fixed) 10(FX) 10G(FX) 6(FX) Com 
 
Equity 1        
 
10(Fixed) 0.3775 1       
 
7(Fixed) 0.4089 0.9901 1      
 
5(Fixed) 0.3312 0.9793 0.968 1     
 
10(FX) 0.2625 0.582 0.5516 0.6468 1    
 
10G(FX) 0.2841 0.6005 0.571 0.6625 0.9978 1   
 
6(FX) -0.015 0.18 0.1185 0.2782 0.7947 0.7791 1  
 
Com 0.3144 0.4314 0.4621 0.3636 0.0843 0.1045 -0.2374 1 
         
Note: This table summarizes the correlations for all the liquidity measures used in this thesis. Equity 
denotes the equity market liquidity measure from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 10(Fixed), 7(Fixed) 
and 5(Fixed) stand for three fixed income market liquidity measures used in Chapter 5, respectively. 
10(FX), 10G(FX) and 6(FX) denote three foreign exchange market liquidity measures used in Chapter 
6, respectively. Com indicates the commodity market liquidity measure used in Chapter 7. The sample 
period covers from July 2007 to December 2012. 
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income market, foreign exchange market and commodity. The liquidity measures in 
the equity market follows Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s price impact measure. We 
are really grateful that Lubos Pastor shares that data of the equity market liquidity 
measure through the link: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/. The 
liquidity measures in other financial markets are those measures used in empirical 
chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Table 8.2 shows that liquidity measures in the same market share 
similar characteristics and are high correlated with each other. The commodity 
liquidity measure has really low value of correlations with other measures. The equity 
market liquidity measure is not highly related with other liquidity measures. Table 8.3 
gives the correlations matrix for different liquidity measures after the start of recent 
financial crisis. We find most of results in Table 8.3 are similar with those in Table 
8.2. The commodity liquidity measure has higher correlation values with liquidity 
measures in equity market and fixed income market after the start of recent financial 
crisis. From Tables 8.2 and 8.3, we find that the equity market liquidity measure is not 
highly related with liquidity measures in other financial markets.  
      To control for the effect of liquidity timing skills in the equity markets, we adjust 
equations (5.5), (6.1) and (7.1) to equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3), respectively. The 
adjusted equations are specified as:   
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1                                                                                                 (8.1)  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) +
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1                                                                                                 (8.2) 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑚) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1                                                                                             (8.3)  
where 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1 is the equity market factor in month 𝑡 + 1, 𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1 denotes the liquidity 
level in the equity market in month 𝑡 + 1, ?̅?𝑀 is the average equity market liquidity 
level, other specifications can be referred to the description of equations (5.5), (6.1) 
and (7.1). Therefore, the equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3) test liquidity timing skills in 
the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity market after  
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Table 8.4 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor in the fixed income market after controlling 
for liquidity timing skills in the equity market. 
  
LiquidityCORPBBB10-
15Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-
10Y 
 
LiquidityCORPBBB5-
10Y 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Directional 
Debt 
 
.5280664  
(3.27***) 
 
.4188625  
(3.41***) 
 
.3817794  
(2.86***) 
Long/short 
Debt 
.4652153  
(2.71***) 
.3695194  
(2.83***) 
.3347041  
(2.37**) 
Long-only Debt 
 
.7964131  
(4.10***) 
.6233728  
(4.21***) 
.6069518  
(3.78***) 
Note: This table summarizes the fixed income market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics 
for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly 
returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of 
monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the fixed income market liquidity 
timing model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵𝑀𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑏) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1 . The dependent 
variables include a bond market factor (𝐵𝑀𝐹 ), which is measured by the change in the constant 
maturity yield on the ten-year Treasury, and 𝑓𝑗  that include other six factors. These six factors include 
an equity market factor (𝑀𝐾𝑇), a size spread factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following 
factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝑏,𝑡+1 is the fixed income market liquidity measure in 
month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑏 is the mean level of fixed income market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures 
fixed income market liquidity timing ability. 𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1 is the equity market liquidity measure in month 
𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑀 is the mean level of equity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝜇 measures equity market 
liquidity timing ability. LiquidityCORPBBB10-15Y denotes that, in the regression, the fixed income 
market illiquidity is calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch United States Corporate BBB 10 - 15 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. 
LiquidityCORPBBB7-10Y means that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is 
calculated by the difference between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States 
Corporate BBB 7 - 10 Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. LiquidityCORPBBB5-10Y 
stands for that, in the regression, the fixed income market illiquidity is calculated by the difference 
between the excess yields of Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States Corporate BBB 5 - 10 
Years and the corresponding CDX credit spreads. To get liquidity measures in the fixed income market, 
the fixed income market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the 
parentheses. Significances of t-statistics at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
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Table 8.5 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor in the foreign exchange market after 
controlling for liquidity timing skills in the equity market. 
  
Liquidity(10) 
 
Liquidity(G10) 
 
Liquidity(6) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
6.786661  
(2.43**) 
 
6.437021  
(2.44**) 
 
6.843807  
(1.91*) 
Distressed 
Securities 
7.616766  
(2.26**) 
7.282753  
(2.29**) 
8.563578  
(1.99**) 
Event-driven 7.351153  
(2.32**) 
6.919654  
(2.31**) 
6.67121  
(1.64) 
Global 
Derivatives 
14.00992  
(2.88***) 
13.15217  
(2.86***) 
17.23225  
(2.77***) 
Currency 14.20041  
(3.59***) 
13.44739  
(3.60***) 
23.14245  
(4.72***) 
Systematic 
Futures 
20.53926  
(2.83***) 
19.18153  
(2.80***) 
24.69041  
(2.66***) 
Relative Value 3.941527  
(2.17**) 
3.808831  
(2.22**) 
5.416209  
(2.34**) 
Debt Arbitrage 3.993954  
(1.97**) 
3.97116  
(2.08**) 
6.887929  
(2.69***) 
Note: This table summarizes the foreign exchange market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-
statistics for these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 
monthly returns. We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean 
values of monthly returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the foreign exchange 
market liquidity timing model as:  
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑡+1(𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐹𝑋) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1. The dependent 
variables include a foreign exchange market factor (𝐹𝑋𝐹), which is measured by the change in the 
trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index, and 𝑓𝑗   that include seven factors in the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. These seven factors include an equity market factor (𝑀𝐾𝑇), a size 
spread factor, a bond market factor, a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, 
currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐹𝑋,𝑡+1 is the foreign exchange market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and ?̅?𝐹𝑋  is the mean level of foreign exchange market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures foreign 
exchange market liquidity timing ability. 𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1 is the equity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, 
and ?̅?𝑀 is the mean level of equity market liquidity. The coefficient 𝜇 measures equity market liquidity 
timing ability. Liquidity(10) denotes that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is 
calculated by bid-ask prices of ten currencies. Liquidity(G10) means that, in the regression, the foreign 
exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of G10 currencies. Liquidity(6) stands for 
that, in the regression, the foreign exchange market illiquidity is calculated by bid-ask prices of  six 
major currencies. To get liquidity measures in the foreign exchange market, the foreign exchange 
market illiquidity measures are multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 8.6 
Coefficients of the liquidity timing factor in the commodity market after controlling 
for liquidity timing skills in the equity market. 
  
Amihud(Total Return) 
 
Amihud(Spot) 
 
Amihud(Excess Return) 
 𝜆 𝜆 𝜆 
 
Event 
 
 
7.239062  
(2.01**) 
 
7.660212  
(2.02**) 
 
7.266988  
(2.01**) 
Distressed 
Securities  
10.48315  
(2.38**) 
11.47281  
(2.48**) 
10.53425  
(2.38**) 
Event-Driven 7.794745  
(1.85*) 
8.177432  
(1.84*) 
7.822534  
(1.85*) 
 
Relative Value 
 
 
5.527317  
(2.10**) 
 
5.934269  
(2.13**) 
 
5.552633  
(2.10**) 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
12.01947  
(2.87***) 
13.21528  
(3.02***) 
12.0792  
(2.87***) 
Diversified 
Arbitrage  
 
7.427791  
(2.06**) 
7.91246  
(2.09**) 
7.454898  
(2.05**) 
Note: This table summarizes the commodity market liquidity timing coefficients and the t-statistics for 
these liquidity timing coefficients. Each hedge fund in the same sample has at least 24 monthly returns. 
We measure each hedge fund category’ performance by using the arithmetic mean values of monthly 
returns’ of hedge funds in the same category. We estimate the commodity market liquidity timing 
model as: 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝑝𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡+1(𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑚) + 𝜇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡+1(𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1−?̅?𝑀) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐽
𝑗=1 +
𝜀𝑝,𝑡+1 , where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡+1  is the excess return on hedge fund category in month 𝑡 + 1 . The dependent 
variables include a commodity market factor (𝐶𝑂𝑀), which is measured by the month-end returns of 
S&P GSCI, and 𝑓𝑗  that include seven factors  in the Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s seven-factor model. 
These seven factors include an equity market factor (𝑀𝐾𝑇), a size spread factor, a bond market factor, 
a credit spread factor, and three trend-following factors for bonds, currency and commodities. 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 
is the commodity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝐶𝑂𝑀  is the mean level of commodity 
market liquidity. The coefficient 𝝀 measures commodity market liquidity timing ability. 𝐿𝑀,𝑡+1 is the 
equity market liquidity measure in month 𝑡 + 1, and ?̅?𝑀 is the mean level of equity market liquidity. 
The coefficient 𝜇  measures equity market liquidity timing ability. For robustness, we compute the 
commodity market factor by using three different S&P GSCI indices. Amihud(Total Return) denotes 
that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI Total Return index. 
Amihud(Spot) means that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is calculated by S&P GSCI 
Spot index. Amihud(Excess Return) stands for that, in the regression, the commodity market factor is 
calculated by S&P GSCI Excess Return index. The commodity market illiquidity is calculated by 
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. To get liquidity measure in the commodity market, the 
commodity market illiquidity measure is multiplied by minus one. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
Significances at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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controlling for the effect of liquidity timing skills in the equity market.  
      Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 report the coefficients of the liquidity timing factor for 
equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3), respectively. It is clear to find that all the coefficients 
of the liquidity timing factor in these three tables are statistically significant. Hence, 
after controlling for liquidity timing skills in the equity market, hedge fund managers 
still exhibit successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign 
exchange market and commodity market, which is consistent with previous findings.  
      In summary, we firstly summarize the empirical results in three chapters 5, 6 and 
7. Then, we investigate the impact of liquidity timing skills in the equity market on 
our findings in three empirical chapters. By showing the correlations between 
different liquidity measures and testing equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3), we conclude 
that our findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income 
market, foreign exchange market and commodity market are driven by the liquidity 
timing skills in the equity market.  
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Chapter 9 
Summary and conclusions 
 
9.1 Summary 
      In the thesis, we have investigated whether hedge fund managers have liquidity 
timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity 
market, respectively. To the best of my knowledge, this research has not been 
investigated in the literature. The research on this topic has important implications in 
practice. If hedge fund managers have liquidity timing skills, then they can 
strategically adjust hedge funds’ exposure to the target financial market based on 
managers’ forecasts about the future changes in liquidity in the financial market.  
      Cao et al. (2013) investigate liquidity timing ability in the equity market. This 
thesis focuses on the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity 
market. To measure hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills, we employ the 
liquidity timing model used by Cao et al. (2013) and make some necessary 
adjustments.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 contain the main findings of this thesis that have 
focused on the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity market, 
respectively, because hedge funds are actively managed in these three financial 
markets and liquidity levels in these markets are important to hedge funds’ 
professional portfolio management. Our investigation is helpful to understand the role 
and the importance of financial market liquidity in hedge fund portfolio management.  
      In Chapter 5, we have investigated whether hedge funds managers have liquidity 
timing skills in the fixed income market by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the 
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fixed income market based on managers’ forecasts on future fixed income market 
liquidity. We have found that hedge fund managers in the directional debt category 
have significantly successful liquidity timing skills. However, the managers of hedge 
funds in other categories do not exhibit liquidity timing skill in the fixed income 
market. Long/short debt and long-only debt are two sub-categories of the directional 
debt category. We also have found that long/short debt and long-only debt hedge 
funds can time fixed income market liquidity.  
      In Chapter 5, we have investigated some alternative interpretations for the 
robustness of our empirical results. We have examined whether the leverage and 
funding constraints could affect hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability in the 
fixed income market. Moreover, we have been concerned with the redemption 
restrictions to hedge fund investors, the size effects on market liquidity and the impact 
of financial crisis on managers’ liquidity timing ability. We have not found evidence 
that our findings of successful liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market are 
driven by the usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions 
and the impact of hedge fund trades. Furthermore, we have found that hedge fund 
managers efficiently use their liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market after 
the start of the recent financial crisis. 
      The data of hedge funds could have some biases because of the freedom of 
regulation to hedge funds and these data biases may affect the accuracy of empirical 
results. In Chapter 5, we have considered the impact of hedge fund data biases on the 
findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the fixed income market. 
We have investigated hedge fund liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market 
after controlling for different data biases, such as survivorship bias, backfill bias, 
selection bias, multi-period sampling bias, funding bias and liquidity bias. We 
conclude that our findings of managers’ liquidity timing skills are not driven by the 
above hedge fund data biases. 
      In Chapter 5, we have examined our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful 
liquidity timing skills with different robustness checks. We have used alternative 
liquidity timing models by controlling for fixed income market return and volatility 
timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors, respectively. 
We have found that hedge funds’ liquidity timing ability is not driven by the impacts 
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of market return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor and systematic stale pricing. 
A longer period of information about option factors is needed for future research on 
liquidity timing ability in the fixed income market. We have also undertaken 
bootstrap analysis to ensure the results are not dependent on the normality assumption. 
We have found that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills are not dependent on 
the normality assumption. 
      In Chapter 6, we have focused on the foreign exchange market and examined 
whether hedge fund managers have the liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange 
market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the foreign exchange market 
based on managers’ forecasts on the future foreign exchange market liquidity. Our 
findings show that managers of hedge funds in the event, distressed securities, event-
driven, global derivatives, currency, systematic futures, relative value and debt 
arbitrage categories have significantly successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign 
exchange market, where distressed securities and event-driven hedge funds are sub-
categories of event hedge funds; currency and systematic futures hedge funds are sub-
categories of global derivatives hedge funds; and debt arbitrage category is one of the 
relative value hedge funds’ sub-categories.  
      In Chapter 6, we have examined some alternative explanations for the robustness 
of our empirical results. We have investigated whether the leverage and funding 
constraints, redemption restrictions, impact of hedge funds’ size effects on foreign 
exchange market liquidity and the effect of financial crisis on managers’ liquidity 
timing ability could influence hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing ability. We have 
found some evidence that our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity 
timing ability in the foreign exchange market are not driven by the usage of leverage, 
funding constraints, investor redemption restrictions and the impact of hedge fund 
trades. More information about hedge funds’ redemption restrictions and size is 
needed for further research. Furthermore, we have found that hedge funds in different 
categories show diverse liquidity timing skills with the impact of the recent financial 
crisis. 
      We have also considered the impact of hedge fund data biases on the findings of 
hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market. We have 
found that our findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the foreign 
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exchange market are not driven by hedge fund data biases that include survivorship 
bias, backfill bias, selection bias, multi-period sampling bias, funding bias and 
liquidity bias. 
      In Chapter 6, we have investigated our findings of hedge fund managers’ 
successful liquidity timing ability in the foreign exchange market with several 
different robustness checks by controlling for foreign exchange market return and 
volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option factors, 
respectively. We have found evidence that hedge fund managers consistently show 
successful liquidity timing skills in the foreign exchange market during these 
robustness checks. We have also undertaken bootstrap analysis to ensure the results 
are not dependent on the normality assumption and found that hedge fund managers’ 
liquidity timing skills are not dependent on the normality assumption. 
      Chapter 7 is devoted to the commodity market and we have investigated whether 
hedge funds managers have liquidity timing skills in the commodity market by 
adjusting hedge funds’ exposure to the commodity market based on managers’ 
forecasts on future commodity market liquidity. Our empirical evidence shows that 
managers of hedge funds in the event, distressed securities, event-driven, relative 
value, convertible arbitrage and diversified arbitrage categories have successful 
liquidity timing skills in the commodity market. Note that distressed securities and 
event-driven categories are sub-categories of event hedge funds. Convertible arbitrage 
and diversified arbitrage categories are sub-categories of relative value hedge funds.  
      We consider some alternative interpretations for the robustness of our empirical 
results in Chapter 7. We have investigated the impacts of the usage of leverage, 
funding constraints, redemption restrictions to hedge fund investors, the size effects 
on commodity market liquidity and financial crisis on hedge fund managers’ liquidity 
timing skills in the commodity market. We have found some evidence that our 
findings that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in the commodity market 
are not driven by the usage of leverage, funding constraints, investor redemption 
restrictions and the impact of hedge funds’ trades. More information about hedge 
funds’ usage of leverage and size is required for further investigation. Furthermore, 
we have found that hedge funds show weak evidence of liquidity timing ability in the 
commodity market for some specific short periods.   
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      We have been concerned with the impact of hedge fund data biases on the 
findings of hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity timing ability in the commodity 
market. We have found that our findings of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
skills are not driven by survivorship bias, backfill bias, selection bias, multi-period 
sampling bias, funding bias and liquidity bias. 
      We have examined our findings of hedge fund managers’ successful liquidity 
timing skills in the commodity market with several different robustness checks in 
Chapter 7. We have not found evidence that hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
skills in the commodity market are driven by these impacts of commodity market 
return and volatility timing, liquidity risk factor, systematic stale pricing and option 
factors. By using bootstrap analysis, we have found that hedge fund managers’ 
liquidity timing skills are not dependent on the normality assumption. 
 
9.2 Future research 
      Potentially, the research undertaken in this thesis could be extended so that more 
insightful findings on liquidity timing ability can be gained. 
      First, in this thesis, due to the data availability and for ease of calculation, we have 
chosen only a few liquidity measures of the financial markets for analysis. Liquidity is 
a complex concept that can be measured in different ways. Different liquidity 
measures could have various interpretations, which could lead to different empirical 
results. Therefore, for robustness purposes, we propose that one future research area 
could be to compare the empirical results of hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing 
ability by employing different liquidity measures in the financial markets.  
      Next, our investigation examines hedge fund managers’ liquidity timing skills in a 
single financial market. However, we have found that some hedge funds show 
liquidity timing ability in more than one financial market. For example, according to 
our results, event, distressed securities, event-driven and relative value hedge funds 
have liquidity timing ability in both the foreign exchange and commodity markets. 
Therefore, we propose that investigation into hedge fund managers’ simultaneous 
liquidity timing skills in multiple financial markets could be a future research area.  
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      Finally, in this thesis, the sample of hedge funds is from Morningstar, Inc. Our 
sample has a wide range of hedge fund classifications and covers a decent size of 
hedge funds in different categories. Because different hedge fund databases could 
have various hedge fund selection standards, which can influence the empirical 
findings, further research could focus on or compare with the results of liquidity 
timing skills in the fixed income market, foreign exchange market and commodity 
market, respectively, by adopting other commonly-used hedge fund databases such as 
TASS, HFR, MSCI, CISDM and Eurekahedge. 
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